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Preface
“We are already hard put to establish a relationship between such an obvious effect
as a charred tree and the lightning bolt that set fire to it, so to trace sometimes endless
chains of causes and effects seems to me as foolish as trying to build a tower that
will touch the sky.”
William of Baskerville, The Name of the Rose by Umberto Eco.
This quote from the book “The Name of the Rose” by Umberto Eco highlights valu-
able insights in the analysis of causal inferences within the area of social sciences.
First, it underlines that analyses and methods for detecting causal relationships de-
pend on the individual perspective. Therefore, the researcher has to argue and de-
fine within his research what is meant by the term causality. The quote shows that
the lightning has an effect on the outcome, i.e. the integrity of the tree. If one ac-
tually can see the lightning strike there is no doubt what is the root cause and the
actual effect. In the field of social sciences the outcome of certain factors, politics, or
determinants are a priori unclear. Vice versa, if the outcome can be quantified, the
reasons for the development of the outcome are in most cases unknown or at least
disputable. If the researcher constructs a model to analyse the influence of one vari-
able on the other, e.g. the effect of lightning on the integrity of trees, the researcher
chooses and therefore pretends the channel which is the root cause in his framework.
This becomes even more challenging if one is interested in the effects for a popula-
tion or subgroup rather than a unique observation. Thus, a reliable model is based
on theoretical thoughts of how one variable affects the other. Second, the quote em-
phasises the simplicity of the explanation when arguing in a causal way. This also
applies one to one to research in social sciences.
This dissertation analyses various determinants of entry into retirement in Ger-
many using econometric methods. The first paper investigates how various ages of
entry into retirement affect the mortality using administrative data of the German
Pension Fund. The second paper takes a closer look at how the additional earning
ceiling (Hinzuverdienstgrenze) for early old-age pensioners influences the growth of
labour force participation and the amount of supplied labour. The source of this
vi
analysis is a merged data set of the German subsample of the Survey of Health, Age-
ing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and pensions in payments (Rentenbestand)
of the German Pension Fund. The third paper analyses the relationship of pension
income, age at retirement, and employment during retirement using data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Here, the focus lies on differences of retire-
ment age andpension income over time. In addition, the influence of pension income
in predicting the probability of employment during retirement has been analysed.
In all papers statistical methods are used to achieve empirical-based evidences in
non-experimental setups.
Throughout the process of writing and completing this dissertation I have re-
ceived a great deal of support. First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Dr.
Thusnelda Tivig, for her guidance and for giving me plenty of rope during my re-
search. In addition, I would like to thank my family and friends who supported me
in so many aspects that every explanation would be insufficient. Thank you so much.
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Summary
This thesis analyses topics related to the determination of entry into retirement in
Germany. The focus lies on administrative guidelines and how they interact with the
individual’s will to retire at a certainmoment in time. Due to demographic ageing of
the German population, adjustments had to be undertaken to guarantee the finan-
cial stability of the predominantly pay-as-you-go financed German Pension Fund.
This includes for example the increase of pension eligibility ages, the termination of
certain types of early old-age retirement, and a decrease of the replace rate (Renten-
niveau). By doing so, average age at entry into retirement is on average increasing
(Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund 2018). Moreover, the share of pensioners being
employed is increasing, too (Brenke 2011).
The first paper examines if different ages at entry into retirement affect mortal-
ity. Descriptive analyses of retirement age andmortality imply that there is a positive
relationship between both variables (Kühntopf and Tivig 2012). As overall health is
unequally distributed over the range of possible ages of entry into retirement, i.e.
individuals with a bad health status tend to retire at younger ages, correlation-based
analysis cannot be easily transferred to a causal inference. Therefore, the first paper
identifies potential differences of mortality which can be attributed to differences
in age of entry into retirement. If differences of mortality caused by variation of
retirement age are significant, evaluations concerning the financial stability of the
Pension Fund have to be re-evaluated irrespective of the direction of the effects. To
identify potential mortality differences associated with age of entry into retirement,
retirement age is instrumented via actual pension eligibility age. In addition, further
control variables are used to overcome non-randomness of the instrument. More-
over, the models include a dummy which captures the heterogeneity of mortality
over analysed birth cohorts. Using different sensitivity analyses, it shows that the
independent relationship of age at entry into retirement and mortality cannot be re-
jected. By reviewing related literature it can be found that differences to previous
results can mainly be attributed to heterogeneity with regard to the relationship of
mortality and age at retirement along different birth cohorts. The outcomes of the
analysis imply that there are no additional budgeting effects of an increase of legal
retirement age as suggested by previous authors.
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The second paper is based on an evaluation of an instrument to restrict the earn-
ings out of employment during retirement when individuals retire before the rel-
evant regular pension eligibility age. The additional earnings ceiling (Hinzuverdi-
enstgrenze) was introduced in the 1970s in combination with several early old-age
pension types to ensure that respective pensioners cannot profit from both, pension
income and earnings from continuing labour. As the share of workers to pension-
ers is declining (Borsch-Supan and Schnabel 1998), recent reforms try to increase
the share of employment of older people in Germany (Bundesgesetzblatt 2016). The
trade-off of not giving an incentive to several incomes versus the wish to increase the
fraction of older people working makes it interesting to analyse the influence of the
additional earnings ceiling on labour force participation. Focusing on early old-age
pensioners the analysis is based on an identification strategy by finding an adequate
control group for the determination of the influence of the additional earnings ceil-
ing. Results show that the additional earnings ceiling from1986 to 2013 does not have
a statistical significant effect on the growth of labour force participation in Germany.
Unfortunately, there is no suitable variable capturing the amount of supplied labour
during retirement within the proposed strategy of identification. By using differ-
ent measures of activity during retirement which can be interpreted as activities of
substitution of labour, one can indirectly control for the amount of labour supplied.
Results give some support that the additional earnings ceiling has a negative effect
on the amount of supplied labour. Results imply that the additional earnings ceiling
during retirement does not affect the range of the population of pensioners working
during retirement, but there is empirical indication that the size of supplied labour
is negatively affected by the additional earnings ceiling. Although recent reforms
ease the burden of supplying labour during retirement (Bundesgesetzblatt 2016), di-
vergent actions in the regulatory framework are still in effect.
Besides the increase of pension eligibility ages the termination of certain types of
early old-age pension lead to an overall increase of the average age at entry into re-
tirement in Germany. The third paper analyses the association of age at entry into re-
tirement and pension income over time while focusing on distributional differences
in the relationship of both variables. In addition, reasons for employment during re-
tirement are analysed to answer the question if working after entry into retirement
is based on preferences or is motivated by a low pension income. Moreover, an em-
pirical univariate overview of pension income, age at retirement, and employment
during retirement are presented in this paper. Within the period of analysis of 1995
until 2015 the distribution of total pension income becomes more unequal. Results
imply that the association of own pension income with age at retirement changed
fundamentally. In previous years age at retirement is not associated with pension
income. In contrast, it can be seen a statistical positive relationship in 2015. More-
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over, the magnitude of this positive effect is higher for lower parts of the distribution
of pension income and flattens out for upper parts. While this development can be
interpreted as an additional incentive of shifting entry into retirement to higher ages,
this result cannot be confirmed by using total pension income which also includes
pension income from non-own source, i.e. widow’s or widower’s pension as well as
orphan’s pension. As the inclusion of those pension income from non-own source
leads to amore equal distribution of pension income, the legislative authority faces a
classical trade-off. Regarding the influence of pension income on probability of em-
ployment, results imply that working after retirement is more a preference of will
rather than a necessity, at least on an aggregated level of analysis.
Using three different sources, covering administrative and surveydata, it is shown
that the regulatory framework of entering retirement has a large impact on the in-
dividual retirement behaviour. Moreover, the analysis points out that objectives
within the system of retirement can be revised on an administrative level due to
changing demographic structure of the population. This change can induce addi-
tional costs when previous guidelines counteract instruments which are used to im-
plement these newer objectives. This dissertation gives empirical evidence of this
multidimensional duality and quantifies additional costs.
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Chapter 1
Statistical Artefact or Mortality Risk
Factor? The Influence of Age at
Retirement on Mortality Using
German Pension Fund Data
1
Abstract
The paper analyses the effect of age of retirement onmortality for old-age pensioners
using administrative data of the German Pension Insurance. Reviewing related liter-
ature, it shows that problems of sample selection and omitted-variables bias (OVB)
influence previous results for Germany. To overcome these problems, the model ac-
counts for heterogeneity of birth cohorts while actual retirement age is instrumented
via age of pension eligibility. The results indicate that the independent relationship
of age of retirement on mortality cannot be rejected. They are robust over various
types of old-age pensions and further sensitivity checks.
JEL codes: I00, J14
2
1.1 Introduction
The entry into retirement constitutes an important cut in individual life, as it is com-
binedwith several economic and social changes. Although entry into retirement can
be the result of decreasing health (Quaade et al. 2002), it in itself might be a health
relevant factor (Bloemen, Hochguertel, and Zweerink 2013, Stolzenberg 2011 or Coe
and Zamarro 2011).
This paper analyses the effects of age at retirement on mortality using data from
the German statutory pension scheme. The determination of the effect is relevant for
different reasons. First, the pensioner must find a solution to the trade-off between
time in retirement and pension income, as they are are negatively correlated. If the
effect of age at retirement on time in retirement is disproportional, as previous stud-
ies from Germany imply, a solution to the trade-off is even more difficult to achieve.
Second, theGerman statutory pension scheme ismainly constructed as a pay-as-you-
go system with age limits for entering retirement. As age limits increase within the
statutory pension system1, time in retirement should decrease proportionally. But
if the choice of age at retirement in itself has an effect on mortality, considerations
regarding the financing of the pension fund have to be re-evaluated.
As there are confounding factors affecting the point of retirement, a strategy us-
ing different eligibility ages is established to identify the influence of age at retire-
ment on different ages of survival. By doing so, one circumvents the problem of
endogeneity due to omitted-variables bias (OVB).
The study is structured as follows. In section 1.2 literature dealing with the rela-
tionship of age at retirement andmortality is reviewed. Here, I will focus onGerman
studies and those studieswhich identify the actual effect of age at retirement onmor-
tality. Section 1.3 presents data. In this section, properties of the underlying data set
is presented and previous results for Germany are re-analysed while also giving an
overview of old-age retirement in Germany. Section 1.4 explains the strategy of iden-
tification and discusses the model and the estimation methods. In section 1.5 results
are presented. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The review reports findings of the relationship of age at retirement and mortality.
Results are separated into studies focusing on Germany and studies focusing on
other countries. Within this review, the focus lies on old-age pensions. Therefore,
1. The age limit for regular old-age pension increases gradually to 67 years (§§ 35, 235 SGB VI).
Other types of old-age pension are also affected by an increase of the age limit, for example §§ 236 II,
236a II, 236b II or 237 IV, 237a III SGB VI.
3
other retirement options and their influence on mortality will not be reviewed.2
Studies can be classified into two categories. The first category analyses the re-
lationship between age at retirement and mortality from a descriptive viewpoint. It
focuses on the question of howmortality differs between different ages of retirement.
The second category analyses the actual influence of age at retirement on mortality.
Therefore, the second category of papers deals with the question of how a poten-
tial change in age at retirement effects mortality. By doing so, studies construct a
strategy to identify the causal link of age at retirement on mortality. The step from
the first category to the second can be seen as a gradual development from a gen-
eral examination of the relationship of age at retirement and mortality to a causal
interpretation.
Table 1.1 reports key results of analysed studies. Furthermore, the overview
presents information about the data set, strategies and estimation methods.
Literature Review – Germany
Giesecke (2015) uses a data set of the German Pension Fund, registering the cessa-
tion of pension payment, which is equivalent to individuals’ death.3 The origin of the
data set is similar to the ones used in this study.4 Focusing on redistribution issues
Giesecke regresses time in retirement, a measure of the life expectancy after retire-
ment, on age at retirement. Based on descriptive and regression results, Giesecke
concludes that for “male individuals, the average remaining years to live increase in
age at retirement towards age 63”.
Kühntopf and Tivig (2012) also analyse data from the general German statutory
pension insurance. Separating by the age at retirement, Kühntopf and Tivig calculate
the probability of dying at the age of 72 for all old-age pensioners reaching the age
of 65. Therefore the authors use the life expectancy in the range of 7 years as a proxy
for mortality. The authors also control for health and income by using aggregated
proxies over the working live span. The authors find a positive correlation between
the life expectancy and age at retirement formen. Forwomen retiring after 60 years5,
Kühntopf and Tivig cannot find substantial differences with regard to mortality.
Brockmann, Müller, and Helmert (2009) analyse individuals’ mortality rate by
age at retirement for old-age pensioners and individuals with an invalidity pension.
2. For a comparison of mortality and life expectancy with regard to various retirement options, i.e.
individuals with old-age pensions versus individuals with invalidity pensions, see e.g. Rehfeld and
Scheitl (1986), (1991) or Kruse (2000).
3. Other reasons of cessation of pension payment as for example change of type of old-age pension
or changes of part-pensions is not included.
4. The data set used in this study utilises another population and includes additional information
regarding the type of old age pension and additional variables on amonthly basis. For further details,
see 1.3.
5. The earliest possibility receiving an old-age pension in the analysed cohorts is 60.
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The authors use data of a German health fund, Gmündner Ersatzkasse6. Since not all
individuals in their data died at the end of the study, Brockmann et al. use as depen-
dent variable the survival time after retirement to proxy for life expectancy. Here,
that can be the end of life or the studies’ end, respectively. To deal with the problem
of right-censoring of this kind of data the authors use a Cox proportional-hazards
estimation method, separately for men and women, to analyse the risk of mortality
for different ages of retirement. In their analysis, ages of retirement of old-age pen-
sioners are combined within a 5 year scale; 56-60 years and 61-65 years. Whereas
their descriptive results are similar to the analyses of Kühntopf and Tivig (2012), i.e.
higher mortality risks for early old-age male pensioners and lower mortality differ-
ences with regard to age at retirement for women, the results of the model estimated
via Cox proportional-hazards show no significant mortality differences between dif-
ferent retirement ages for men. For women on the other hand hazard ratios show
considerably lower mortality risks when retiring at earlier ages. Moreover, Brock-
mann et al. control for marital and socio-economic status and include calendar year
of retirement as well as age variables in their models. In an additional regression,
the authors also include the days in hospital two years prior to retirement. But since
old-age and disability pensions are not identifiable in this model no conclusions for
old-age pensioners can be obtained.
Rohwer (2003) analyses data, similar to Brockmann, Müller, and Helmert (2009),
from the German health fund Gmündner Ersatzkasse. The period of observation for
old-age pensioners covers 27 years form 1975 until 2001. In comparison to Brock-
mann et al. Rohwer analyses male old-age pensioners from the age of 59 until 66.
Rohwer uses survival functions of individuals’ age at death or age at studies’ end,
respectively. For old-age pensioners, the author finds a positive correlation between
life expectancy and age at retirement.
In summary, German studies analyse the relationship between retirement age
and mortality from a descriptive point of view. In most cases those studies find a
positive relationship between age at retirement andmortality for menwhereas there
is no clear tendency for women. Literature dealing with the influence of age at re-
tirement on mortality (second category) regarding Germany are rare. So far, stud-
ies about Germany did not take the characteristics of the German statutory pension
scheme into account, i.e. the individual requirements for entering into specific types
of old-age retirement. Moreover, only some studies factor in particularities within
the German pension scheme.7 Incorporating those particularities and accounting for
non-equal distribution of age at retirement across birth cohorts, studies concerning
6. Nowadays, the fund is called Barmer GEK.
7. An example might be the fact that pensioners with an invalidity pension automatically become
old-age pensioners at the age of 65.
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Germany are re-analysed in subsection 1.3 by using similar methods.
Literature Review – Other Countries
Hernaes et al. (2013) analyse administrative data from Norway. The authors use
exogenous variation of eligibility age and build their model around a Difference-
in-Differences (DiD) specification. By using DiD they can control for non-random
assignment of the eligibility status. This is an advantage to studies where the data
set does not offer the possibility to control before and after the introduction of early
retirement. Using a dummy as a dependent variable indicating whether the respec-
tive individual lives beyond a given age limit (up to age 77), Hernaes et al. do not
find any effects of age at retirement on life expectancy.
Kuhn, Wuellrich, and Zweimüller (2010) analyse the effect of early retirement on
mortality for blue collar workers in Austria. Eligible workers can withdraw from
employment up to 3.5 years earlier compared to non-eligible individuals. Eligibility
varies by region. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the indi-
vidual died by the age of 67. Kuhn, Wuellrich, and Zweimüller instrument the dif-
ference between the statutory and actual age at retirement by an eligibility dummy.
Results indicate that early retirement increases mortality significantly for men, but
does not have any effect on women. The size of the effect is large, implying that early
retirement increases the probability of dying by 13%. Further evidence of the rela-
tionship between age at retirement and mortality in other countries (first category)
are summarised in Table 1.1.
In summary, evidence from other countries regarding the correlation between
age at retirement and mortality differ by magnitude and direction. Studies using an
instrumental variables approach (IV) have a high internal, but low external validity.
The reason for low external validity are differences in the composition of the group
of compliers across data sets. Compliers8 are individuals whose treatment status
change due to the assignment to the instrument. So, different data sets and setups,
i.e. different retirement systems or different instruments, affect different groups of
complying individuals. Thus, results obtained via IV can vary across different stud-
ies. Therefore, previous empirical findings achieved by an instrumental variables
approach cannot easily be applied to Germany. The broad coverage of the statu-
tory pension scheme9 and its relevance as an important source of income during
retirement is an additional motive for analysing the influence of age at retirement on
mortality in Germany.
8. See Angrist and Pischke (2008) for details.
9. Scholz (2005) estimates that for 2003 on average 92% of men and 95% of women between the age
of 65 and 99 are covered by the German statutory pension scheme.
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Table 1.1: Age at Retirement Effects and Mortality – Overview of Empirical Results for Germany and Worldwide*
Author(s) / Title Data Set Strategy &Method Results
Germany
Giesecke (2015) • period: 2006-2008 (only death people) • OLS regression of duration • significant differences between different ages of retirement
Redistribution in a Pay-As-You-Go Pension System** • German statutory pension insurance of retirement till death for men and women on mortality
• 116,991 individuals (48% men)
Kühntopf and Tivig (2012) • period: 2002-2005 • period life tables • positive correlation of life expectancy and age at retirement for men
Early retirement and mortality in Germany • German statutory pension insurance • no differences for women
Brockmann, Müller, and Helmert (2009) • period: 1990-2004 • Cox proportional hazard model • no effect on life expectancy for men
Time to retire – Time to die?** • German health insurance fund (GEK) of survival time after retirement • lower mortality risk for early retired women
• 104,914 individuals (65% men)
Rohwer (2003) • period: 1975-2001 • period life tables • positive correlation of life expectancy and age at retirement for men
Rentenzugangsalter und Lebensdauer** • German health insurance fund (GEK) • survival functions
• 77,144 individuals (men only)
Other Countries
Hernaes et al. (2013) • period: 1992-2010 • IV and DiD using exogenous • no causal effect of age at retirement on mortality
Does retirement age impact mortality? • administrative registers of Statistics Norway variation in retirement eligibility using survival probability up to age 77
• 148,643 individuals (52,5% men)
Carlsson et al. (2012) • period: 1991-2008 • probability model (logit) • early retirement is associated with increased mortality
Late retirement is not associated** • Swedish population registries comparing mortality between 69 and 78 for men
• no effect for women
Kuhn, Wuellrich, and Zweimüller (2010) • period: 2006-2008 • IV using exogenous • early retirement increase mortality for men
Fatal Attraction?** • Austrian Social Security Database variation in retirement eligibility using survival probability to age 67
• 20,873 blue-collar workers (84% men) • no effect for women
Skirbekk et al. (2010) • period: 1970-2007 • Cox proportional hazard model • early retirement is associated with increased mortality
Retirement and mortality in Norway** • administrative registers of Statistics Norway using survival probability up to age of 70 for men and women
• 352,315 individuals
Bamia, Trichopoulou, and Trichopoulos (2008) • period: 1994-2006 • Cox proportional hazard model • lower mortality risk for individuals with higher age at retirement
Age at Retirement and Mortality** • EPIC study (Greek participants only) for men and women
• 16,827 individuals (53% men)
Other findings***
*Findings and characteristics rely on old-age pensioners only. Results for disability pensions are not further displayed. **For the sake of clarity, titles are abbreviated. The complete title can be
found in the bibliography. ***Litwin (2007) (±); Tsai et al. (2005) (+); Waldron (2002) (+); Baker et al. (1982) (+); Tyhurst, Salk, and Kennedy (1957) (±); where (+) means positive effect of higher age
at retirement on life expectancy, (−) negative effect of higher age at retirement on life expectancy and (±) no effect of age at retirement on life expectancy. Those methods are reported which are
predominantly important for the respective results. Obs. - observations. GEK - Gmündner Ersatzkasse. IV - Instrumental Variables. DiD - Differences-in-Differences. EPIC - European Prospective
Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition.
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1.3 Data
The chapter’s results are based on data from the research data centre of the German
Pension Insurance (FDZ-RV). Two independent data sources, pensions in payment
(Rentenbestand) and cessation of pension payment due to death (Rentenwegfall durch
Tod), are used to analyse the influence of age at retirement on mortality. The data set
is a pooled cross-section and covers observations from 2004 until 2012 in a two year
interval. In addition, data for 2013 is available and used, too. Therefore, the whole
data set covers a time span of 10 years. Individuals who receive two pensions are
recorded only once per year. Data of pensions in payment covers all pensioners who
are alive at least until November of the year under review. In comparison, the data
of cessation of pension payment enlists all deceased pensioners from January until
November of the given year.
As both data sets exhibit similar sets of variables the data sources can be easily
merged. From each of the six reporting years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2013)
a 10% random sample of the population of each reporting year was drawn and used
for analysis.10 The merged data set contains the year and month of birth, year and
month of entry into retirement, and year at death (for deceased pensioners). Using
the information available in the data, I construct the age at entry into retirement
and current age for living pensioners and age at death of deceased pensioners on
a monthly basis respectively. In addition to these variables the data set contains
demographic indicators like sex, citizenship11, number of children, and family status
indicating if the respective individual is re,-married or unwed. The data set also
includes variables which are connected to the calculation of the actual pension. It
includes: the type of old-age pension; the contribution periods (fully fledged); the
creditable periods due to illness and unemployment; the personal earnings points12;
whether the individual has pension entitlements from foreign countries; and if so,
how many years are accounted for in the data for the calculation of the pension.
Those individuals whose entry into retirement do not require a poor health sta-
tus were selected for the analysis. Therefore, I exclude individuals receiving an in-
validity pension and concentrate on old-age pensioners only. Thereby, I manually
exclude a large source of bias affecting the influence of age at retirement on mortal-
10. Due to reasons of data protection the analysis was executed via remote computing. Although I
have access to the complete population data, results are based on the restricted sample due to limit
of available server capacity.
11. The original data set contains foreign citizenship for different regions and countries in more
detail. Due to non-coverage of formerWest and newly formed German states a dichotomous variable
indicating German or foreign citizenship was constructed.
12. One earning point in a given year corresponds to the average pay. The respective annual pay
of an individual is divided through the average pay to determine the earnings points. The variable
psegpt contains the sum earning points adjusted for the access factor within pension calculation and
other determinants.
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ity, as invalidity pensioners retire at earlier ages and tend to have higher mortality
rates at lower ages. Nonetheless, since individual’s health is a relevant factor among
old-age pensioners, it can potentially affect the influence of different ages of retire-
ment on mortality. That means omitted-variables bias in the form of different health
outcomes at varying ages of retirement can still be relevant.
Due to the fact that invalidity pensions will be assigned to old-age pensions after
the respective individual turns 65 years, the samplewas further restricted to individ-
uals whose type of pension have not changed, i.e. start of current entry into retire-
ment is similar to the first beginning of retirement. This method identifies old-age
pensioners only, but has some drawbacks. Pensioners with former GDR pension,
whose pension is revalued after the German reunification, were mostly excluded
by construction. Moreover, recipients of part-pensions whose portion of pensions
change or pensioners whose first receipt of pension is missing are excluded, too.
As the data source contains information on the specific age at entry into retire-
ment and type of old-age pension, it was possible to calculate13 the actual age at
pension eligibility without deductions.14 After examination of the data some obser-
vations were excluded with regard to problems of plausibility. This refers to people
whose age at retirement is higher than their respective actual age or age at death. In
addition, observations were excluded when the age at pension eligibility is higher
than the actual age at retirement. The whole sample consists of 6,742,180 observa-
tions. A detailed overview of the data set can be found in the appendix on Table
1.13.
Sample Selection and Omitted-Variables Bias
As I use administrative data, one has to account for the non-experimental design of
the given data source when analysing the influence of age at retirement on mortal-
ity. This sectionwill focus on the properties of the data and their consequenceswhen
analysing the research question. Due to changes in the legal frameworks concerning
retirement across the analysed period (Deppe and Foerster, 2014) and the construc-
tion of the data set biases arise when analysing data without further adjustments.
Potential biases can be generalised into two categories. The first category, sample
selection, deals with the choice of individuals within the data set. With respect to the
data source of cessation of pension payment due to death, individuals were selected
by death during the period of observation. By construction, pensioners of earlier
birth cohorts die at older ages in comparison to pensioners of later birth cohorts
within the respective year under review. This can cause biases when individuals’
13. For the determination of age at pension eligibility I used the Federal LawGazettes (Bundesgesetz-
blätter).
14. This step is important when it comes to the identification strategy explained in section 1.4.
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age at retirement diverge over birth cohorts, as it the case for Germany, see Deppe
and Foerster (2014).
The second category is omitted-variables. Here, omitted-variables can be seen as
a divergence between experimental setup and observational data regarding poten-
tial comparisons when analysing individuals with different age at retirement. To be
precise, within an experiment, treatment and control group diverge in only one as-
pect; here that would be age at retirement. Within administrative data individuals
might also differ not only in age at retirement, but in determinants regarding health,
wealth or social background. If this is true, a simple comparison of mortality with
respect to retirement age would be misleading as those determinants are correlated
withmortality. Therefore, one has to clarify if a potential statistical effect is the result
of differences of characteristics of analysed groups or attributed to different age at
retirement.
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Notes: Average age at death by year of birth from 1910-1940. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTWF04-13; own calculations.
Figure 1.1 displays the distribution of the average age at death by year of birth.
Within the data set the trend of age at death is decreasing for later birth cohorts.
This is in contrast to average life expectancy where individuals tend to be older for
later birth cohorts. This result is based on the fact that the draw of the sample is
built upon the year of cessation of pension payment due to death. This is also true
10
for pensions in payment, the other data source. Therefore, individuals from earlier
birth cohorts are systematically older than individuals from later cohorts. Thus the
method of sampling does not allow for the equal probability of ageing between birth
cohorts.
Remark 1. Within sample data, early birth cohorts die on average at older ages than indi-
viduals from later birth cohorts. This is in contrast to normal age trends in Germany.
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Year of Birth
Women
Notes: Average age at entry into retirement by year of birth between 1910-1940. FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF12; own calcu-
lations.
If the distribution of age at retirement is identical over birth cohorts, a diverg-
ing age structure for birth cohorts does not per se have to be a source of bias. But,
Figure 1.2 shows that age at retirement for pensions is decreasing for later birth co-
horts. As Deppe and Foerster describe, there was a far-ranging introduction of early
retirement options within the German Pension Fund during the analysed time. This
introduction offered the possibility to retire at earlier ages for later birth cohorts15.
Remark 2. Within data, the trend of average age at retirement is decreasing for later birth
cohorts.
15. Nowadays, some of the early old-age retirement options are closed and pension eligibility age
has increased. This explains to some extent the rise of the graph at the end of the scale.
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Within data, individuals from earlier birth cohorts die systematically at older
ages and have, on average, a higher age at retirement; analogously, individuals of
later birth cohorts tend to retire at earlier ages and die on average at lower ages.
When estimating the effect of retirement age on mortality without further adjust-
ments there would be a systematic spurious relationship implying that higher ages
of retirement increase the age at death or lowers mortality. A priori, it is unclear if
the heterogeneity of mortality over birth cohorts with respect to age at retirement is
the result of sample selection or can be attributed to age at retirement.16 To face this
source of bias one has to account for systematic differences of age at retirement over
birth cohorts. This can be achieved by controlling the year of birth within the regres-
sion framework. Doing so, one can control for legal differences which can influence
entry into retirement.
Evenwhen controlling for birth year, omitted-variables can still bias the influence
of age at retirement on mortality. Here, one source of confounding the influence of
age at retirement on mortality is health. That means, that individuals with poor
health condition tend to retire at earlier ages. This is also known as the healthy-
worker-effect.17 Besides health, other determinants like economic or social factors
can be also potential unobserved components which influence the effect of age at
retirement on mortality within the same age cohort. Ideally, omitted-variables bias
is solved by finding a variable which extracts the part of age at retirement which is
unrelated to those unobserved components.18
In summary, sample selection and omitted-variables tend to affect the impact of
age at retirement on mortality within the given data set. Both biases go in the same
direction, i.e. implying that later retirement is associated with better health. Thus, a
convincing analysis identifying the influence of age at retirement onmortality should
account for both biases.
Analysis of Previous Results for Germany
In this section, literature dealing with the relationship of age at retirement and mor-
tality in Germany is analysed in detail. Similar methods used by the authors are
estimated with the given data set of the German Pension Fund. While reported
studies capture different retirement schemes, the focus in this article lies upon old-
age pensioners only. As section 1.3 implies, aggregating individuals over different
birth cohorts while distribution of age at retirement is not constant may lead to mis-
16. As different birth cohorts face different probability of ageing (due to construction of the data)
and distribution of age at retirement is not equal over birth cohorts (due to administrative changes)
the origin for the positive effect of higher age at retirement on mortality is unclear.
17. As individuals with invalidity pension are excluded one controls indirectly for health. Never-
theless, health differences may also arise between old-age pensioners.
18. The identification strategy to circumvent omitted-variables bias is presented in section 1.4.
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leading conclusions. With regard to omitted-variables bias, methods and data are
evaluated by the possibility of controlling for confounding variables. Since this pa-
per focuses on the influence of age at retirement on mortality, one has to control for
both types of biases. But, since previous studies deviate on the research question,
omitted-variables bias can be of minor importance in descriptive analysis of mor-
tality differences with regard to retirement age. In contrast, sample selection affects
results irrespectively of the underlying research question. As presented, studies in
Germany do not or only indirectly control for birth cohort heterogeneity. Therefore,
this section tests the sensitivity of the results presented in section 1.2 when birth
cohort heterogeneity is accounted for.
Giesecke (2015) identifies mortality differences by analysing time in retirement
across ages of retirement. Giesecke focuses solely on cessation of pension due to
death. Therefore it is possible to generate time in retirement.19 Using descriptive
analysis and regression models using cessation of pension payment between the
years 2006 and 2008 Giesecke concludes that men retiring at the age of 63 receive
pensions for longer periods than individuals retiring at lower ages. Giesecke uses
data, like this analysis, from the German Pension Fund. But using only deceased
pensioners when analysing mortality differences with regard to age at retirement is
misleading, since pensioners who are not dead may have a large impact on estima-
tion results. Imagine that a potential large fraction of pensioners retired before age
of 63 survived the period of observation of Giesecke’s analysis. This would imply
that the main result of the author, i.e. men retiring at the age of 63 receive pensions
for more periods than individuals retiring at lower ages is just the consequence of
sampling solely deceased pensioners. Therefore the choice of data by Giesecke is
problematic. Using only deceased pensioners creates sample selection which goes
beyond the selection effect of using pensioners of different birth cohorts at oncewith-
out controlling for birth cohort’s heterogeneity. ThewayGiesecke analysesmortality
by different ages of retirement is not reasonable as using only deceased pensioners
is only valid if there is no connection between age at retirement and mortality at all.
Interestingly, Giesecke controls in a second step of his analysis for birth cohorts
within regression analysis. By doing so, the remaining life expectancy is decreasing
with higher ages of retirement. Giesecke does not discuss sampling bias and assigns
the importance of birth cohorts to retirement rules and social security incentives.
Due to data problems, concerns dealing with redistribution in a pay-as-you-go
pension system, as Giesecke claims, cannot be affirmed. Therefore, the results were
not re-estimated.20
19. Whereas the time span of time in retirement for deceased pensioners is fully known, the actual
time span of pensioners alive is unknown.
20. Table 1.9 estimates the influence of age at retirement on mortality via OLS, similar to Giesecke,
but incorporates both, deceased pensioners and pensioners alive. Results show no clear tendency of
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Kühntopf and Tivig use period life tables separating by age at retirement and sex
to estimate the influence of retirement age on life expectancy at the age of 65. More-
over, within their descriptive analysis they control for creditable periods of disease
and separate their analysis of age at retirement and life expectancy by income quin-
tiles. By doing so, they control indirectly for health and income differences between
the groups of different ages of retirement. But, those proxies used for health and in-
come are in themselves determined by the entry in retirement. Therefore, selection
regarding health and income may still be present.21 Results of the study of Kühn-
topf and Tivig (2012) indicate that later retirement is associated with an increase in
remaining life expectancy for men. For women, Kühntopf and Tivig find no overall
differences with regards to life expectancy of old-age female pensioners. Kühntopf
and Tivig use data of pension stock and cessation of pension payment between 2003
and 2005. As there are no adjustments regarding birth cohort heterogeneity, the
sampling design of the data may bias the achieved results. From a technical side it
is not clear if invalidity pensions are to a minor extent part of the analysis of old-age
pensioners. This would explain the somewhat lower life expectancy of individuals
retiring at age 65 in comparison to individuals retiring at 63 or 64 in their article.
Figure 1.3 plots mortality differences by age at retirement while accounting for
birth cohorts heterogeneity. In comparison to remaining life expectancy as in the
analysis of Kühntopf and Tivig, I used a dummy variable which indicates whether
the respective individual survives the age of 75 or not. Birth cohorts are analysed
individually. By doing so, one circumvents the problem of non-equal distribution of
age at retirement and mortality differences over birth cohorts. The share of individ-
uals surviving the age of 75 is plotted for different ages of retirement from 60 to 68
for birth cohorts 1930, 1932, 1935 and 1937.22 Analysis is separated by sex.23 Due to
data properties probability of ageing is decreasing for later birth cohorts. Therefore
the share of individuals living past the age of 75 is decreasing for later birth cohorts,
too. Figure 1.3 highlights three points. First, differences in surviving the age of 75 by
different ages of retirement are small. Those differences are much smaller in com-
parison to the results of Kühntopf and Tivig.24 Second, there are no differences with
respect to the relationship between age at retirement and surviving the age of 75 be-
tween women andmen. And third, there is no clear tendency that higher retirement
age is associated with higher probability of surviving the age of 75. Differences of
mortality regarding age at retirement, implied by Kühntopf and Tivig, are not sen-
age at retirement affecting mortality. A discussion can be found in section 1.5.
21. If an individual delays retirement the period of aggregating pension income increases.
22. Retirement age is rounded to full integer.
23. Descriptive analysis shows that mortality is higher for men than for women. There are only
some divergences at the boundaries of analysed birth cohorts.
24. Resulst of Kühntopf and Tivig show differences up to several years between ages at retirement
between 60 and 65.
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Notes: Share of individuals surviving the age of 75 for different birth cohorts. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTWF04-13; own
calculations. Number of individuals (n): 𝑛1930 = 163, 450 ; 𝑛1932 = 180, 318; 𝑛1935 = 192, 934; 𝑛1937 = 141, 275.Results for individuals retiring after the age of 65 is based on few observations. This may explain their volatile process.
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sitive if one controls for birth cohorts individually. Therefore, results indicate that
sample selection bias is relevant when comparing age at retirement without control-
ling for birth cohort heterogeneity.
Brockmann et al. analyse mortality differences with regard to different ages at
retirement by estimating their model via Cox proportional-hazards. Time in retire-
ment is used as survival time. The death of the respective pensioner or the end of
study in case of surviving the period of analysismarks the end of survival. This strat-
egy is based on a control strategy similar to OLS, but offers the possibility to control
for the right-censored data. Brockmann et al. analyse data of individuals who re-
tired between 1990 and 2004. This means year of retirement does not vary as much
as in the data set analysed here. Therefore potential sample selection due to birth
cohort heterogeneity might be of minor relevance.25 Since Brockmann et al. use time
in retirement as dependent variable, individuals with earlier retirement entries have
by construction larger periods of time in retirement than groups with increasing re-
tirement age. Due to this fact26, conclusions regarding mortality risk differences are
misleading when hazard ratios diverge by construction.
Brockmann et al. find lower mortality risk for women retiring at lower ages and
no differences of mortality for men when using the Cox proportional-hazards esti-
mation method.27 Table 1.2 shows hazard ratios by using Cox proportional hazards
estimation strategy. The model controls for socio-cultural differences.
Table 1.2 presents four different models with respect to the dependent variable.
The dependent variables sum up the years since the age of 6528 until the ages of
70, 75, 80, and 85 for the respective individual. For pensioners not surviving the
respective age of the dependent variable, the difference between age at dead and
65 is computed. By using different ages of survival as a dependent variable, one
analyses potential differences of age at retirement on mortality over the life span.29
Hazard ratios for age at retirement are all near to one. Whereas the first twomod-
els indicate a statistically significant effect of age at retirement onmortality30, the last
twomodels showno statistically significant differences ofmortality for different ages
of retirement. Themagnitude of the hazard ratios is close to one, implying that there
25. Moreover Brockmann et al. control for year of retirement and therefore control indirectly for
birth cohorts.
26. Individuals with same age at death, but varying age at retirement differ in the survival time
after retirement.
27. In contrast, when using Kaplan-Meier estimates results of Brockmann et al. imply that later re-
tirement is associated with higher probability of survival. Brockmann et al. explain those differences
with the inclusion of control variables.
28. Only individuals are selected whose age at death is beyond the latest retirement age. Otherwise
there would be the chance of individuals dying before the last individual retires.
29. For a detailed overview of controls and estimation procedures, see section 1.4.
30. A hazard ratio of age at retirement significantly lower than one indicates that a higher retirement
age is associated with a lower mortality risk.
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Table 1.2: Cox Proportional-Hazards
Dependent Variable: duration from 65 to 70,75,80 and 85
Cox Proportional-Hazards
Duration until
70 75 80 85
retirement age 0.999 0.998 1.000 0.994
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007)
gbjavs 1.001 1.004 1.012 1.014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005)
family status
re-,married 0.997 0.991 0.979 0.980
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.023)
sex
female 0.994 0.982 0.964 0.951
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.025)
Number of children
1 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.981
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.029)
2 0.999 0.998 0.996 1.031
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.036)
3 0.999 0.999 1.001 0.997
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.038)
4 1.001 1.003 1.007 1.049
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.059)
5 or more 1.001 1.006 1.012 0.994
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.051)
citizenship
foreign 1.000 0.999 0.998 0.998
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.024)
foreign pension time
GDR 1.000 0.998 0.998 0.948
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.053)
other 1.000 0.999 1.006 0.979
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.033)
Observations 1,271,437 639,708 91,753 1,324
Notes: The model is estimated using robust standard errors. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Estimates are
rounded to three digits after the comma. The table reports hazard ratios. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF04-13; own
calculations. Analysis includes individuals who survived at least until the age of 65 and whose type of retirement is not
pension for invalids. Age at retirement is limited to ages equal or under 65 years. In addition, first type of retirement equals
current retirement status.
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is no economical relevant divergence of mortality for different ages of retirement for
all four models.31
Without using an identification strategy for the effect of age at retirement onmor-
tality, omitted-variables bias may be still present. By using a control strategy, like
Cox proportional-hazards, one cannot control with certainty for all unobserved com-
ponents influencing the effect of age at retirement on mortality. In comparison to
Brockmann et al., the inclusion of birth cohort as a control variable leads to a differ-
ent conclusion of the effect of age at retirement on mortality, at least for women. The
results for men are similar although the approach of Brockmann et al. are based on
non-equal hazard ratios by construction.
Rohwer uses survival graphs to display mortality differences with regard to age
at retirement. Since Rohwer uses a long time period for his analysis32, potential bias
as noted in section 1.3 may be relevant. The author finds that men retiring at later
ages die on average at higher ages. Thus, they have a lower mortality risk. Figure
1.4 shows the re-estimated survival functions at the most frequent entry ages into
retirement for birth cohort 1932.33
Results using Kaplan-Meier estimates are mixed. For some birth cohorts (Figure
1.8 and 1.9) descriptive analysis implies a positive relationship of age at retirement
and survival. For other birth cohorts (Figure 1.4, 1.10, and 1.11) the differences be-
tween the most frequent ages of retirement are low or even non-existent.34
After analysis of the four studies one can conclude that previous results for Ger-
many do not incorporate changes of the institutional settings of the pension system
in Germany and do not or only indirectly account for the difference of probability
of survival over birth cohorts. By controlling for birth cohorts, it shows that a large
fraction of mortality differences with respect to age at retirement can be accounted
for. Section 1.4 establishes an identification strategy to verify if remaining differ-
ences can be attributed to differences in age at retirement. As identification requires
specific knowledge over the legal framework of retirement options the next subsec-
tion summarises necessary information and gives a descriptive overview over types
of old-age retirement in Germany.
31. Due to large sample size, especially for the first two models, it is not surprising that estimation
results are statistically significant on common levels of significance.
32. Retirement entry from year 1975 until 2001.
33. Results for other birth cohorts can be found in the appendix.
34. Although, figures show that differences of age at retirement are more relevant for older birth
cohorts, this conclusion cannot be verified. This is due to sampling. That means that distribution
of birth cohorts with regard to mortality is not equal nor distribution of retirement age over birth
cohorts. Therefore general conclusions of birth cohort differences are misleading.
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Old-Age Retirement in Germany
Type of Old-Age Pension
In Germany, old-age pensioners can choose between different paths into retirement.
The eligibility age varies between the different types of old-age retirement. To take
advantage of early retirement, prerequisites have to be fulfilled. The following sec-
tion provides information on the various types of old-age pensions. This information
is only valid for the underlying data set as prerequisites with regard to pension eli-
gibility change over time.35
Individuals can enter regular old-age pension, with respect to the analysed birth
cohorts, at the age of 65 (§ 235 SGB VI, including previous versions). There is no
possibility of earlier entry. Therefore, this type of old-age pension exhibits the latest
pension eligibility age within the German Statutory Pension Insurance. Normally36,
the qualifying period is five years for applying for this type of pension. The qual-
ifying period37 can consist of contribution periods or credited substitute periods.
Since conditions are rather low compared to other pensions, a majority of individu-
als (44,70%pensionerswithin data of reporting year 2012) receive this type of old-age
pension.
Entry at retirement for longtime insured persons is normally38 possible at the
age of 63 (§ 236 SGB VI, including previous versions). Individuals have at least 35
years of qualifying periods. As the name of the pension suggests, people with a long
earnings history can apply for this type of pension. 8,41% of analysed individuals in
2012 apply for this type of pension.
Pension for women is generally possible at the age of 60 (§ 237a SGBVI, including
previous versions). As the name suggest for this type of pension only women can
apply. In addition, female pensioners need 10 years of compulsory contribution pe-
riods after the age of 40 and in total 15 years of qualifying periods. Thus, for this type
of pension women with persistent earnings histories can apply. 21.74% of old-age
pensioners in the data set of 2012 chose this type of old-age pension.
Individuals with pension due to unemployment or part-time work can enter re-
tirement at the age of 60 years earliest (§ 237 SGB VI, including previous versions).
One possibility is to be unemployed for 52 weeks in the last one and a half years
before retirement. Another possibility is to apply for part-time work for at least 24
months. In addition, both possibilities require 8 years of compulsory contribution
35. Some of the presented types are no longer available to potential pensioners with later birth co-
horts.
36. If the respective individual had a pension due to reduced earning capacity or a child-raising
pension qualifying period is seen as fulfilled.
37. Qualifying period indicates the required insurance period.
38. For a certain group of people entry into retirementwas possible at the age of 62. But, this pertains
only to a small fraction of people with protection of legitimate expectation.
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periods in the last 10 years and 15 years of qualifying periods. Since the law for ap-
plying for part-timeworkwas introduced in 1996, themajority of individuals should
use the first path via unemployment to enter retirement in the analysed sample.39
The share of this type of retirement is 14.95%.
The earliest eligibility age for individuals who enter retirement via a pension for
disabled persons is 60 years (§ 236a SGB VI, including previous versions). Individ-
uals have to fulfil 35 years of qualifying periods and have to be accepted as severely
disabled, unfit for work or invalid. Due to special health related requirements of
applying for this type of pension, individuals with pension for disabled persons are
mostly excluded from the analysis. They represent 10.21% of old-age pensioners in
2012 data.
Table 1.3: Distribution of Age Retirement by Type of Pension – 2012
Age at Retirement in %
60 61 62 63 64 65 66+
Total
♂ 24.22 6.79 6.18 17.02 4.82 38.89 2.08




Pension for longtime insured persons
♂ 71.52 19.23 9.16 0.09
♀ 67.87 17.02 14.97 0.24
Pension for women
♀ 70.83 9.95 7.89 5.93 3.18 2.20 0.02
Pension because of unemployment or
part-time work for employees over 55
♂ 54.46 15.02 14.19 10.89 3.74 1.71
♀ 80.88 6.90 5.12 3.32 1.71 2.07
Pension for disabled persons
♂ 51.27 14.88 12.48 15.93 4.28 1.16 0.00
♀ 59.65 13.26 9.28 12.84 3.58 1.38 0.00
Notes: Sample: 1,169,740 observations (45% men). Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF12; own calculations. Rounded off to
the second decimal place.
Table 1.3 shows the distribution of age at retirement by type of old-age pension.
The first two rows present the distribution of age at retirement for all old-age pen-
sions, separated for women (♀) and men (♂). The table presents only individuals
for whom first and current retirement is the same, that have no non-logical values,
and can be assigned to one type of old-age pension. Retirement age is rounded to
full year. The distribution for men is concentrated on three retirement years, 60, 63
and 65. Women retired primarily within the analysed period at the age of 60 and 65.
Those peaks are directly attributed to pension eligibility age, i.e. a large fraction of
39. There is no possibility to distinguish between the two types.
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people tend to retire when they are allowed to do so.40 More than 94% of regular old
age pensioners retired in the first year of being eligible. For individuals with pen-
sion for longtime insured, the majority retires at the age of 63. Noteworthy is that
the share of individuals retiring within the first year is smaller compared to regular
old-age pensions. This may be the result of eligibility age differences, which are up
to several years between both types of pension. Another explanation refers to im-
manent eligibility differences within the pension for longtime insured persons. This
means that some individuals fulfil prerequisites for entering into pension for long-
time insured persons at ages later than 63. A similar pattern of retiring is also valid
for pension for women and due to unemployment or part-time work. The pattern of
retirement age for individuals with pension for disabled persons is more equally dis-
tributed than for other types of old-age pension. This may be due to health-related
conditions which have to be fulfilled when the individual enters retirement.
Distributional Aspects of Retirement
Aspensions from theGermanPension Fund are predominantly financed by a pay-as-
you-go scheme, subgroup differences with regard to variation of time in retirement
have a redistributional relevance. Disproportional differences of mortality, caused
by different age at retirement, may have an unexpected influence of redistribution
within the pension fund.
Table 1.4: Distribution of Survival by Type of Old-Age Pension
Survival at Age
70 75 80 85
1942 1935 1937 1930 1932 1925 1927 1920
Regular old-age pension
♂ 0.983 0.996 0.955 0.992 0.920 0.984 0.830 0.979
♀ 0.989 0.998 0.974 0.996 0.949 0.989 0.897 0.978
Pension for longtime insured persons
♂ 0.986 0.997 0.964 0.992 0.923 - 0.822 -
♀ - 0.999 0.980 0.997 0.950 - 0.879 -
Pension for women
♀ 0.989 0.998 0.977 0.997 0.950 - 0.892
Pension because of unemployment or
part-time work for employees over 55
♂ 0.974 0.995 0.949 0.992 0.900 - 0.790 -
♀ 0.990 0.998 0.975 0.996 0.946 - - -
Pension for disabled persons
♂ 0.956 0.995 0.932 0.989 0.892 - 0.782 -
♀ 0.978 0.994 0.958 0.993 0.926 - - -
Notes: Sample: observations. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF04-13; own calculations. Rounded off to the third decimal
place. Items with - do not have enough observations.
40. For a detailed view of entry into retirement by eligibility age see Table 1.7.
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Table 1.4 lists the survival at different ages separated by type of old-age pension.41
For each age at survival two relevant birth cohorts are chosen. Table 1.4 shows that
the share of survival is decreasing by age at survival for all types of old-age pen-
sion. As already noted in section 1.3, due to sampling of the data source earlier birth
cohorts face lowermortality rate for each age at survival. Moreover, as commonly as-
sumed, women’s share of survival is higher for almost each category. Interestingly,
the share of survival differs in terms of type of old-age pension. For example male
longtime insured pensioners face higher survival at age of 80 than other types of old-
age pension. This is generally also true for other ages of survival. For women one
finds a similar pattern implying that female pensioners having a pension for women
or being longtime insured face higher rates of survival at different ages. This result
can be seen as a sign for subgroup heterogeneity of different types of old-age re-
tirement with regard to mortality. As types of old-age pension differ with respect
to distribution of age at retirement this subgroup heterogeneity may bias the influ-
ence of retirement age on mortality. This bias can be seen as the classical form of
omitted-variables bias.
Table 1.5: Retirement-Relevant Information – 2012
byvl psegpt auaz ajaz
retirement age
60 ♂ 37.81 46.84 1.56 6.67
♀ 32.01 30.07 1.18 7.96
61 ♂ 39.70 47.47 1.28 3.35
♀ 31.69 29.38 0.83 4.11
62 ♂ 40.60 49.16 1.21 3.00
♀ 31.30 29.59 0.80 3.92
63 ♂ 41.10 48.73 0.93 2.65
♀ 29.66 27.09 0.66 5.87
64 ♂ 40.77 49.45 0.95 2.81
♀ 30.40 28.62 0.69 4.35
65 ♂ 27.47 27.69 0.69 3.05
♀ 14.00 12.07 0.51 2.98
66+ ♂ 17.33 12.44 0.31 1.27
♀ 9.90 8.80 0.20 0.73
Notes: byvl – contribution period full-valued. psegpt – sum of personal earnings points. auaz – creditable periods due to
illness. ajaz – creditable periods due to unemployment. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF12; own calculations. Rounded
off to the second decimal place.
As prerequisites for applying to a specific type of old-age pension differ, Table
1.5 lists the contribution period (byvl) in years42, sum of personal earnings points43
(psegpt) and creditable periods due to illness (auaz) and due to unemployment (ajaz)
in months separated by age at retirement and sex.44 When analysing Table 1.5, dif-
41. If one multiplies the decimal value by 100, one will get the percentage of pensioners surviving
the respective age.
42. byvl covers the sum of contribution periods full valued including periods of reduced contribu-
tion.
43. psegpt is the sum of earning points reflecting the individual working life including allowances
and deductions and multiplied by the access factor in pension calculation.
44. As byvl, auaz and ajaz are top-coded from above the amount can be biased. The extent should
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ferences of the distribution of byvl with respect to age at retirement and sex are pre-
dominant. While for men the contribution period has a bell-shape, for women it is a
decreasing functionwith higher age at retirement. This result is also true for the sum
of personal income points. Values of auaz are mostly decreasing with age at retire-
ment for both sexes, but the time span of absence from work due to illness is larger
for men. In comparison, values of ajaz are higher for women up to age at retirement
of 65 (not included).
As presented, variables can be seen as proxies for duration of employment, in-
come, time of unemployment, and time of sick leave. Thus, they are potentially
health relevant factors in the long run. Therefore, differences of those proxies with
regard to age at retirement can confound the identification of age at retirement on
mortality.
Table 1.6 shows survival at age of 70 and 80 using proxies of individual years
of contribution and pension income. Individuals are separated if their individual
amount is below or above the median value. By doing so, distributional effects with
regard survival can be identified. As individuals’ insurance period varies, the ratio
of bothmeasures, psegpt/byvl, is constructed to highlight the influence of individual’s
income position.
Table 1.6: Share of Survival by byvl and psegpt – 2012
byvl psegpt psegpt/byvl
BelowMdn Above Mdn BelowMdn Above Mdn BelowMdn Above Mdn
survived 70 ♂ 0.994 0.995 0.993 0.997 0.992 0.996
♀ 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.998
survived 80 ♂ 0.817 0.834 0.875 0.888 0.818 0.833
♀ 0.939 0.864 0.962 0.916 0.921 0.882
Notes: Share of individuals surviving the respective age is displayed. Median - Mdn. Quantiles are computed for each sex;
old-age pensioners only. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF12; own calculations. Rounded off to the third decimal place.
Analysing the survival at age 70, differences between individuals belowand above
the median of the respective variables are low. This is especially true for women.
For men, survival rates are higher for individuals above the median of psegpt and
psegpt/byvl. This can be interpreted that higher relative income has a positive effect
on survival at age 70. Taking a look on survival at age of 80, differences between
individuals below and above the median are larger. Interestingly, survival rates are
higher for men above the median when comparing contribution periods while for
women contribution periods above the median lead to lower survival. For men rela-
tive income position has a positive effect on survival, while for women this effect is
be relatively small. For byvl values are top-coded if the respective individual have more than 48 years




This section shows that individuals’ mortality varies across types of old-age pen-
sion with different distribution of age at retirement. Moreover, variables which are
important for applying the specific type of old-age pension have an influence on sur-
vival at different ages. Therefore, an identification strategy is necessary to measure




This section focuses on retirement age and its influence on mortality. The decisions
to retire are varied and depend on personal constitution, institutional aspects, and
social and economical conditions. All parts of this multidimensional decision may
be relevant when someone is willing to retire and are weighted by individual im-
portance. Therefore, the point of retirement, i.e. age at retirement, is the result of an
individual’s own decision. Regarding the influence of age at retirement onmortality,
the age at retirement covers the point in timewhere life-changing habits occur. Those
changes may concern activities, socialisation, status, time budget etc. In summary,
by comparing different ages of retirement, one identifies the influence of a shift of
age at retirement on mortality. Although one controls for heterogeneity of birth co-
horts, one is confronted with omitted-variables bias when using non-experimental
data. The problem is illustrated in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5 visualises the difficulty of identifying the actual influence of retirement
age. As one is interested in finding the influence of age at retirement on mortal-
ity, highlighted by the arrow from retirement age to mortality, one is confronted with
omitted variables. Those omitted variables are the result of the non-experimental data
source. That means, individuals differ by more than just age at retirement when
analysing mortality differences. One can think of overall health, as individuals with
better health may tend to retire later and face lower mortality risk.46 Another source
of omitted variables may be income, as income affects both the point of retirement
and mortality. Therefore, omitted variables affect age at retirement as well as mor-
tality. This is illustrated by the two arrows going to retirement age and mortality,
45. As results are based on individual analyses, household datawould offer a better view on income
during retirement. Moreover, pension income from the German Pension Fund is just one possible
source of income during retirement.
46. Analogously, if early retired individuals show systematically poor health outcomes, which is
not the result of the difference between the age at retirement, estimated results would be a proxy for
health-related components and would not display the influence of age at retirement on mortality in
itself.
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respectively. It is important to note that only those variables are relevant which affect
both variables, retirement age and mortality.
Figure 1.5: Graphical Illustration of the Empirical Model
Omitted Variables




Notes: Pension eligibility is not related to the unobserved component and affects mortality only through the treatment
variable, i.e. age at retirement.
In a perfect experiment, avoiding omitted-variables bias, one would assign indi-
viduals randomly to retire at different ages and compare their survival after several
years. If individuals are willing to follow this assignment concordantly, potential
differences with respect to mortality are only the result of different ages of retire-
ment. Since both, treatment and control group, exhibit similar properties, i.e. do
not differ in health or other important variables47, identification of the influence of
age at retirement on mortality is possible. Unfortunately, there is no randomisation
within ages of retirement per se. Therefore, omitted variables are always a source of
bias and may influence the results. To overcome this bias, one can use the second-
best alternative and establish a quasi-experiment design by using different pension
eligibility ages to instrument the actual age at retirement.
For a valid instrumental variables (IV) approach necessary assumptions have to
be fulfilled. Here, the age at retirement should be sufficiently correlatedwith pension
eligibility age, also called existence of a first-stage. Analysing Table 1.7, one can see
that a major part of individuals retire when they are institutionally able to do so.48
In addition, Figure 1.6 shows that average age at retirement is decreasing along with
the introduction of early retirement options.
Secondly, the instrumentworks only through the channel of the endogenous vari-
able, i.e. age of retirement. Thismeans that pension eligibility age has no direct effect
on mortality, but indirectly through retirement age. This assumption is known as
47. Confounding variables would otherwise bias our results, i.e. overestimate or underestimate the
actual influence.
48. In addition, the older the individuals the higher the fraction of entry into retirement at date of
eligibility.
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Notes: Average age at entry into retirement by year of birth between 1910-1940. FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF12; own calcu-
lations.
the exclusion restriction and not testable by construction. The possibilities to retire
at earlier ages for old-age pensioners introduced in Germany during the 1950s until
1970s were mainly the result of labour market considerations to provide an incentive
for the demand for labour of younger individuals. With regard to the requirements
of early old-age pensions, the possibility to retire is mainly the result of contribution
periods within the retirement system. Therefore, access to pension eligibility does
not favour potential pensioners with poor health. Moreover, being eligible does not
affect mortality. It can only affect mortality if the individual decides to retire.
The idea of an instrument within the setup of age at retirement and mortality is
simple. If pension eligibility is randomly assigned, one identifies those individuals
who change treatment status because of the assignment of earlier or later pension
eligibility. This means one shows the effect on those individuals who retire at a dif-
ferent age due to individual pension eligibility status. In Figure 1.5, it is visible that
pension eligibility works only through age at retirement and has no direct effect on
mortality. If this is true, no omitted variables affect the assignment of pension eligi-
bility. Within the ideal standard, there are no arrows from omitted variables to the
instrument, i.e. age at pension eligibility. Therefore, the effect of age at retirement
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Table 1.7: Retirement Entry in Percent by Age at Eligibility – 2012
Age at Retirement
60 61 62 63 64 65 66+
Eligibility
60 77.56 9.33 7.11 4.00 1.46 0.53 0.01
63 79.25 15.19 5.51 0.05
65 94.21 5.79
Notes: 𝑛 = 773, 006, without pension for disabled persons. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF12; own calculations. Year of
pension eligibility within chosen type of old-age pension, no earlier retirement entry with deductions possible.
on mortality is identified by instrumenting age at retirement via pension eligibility.
Thus, one overcomes omitted variables by using shifts of the age at retirement which
are not the result of a change in habits or needs of the affected individual, but rather
an exogenous event like age at pension eligibility.
The administrative data has the advantage of detailed information concerning the
time and age at which the respective individual enters retirement. In combination
with the type of pension, one can use the heterogeneity of eligibility into retirement
to construct a quasi-experiment. For that reason, eligibility ages are constructed us-
ing information provided in the data set in combination with Federal Law Gazettes.
The critical assumption of a comparison of treatment and control group is the as-
signment into one of those two groups. If the assignment is randomly chosen, this
method would be valid to measure the actual effect of age at retirement on mor-
tality. Although pension eligibility is not random per se, one can identify the true
effect if one controls for those factors that influence the assignment into the respec-
tive eligibility status. Formally, this would imply that 𝑢 ⟂ retirement age|𝑋2, where𝑋2 describes those variables influencing the assignment into eligibility status. This
is known as the independence assumption. Individuals’ eligibility status depends
mainly on age at birth and type of old-age pension. The type of old-age pension de-
pends on personal properties like sex and different aspects of employment history
for which proxies are available in the data; see section 1.3 for details.
The potential drawback is that those variables affecting the pension eligibility
status, i.e. contribution periods’ full value or proxies for health and employment
might also be outcome variables of the endogenous age at retirement. If this is true,
using those variables can generate a bad control problem; for details see Angrist
and Pischke (2008). Therefore, one is confronted with the trade-off to include vari-
ables for the sake of randomness while the actual inclusion can result in a different
form of bias. Sensitivity of results concerning this problem is analysed in section
1.5. Moreover, the pension eligibility age of an individual represents the earliest
entry into retirement within the chosen type of retirement. Technically, an earlier
entry would be possible if the individual was able to choose another old-age type of
retirement. But, this seems implausible since age limits between different types of
old-age pensions are relatively high within the analysed period. Another concern is
28
that individuals with poor health are earlier eligible to entering pension than health-
ier individuals. Since the focus lies on old-age pensions, invalidity pensions are not
included. In addition, individuals with pensions for disabled persons are not in-
cluded in the regression analysis either. Therefore, one can, to some extent, control
for anticipatory behaviour. Furthermore, as already noted, laws of early old-age re-
tirement options in Germany focus on participation, i.e. contribution periods rather
than health issues.
As a result, identification is based on two means. First, one accounts for poten-
tially omitted variables by using eligibility age as an instrument for actual retirement.
Using retirement-relevant variables which determine the assignment into respective
types of old-age retirement one controls for subgroup heterogeneity over different
types of old-age pension. Second, the approach controls for birth cohort differences
to account for the sample design of the underlying data set and changing ages of
retirement over the analysed period. If assumptions are fulfilled, this strategy iden-
tifies potential differences of mortality which can be attributed to different ages of
retirement.
Model & Estimation
To highlight potential differences over the life span after retirement, four different
dummies of ages of survival (70, 75, 80 and 85) are regressed separately on age at
retirement and other variables indicated by 𝑋. As each variable on the left-hand
side is a dummy, a linear probability model is estimated.
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛾 RetirementAge+𝑋′𝛽 + 𝑢 (1.1)
Baseline estimation is done via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) using robust stan-
dard errors. Control variables consist of a constant and socio-demographic vari-
ables like family status, sex, number of children, citizenship, and foreign pension
time.49 To account for birth cohort heterogeneity with respect to age at retirement
and survival, the model controls for the respective year of birth of the pensioner.
49. Family status controls whether the pensioner is re,-married or unwed during pension claim.
Sex is a dummy variable indicating whether the pensioner is female or male. Number of children is a
ordinal variable indicatingwhether the pensioner has zero, one, two, three, four, or fivemore children.
The identification on number of children depends on two conditions. First, only children before 1st
of January 1992 are recorded and second, only those children are recorded for whom the pensioner
received benefits or periods of child raising within the pension insurance system. Citizenship is a
dummy variable highlighting whether the pensioner has a German or different citizenship. Foreign
pension time is a categorical variable indicatingwhether the pensioner has foreign pension time from
the German Democratic Republic (GDR), other countries (other) or none (baseline category in the
regression framework).
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While sex is an important determinant for longtime health differences the influence
of other variables, except for birth year50, is a priori unclear. The OLS estimator
is ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(RetirementAge, 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑉𝑎𝑟(RetirementAge) . While zero conditional mean assumption re-mains critical, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(RetirementAge, 𝑢) = 0, identification of 𝛾, the coefficient of age at
retirement, is done via instrumental variable approach using pension eligibility age
to instrument actual retirement age. Estimation is executed via Two-Stages-Least-
Squares (2SLS) using robust standard errors.51 Since types of old-age retirement
differ by requirements of eligibility vector 𝑋2, a subset vector of 𝑋, includes prox-
ies of prerequisites of eligibility status. To be precise, vector 𝑋2 includes the con-
tribution periods full-valued, personal income points and creditable periods due
to illness and unemployment.52 In addition, exogenous covariates include socio-
demographic variables, too. The 2SLS estimator has the following form, ?̂?2𝑆𝐿𝑆 =𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒, PensionEligibilityAge)𝐶𝑜𝑣(RetirementAge, PensionEligibilityAge) .53As the data set is a pooled cross section of six years between 2004 and 2013 in-
dividuals can potentially occur in the regression framework several times. Unfor-
tunately, the personal identifier of pensioners is not fix over the years. Therefore
sample size of regression outputs display the number of observations, since the ac-
tual number of individuals is unknown by construction.
The analysis focuses on specific birth cohorts. The selection of birth cohorts for
the regression analysis is based on the idea that each chosen birth cohort faces a non-
zero probability of surviving or not surviving the respective age of the dependent
variable. Table 1.8 lists the relevant birth years for each age at survival.
Taking individuals surviving age 75 as an example: pensioners in the birth cohort
1930 include on the one hand individuals dying before the age of 75, i.e. dying at 74
years at reporting year 2004, and on the other hand this method includes pensioners
surviving the age of 75 of subsequent reporting years 2006 until 2013, i.e. pensioners
being alive and older than 75 and pensioners dying at ages before the age of 75. By
50. Due to construction of data, see section 1.3, birth year has an negative effect on survival.
51. As type of old-age pension is chosen by the individual standard errors are not clustered by type
of old-age pension.
52. Available proxies could be unsatisfactory controls. Take for example the variable auaz, which
contains the creditable periods due to illness or rehabilitation in the social security system. One can
think of a proxy for health, but one has to keep in mind that requirements of those creditable periods
change over time. Moreover, the variable is censored from above and is directly connected to the age
at retirement. In this context that means, the longer you work, the longer you are eligible for such
periods. This could mean that auaz can be in itself an outcome variable of age at retirement. This
may cause problems when using such variables as control variables, e.g. a bad control problem. This
problem is addressed in the sensitivity section. In summary, auaz may be an indicator for health,
but does not cover all the aspects of health-influencing factors affecting the relationship of age at
retirement on health.
53. Multiplying the expression by the empirical variance of the instrument, the ratio of the 2SLS
estimator is the ratio of regression coefficients of the reduced form (regression of survived age on
the instrument and controls) and first-stage regression of age at retirement on pension eligibility age,
RetirementAge = 𝛽1PensionEligibilityAge+𝑋′𝛽2 + 𝑢1.
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Table 1.8: Survival and Relevant Birth Cohorts
Dependent Variable Relevant Birth Cohorts
survived age of 70 1935-1942
survived age of 75 1930-1937
survived age of 80 1925-1932
survived age of 85 1920-1927
Notes: The choice of birth cohorts depends on the assumption of non-zero probability of surviving or not-surviving the
respective age for given reporting years 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2013.
construction, later birth cohorts face lower a probability of survival.5455
The model analyses potential differences of age at retirement on mortality. If 𝛾
is significantly different from zero, it implies that a shift in the age at retirement has
a mortality-relevant influence (positive or negative). In fact, one tests if 𝛾 = 0 and
draws conclusions on mortality at different ages of survival.56
Due to the construction of the model and the fact that highest pension eligibility
within the data is at the age of 65, only those individuals were analysed in the regres-
sion framework who survived at least the age of 65 years. The analysis recognises
old-age pensioners only. Thus, individuals with invalidity pensions or pensions for
disabled persons are excluded from the analysis. Moreover, analysed individuals
have no possibility of earlier access to retirement with deductions.
1.5 Results
The following section presents and discusses the results of the estimation strategies
of model 1.1. At first, results were presented for OLS and 2SLS using all types of
old-age retirement at once. For 2SLS, regression results are shownwith and without
proxies for prerequisites of eligibility. Within sensitivity analysis, different types of
early old-age retirement are analysed individually by comparing them to pension-
ers with regular old-age pension. Afterwards, pensions due to unemployment or
part-time work are excluded and regression results are also separated by sex. More-
over, nearest neighbour matching is used to overcome the trade-off of using proxies
of prerequisites to fulfil the assumption of randomness of the instrument and the
potential emerging bad control problem.
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Table 1.9: Overall Baseline Regression Results – OLS
Dependent variables: survived the age of 70, 75, 80 and 85
OLS
survived 70 survived 75 survived 80 survived 85
retirement age 0.007 0.019 -0.016 0.333
(0.003) (0.007) (0.035) (0.579)
Socio-Demographic Variables
birth year -0.145 -0.428 -0.881 -1.401
(0.003) (0.006) (0.023) (0.118)
family status
re-,married 0.353 0.724 1.197 0.572
(0.016) (0.034) (0.095) (0.560)
sex
female 0.460 1.219 2.621 6.102
(0.021) (0.043) (0.122) (0.720)
number of children
1 0.087 0.143 0.060 1.175
(0.023) (0.049) (0.142) (0.765)
2 0.142 0.235 0.600 0.854
(0.022) (0.045) (0.131) (0.769)
3 0.076 0.161 0.400 1.603
(0.024) (0.049) (0.145) (0.907)
4 -0.015 -0.077 -0.039 1.672
(0.032) (0.062) (0.179) (1.127)
5 or more -0.202 -0.535 -0.582 -0.599
(0.040) (0.072) (0.197) (1.436)
citizenship
foreign 0.099 0.221 0.619 3.070
(0.023) (0.047) (0.131) (0.633)
foreign pension time
GDR 0.041 0.206 0.549 -3.574
(0.046) (0.079) (0.266) (2.280)
other 0.028 0.090 -0.275 -1.667
(0.032) (0.066) (0.193) (1.197)
constant 379.722 923.935 1794.641 2761.104
(5.754) (12.276) (45.542) (229.860)𝛾 = 0 0.014 0.004 0.637 0.565𝑅2 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.022
Observations 1,961,510 1,151,175 320,073 16,652
Notes: All point estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Therefore, reported results show the magnitude of
the effect in percentage points. The model is estimated using robust standard errors. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. The row 𝛾 = 0 reports the p-value of testing if the coefficient of age at retirement is equal to 0. Relevant birth
cohorts, see Table 1.8. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF04-13; own calculations. Rounded off to the third decimal place.
Analysis includes individuals who survived at least the age of 65 and whose type of retirement is not pension for invalids.
Retirement age is limited to ages 65 and under. In addition, first type of retirement equals current retirement status.
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OLS
When comparing coefficients of retirement age over different ages of survival one has
to keep inmind that subsets of relevant individuals differ because of the choice of rel-
evant birth cohorts. Due to the construction of the underlying data set, comparisons
correspond only for respective years under report and cannot be easily transferred to
universally valid conclusions. In general, magnitude of estimates of age at retirement
on mortality are rather low. In contrast to previous results from Germany57 the in-
fluence of age at retirement onmortality is non-existent for higher ages of survival.58
Although estimates of age at retirement are significantly positive using survival at
age 70 and 75, implying that individuals with higher age at retirement face lower
mortality risk, the actual size of the effect is negligible. For example, looking at the
effect of age at retirement on survival at age of 75, reveals that for pensioners retir-
ing one year later the mortality risk decreases between 0.062 and 0.0330 percentage
points within 95% confidence interval (point estimate of 0.007). The effect using age
at retirement on survival at age 70 is even lower. The effect of age at retirement on
mortality using measures of survival at age of 80 and 85 are not significant at all, im-
plying that there is no sufficient statistical evidence that different age at retirement
affects mortality at higher ages. As heterogeneity increases with ages beyond the re-
tirement age standard errors increase, too. But, the increase in standard errors with
higher survival can be also attributed to decreasing number of observations when
using survival dummies for higher ages.
Analysing other coefficients of the model using OLS shows that the coefficient
of birth year has the expected negative and significant sign. This can be attributed
to the construction of the underlying data set. The actual influence of birth year is
increasing using higher ages of survival. One reason for this result may be the dif-
ferent frequencies of relevant birth cohorts for each regression.59 An overview for
the frequencies of birth years for each reporting year can be found in the appendix,
see Figure 1.7. The effect of being married or remarried during entry into retirement
lowers mortality risk significantly for the first three models. Although the effect of
being re,-married using survival at age of 85 has a positive sign, it is not significant.
54. Doing analysis for reporting years separately offers the possibility to identify the actual number
of individuals. However, there is no heterogeneity of survival for each birth year. Therefore, the
following analysis is based on a pooled cross section.
55. Regression results for each relevant birth year separately are available upon request.
56. Due to test construction it is statistically not possible to conclude that 𝛾 is automatically zero. It
is just possible not to reject the null hypothesis of 𝛾 = 0.
57. Previous results did not take into account birth cohort heterogeneity with respect to age at re-
tirement. For details see section 1.3.
58. For an actual comparison of the relative magnitude of the coefficients, one has to use standard-
ised coefficients. As the cited literature does not provide this information an actual comparison of
the magnitude of the coefficients on survival is difficult.
59. See Table 1.8 for the relevant birth cohorts.
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Since the variable indicates whether the respective individual is married during en-
try into retirement the probability of a change of the family status due to death or
divorce of the husband or wife is increasing when using higher ages of survival.
This may explain the increasing standard errors for family status. In general, there
is some support that being married has a protective mechanismwith respect to mor-
tality. Women face higher survival rate at any analysed age. The magnitude of the
effect is increasing with age at survival. The effect of having children on mortal-
ity using survival at age of 70 until the age of 80 has a bell shape. That means that
having up to three children lowers mortality; the maximum of the effect is at two
children. The magnitude of the effect of having children becomes negative when
having more children, but differences with respect to the baseline category on hav-
ing no children is significant only for 5 and more children. When using survival at
age of 85 as dependent variable there are no significant differences at all. Foreign
citizenship is a mortality decreasing factor. As migration is a selective process, i.e.
those who migrate are on average healthy, this subsample of the population exhibits
higher survival probability in comparison to individuals with German citizenship.
The effect is increasing with age at survival and always significant. There is no clear
tendency that having foreign pension time affects mortality in a certain way. Most
estimates are insignificant and magnitude is volatile.
The fraction of explained variation of the dependent variable is rather low and is
increasing slightly for older birth cohorts and higher ages of survival, respectively.
Moreover, the number of observation is decreasing with higher age at survival. This
pattern is not surprising since the chance of survival is decreasing with higher ages,
i.e. mortality increases. As OLS lacks an adequate identification strategy achieved
results report correlations only.
2SLS
In this section the strategy proposed in section 1.4 is estimated via 2SLS. Age at re-
tirement is instrumented by individual pension eligibility age. Estimation is based
on the same set of socio-demographic variables. In addition, the model is estimated
with and without retirement-relevant variables, which represents the prerequisites
of eligibility status.
The effect of age at retirement on mortality using the identification strategy of
instrumenting retirement age by pension eligibility age reveals that the influence is,
similar to OLS results, low and insignificant. The only significant estimate without
the inclusion of retirement-relevant variables can be found using survival at age 70
as a measure of mortality. The magnitude of the effect is even reversed compared
to previous findings, implying that higher age at retirement is associated with lower
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Table 1.10: Overall Regression Results – 2SLS
Dependent variables: survived the age of 70, 75, 80 and 85
2SLS
survived 70 survived 75 survived 80 survived 85
Socio-Demographic
retirement age -0.011 0.003 -0.001 0.064 0.061 0.312 -0.210 -0.593
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.039) (0.063) (0.662) (2.078)
gjavs -0.148 -0.147 -0.416 -0.405 -0.858 -0.880 -1.406 -1.458
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.024) (0.034) (0.118) (0.193)
family status
re-,married 0.281 0.276 0.661 0.649 1.193 1.202 0.591 1.260
(0.017) (0.017) (0.033) (0.035) (0.095) (0.113) (0.560) (1.137)
sex
female 0.351 0.399 1.142 1.398 2.619 3.422 6.089 7.406
(0.024) (0.026) (0.043) (0.051) (0.122) (0.167) (0.720) (1.651)
number of children
1 0.080 0.104 0.131 0.255 0.039 0.411 1.196 2.316
(0.025) (0.026) (0.048) (0.052) (0.142) (0.179) (0.765) (1.588)
2 0.139 0.167 0.229 0.351 0.571 0.873 0.875 2.456
(0.023) (0.024) (0.045) (0.049) (0.131) (0.166) (0.769) (1.643)
3 0.101 0.135 0.165 0.296 0.363 0.724 1.627 2.357
(0.025) (0.027) (0.049) (0.053) (0.145) (0.181) (0.907) (2.075)
4 0.022 0.059 -0.068 0.096 -0.081 0.176 1.699 2.209
(0.033) (0.034) (0.062) (0.066) (0.179) (0.219) (1.128) (2.692)
5 or more -1.72 -0.119 -0.527 -0.360 -0.628 -0.542 -0.570 -0.350
(0.042) (0.044) (0.073) (0.077) (0.197) (0.236) (1.436) (3.130)
citizenship
foreign 0.128 0.200 0.221 0.507 0.593 1.502 3.038 2.547
(0.025) (0.028) (0.047) (0.055) (0.131) (0.172) (0.634) (1.256)
foreign pension time
GDR 0.014 -0.012 0.177 0.061 0.548 0.582 -3.586 -12.673
(0.045) (0.046) (0.078) (0.078) (0.266) (0.281) (2.278) (5.078)
other 0.035 -0.037 0.071 -0.234 -0.234 -1.038 -1.730 -4.457
(0.033) (0.042) (0.065) (0.081) (0.193) (0.267) (1.197) (2.532)
Retirement-Relevant
byvl 0.000 0.008 -0.007 0.008
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006)
psegpt 0.004 0.014 0.044 0.099
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.040)
auaz -0.026 -0.056 -0.178 -0.246
(0.003) (0.005) (0.017) (0.136)
ajaz -0.003 -0.010 -0.036 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.057)
constant 386.489 383.133 902.135 874.967 1744.416 1769.201 2806.283 2928.480
(7.703) (7.912) (12.713) (13.847) (46.706) (66.859) (232.620) (381.064)
Partial 𝑅2 0.940 0.899 0.901 0.825 0.799 0.713 0.647 0.527
F-value 1.7𝑥107 7.0𝑥106 6.0𝑥106 2.4𝑥106 242,005 119,515 716 101
Robust regression-based test 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.970 0.000 0.000 0.145 0.573
Observations 1,375,716 1,298,067 1,103,366 1,003,373 320,057 244,405 16,652 5039
Notes: All point estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Therefore, reported results show the magnitude
of the effect in percentage points. The model is estimated using robust standard errors. Standard errors are displayed
in parentheses. F statistic of instruments is rounded as integer. P-values for regression-based test are displayed; null
hypothesis: variables are exogenous. Relevant birth cohorts, see Table 1.8. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF04-13; own
calculations. Rounded off to the third decimal place. Analysis includes individuals who survived at least the age of 65 and
whose type of retirement is not pension for invalids. Retirement age is limited to ages equal or under 65 years. In addition,
first type of retirement equals current retirement status.
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long term health. This can be interpreted as implying that estimates using OLS are
confounded by unobserved variables. But, the actual effect is, similar to OLS, very
small. Using survival at age of 70, results indicate that a delay of one year of entry
into retirement decreases the survival rate on average by 0.011 percentage points.
As discussed in section 1.4 pension eligibility is not randomly distributed and
depends on individual circumstances. To overcome a potential bias due to non-
randomness of pension eligibility age retirement-relevant variables which proxy for
the prerequisites of entering retirement are used. Estimates show significant posi-
tive results of age at retirement on survival at age 75 and 80, respectively. The effect
on survival at age of 80 is rather large implying that a delay of age at retirement is
associated on average with an increase in probability of survival by 0.312 percent-
age points. However, estimates of the coefficients of age at retirement are volatile
since survival at age 70 and age 85 are not significant when including the subset of
retirement-relevant variables. Even more problematic is the potential bad control
problem, since measures used to overcome non-randomness of the instrument de-
pend on actual age at retirement. That means that exogenous covariates are in fact
endogenous.
Estimates of the control variables are in line with OLS estimates. The birth year
has the assumed negative effect on survival. Results for the control variables are not
affected by the inclusion of retirement-relevant variables, either. Being re,-married
has a positive effect on survival up to age 80. Afterwards estimates are too heteroge-
neous for significant effects. The effect of being female lowers mortality at every age
of survival. The effect of having children has, similar to OLS estimates, a bell shape.
Having up to three children lowers mortality whereas the biggest effect is at two
children. Having four children makes no difference with respect to mortality to in-
dividuals having no children at all. The effect of having five and more children low-
ers chances of surviving up to age of 80 years. There are no significant results when
analysing the effect of having children on survival at age of 85. Individuals with
non-German citizenship exhibit lower mortality at every age of survival in compar-
ison to individuals with German citizenship. Similar to OLS results foreign pension
time has no clear direction of affecting mortality.
Analysing proxies for prerequisites of being eligible of entering retirement shows
that psegpt, a measure of pension income during retirement, has a positive effect on
survival. The effect is increasing with age of survival. The proxy of length of work
before retirement is mostly insignificant and time of being unemployed or ill have a
negative effect on survival until age of 80.
The partial 𝑅2 and F-value are summary statistics for the first-stage regression,
i.e. they show if pension eligibility is sufficiently correlated with the age at retire-
ment. Both measures show the significance of the instrument, but in different ways.
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The partial𝑅2 represents the proportion of variation of age at retirement which is ex-
plained by pension eligibility andwhich is not explained by other variables included
in the model. Here, the instrument is more important for later birth cohorts or lower
ages of survival. The F-value reports the test statistic of testing if the effect of pen-
sion eligibility age on age at retirement is different from zero. As a rule of thumb an
F-value of at least 10 is regarded as sufficient. The F-value implies high significance.
In summary, this analysis finds a strong statistical evidence for a sufficient first-stage
of the instrument.
Moreover, a robust regression-based test is performed to test the endogeneity of
age at retirement. The test is based on an auxiliary regression of the endogenous
variable on all exogenous variables. The residuals, the part which is not explained
by the auxiliary regression, are used in a second regression as an additional regressor
of (1.1). Afterwards, one tests the null hypothesis of the significance of the residuals
with a t-test. The row “Robust regression-based test” reports the corresponding p-
values.60 The null hypothesis of exogeneity of age at retirement is rejected in most
cases. The inclusion of retirement-relevant variables leads to a non-rejection of the
null hypothesis of exogeneity using survival at age of 75. Estimates of survival at 85
imply that one cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity irrespective of the in-
clusion of retirement-relevant variables. In this case results of the robust regression-
based test imply that using OLS is the more efficient way of estimating the influence
of age at retirement on survival at age of 85. OLS results, similar to 2SLS estimates,
imply that age at retirement does not affect survival at age 85 at all.
In general, results using 2SLS imply that age at retirement does not affect mor-
tality. But, when using additional measures of retirement-relevant variables results
are more volatile. To check the sensitivity of estimates using retirement-relevant
variables types of old-age pension are analysed individually and matching is used
to overcome the bad control problem while also accounting for non-randomness of
the instrument.
Sensitivity Analysis
In the following, different types of old-age pensions are examined individually. The
analysed data for regressions consists out of four types of old-age pension. There
are three types which allow an early entry into retirement, namely the pension for
longtime insured persons, the pension for women and the pension because of un-
employment or part-time work for employees over 55. In contrast, individuals of
the regular old-age pension do not have any possibilities of early retirement. The
pensions differ from each other with respect to requirements for entry into retire-
60. For further details of the test, see Wooldridge (2001).
37
ment and diverge regarding the age at pension eligibility. The control group are
individuals with regular old-age pensions. The separation of types of early old-age
pensions increases the comparability between the groups. All models include socio-
demographic as well as retirement-relevant variables. For the sake of simplicity only
point estimates and standard errors of 𝛾 are presented along with observations and
first-stage summary statistics.
Table 1.11: Regression Results by Type of Old-Age Pension – 2SLS
Dependent variables: survived the age of 70, 75, 80 and 85
2SLS
survived 70 survived 75 survived 80 survived 85
Longtime Insured
retirement age -0.026 -0.134 0.124 -2.911
(0.017) (0.028) (0.101) (4.057)
Socio-Demographic Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Retirement-Relevant Information ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓𝛾 = 0 0.131 0.000 0.220 0.473
Partial 𝑅2 0.901 0.852 0.820 0.493
F-value 1.1𝑥106 1.2𝑥106 227,629 205
Robust regression-based test 0.066 0.348 0.355 0.594
Observations 760,323 639,650 220,351 5004
Women
retirement age -0.019 -0.022 -0.063 0.764
(0.006) (0.014) (0.073) (2.600)
Socio-Demographic Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Retirement-Relevant Information ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓𝛾 = 0 0.001 0.111 0.391 0.769
Partial 𝑅2 0.859 0.815 0.742 0.516
F-value 2.4𝑥106 890,090 44,583 35
Robust regression-based test 0.000 0.024 0.755 0.388
Observations 821,199 539,792 127771 2278
Unemployed or Part-Time Work
retirement age 0.017 0.134 0.761 1.210
(0.007) (0.015) (0.102) (4.467)
Socio-Demographic Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Retirement-Relevant Information ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓𝛾 = 0 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.786
Partial 𝑅2 0.941 0.842 0.818 0.752
F-value 4.2𝑥106 1, 6𝑥106 84,602 25
Robust regression-based test 0.309 0.092 0.202 0.520
Observations 822,071 648,699 198,140 4839
Notes: All point estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Therefore, reported results show the magnitude
of the effect in percentage points. The model is estimated using robust standard errors. Standard errors are displayed
in parentheses. F statistic of instruments is rounded as integer. P-values for regression-based test are displayed; null
hypothesis: variables are exogenous. Relevant birth cohorts, see Table 1.8. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF04-13; own
calculations. Rounded off to the third decimal place. Analysis includes individuals who survived at least the age of 65 and
whose type of retirement is not pension for invalids. Retirement age is limited to ages 65 and under. In addition, first type
of retirement equals current retirement status.
Pensions for Longtime Insured Persons
Entry into retirement of pensioners for longtime insured persons is possible at the
earliest at age of 63. Therefore differences with regard to pension eligibility age are
up to two years in comparison to regular old-age pensioners.
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The coefficient of age at retirement is not significant from zero in three cases im-
plying that retirement age does not have any influence on mortality using survival
at age 70, 80 and 85. The effect on survival at age 75 is significant and negative.
As other measures of survival and general results using 2SLS imply that there is
no differences with regard to mortality and age at retirement, these results can be
explained by subgroup heterogeneity which cannot be accounted for by the identi-
fication strategy proposed in section 1.4.
Pensions for Women
Thedifference of pension eligibility age between individualswith pension forwomen
and regular old-age pension is 5 years. As the title suggest onlywomen can apply for
this pension. Therefore the control group is restricted to female old-age pensioners
only.
Coefficients of age at retirement are mostly insignificant implying that there is
an independent relationship between retirement age and mortality for women. The
only significant coefficient is negative when using survival at age of 70. But, similar
to previous results the magnitude of the coefficient is low.
Pensions because of Unemployment or Part-Time Work
Early retiring is possible at the age of 60 for individuals with pension because of
unemployment or part-time work for employees over 55.
In comparison to other types of early old-age retirement estimates using pension-
ers eligible due to unemployment or part-time work show only positive coefficients
of age at retirement on mortality. Except for survival at age 85 all coefficients of age
at retirement are significant. Taking a closer look at the coefficient of age at retire-
ment on survival at age 80, the actual size of the estimate is considerable. Comparing
the significance and size of other estimates using pension for women or pensions for
longtime insured persons reveals that the general effect of age at retirement on sur-
vival at age 80 (see Table 1.10, survival 80 including retirement-relevant variables)
using all types of old-age pensions at once is mainly driven by higher mortality of
pensioners because of unemployment or part-time work. As individuals with pen-
sion due to unemployment or part-timework consistmainly of formerly unemployed
individuals rather than part-time workers61 one can reasonably assume that part of
the variation of mortality attributed to unemployment is responsible for the signifi-
cant positive estimates of age at retirement onmortality. Therefore, the identification
strategy fails to account for consequences related to unemployment when analysing
61. For details, see section 1.3.
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mortality differences by age at retirement.62 To account for that, in the next sec-
tion the model will be re-estimated without pensioners because of unemployment
or part-time work. By doing so, one checks if previous results implying that age at
retirement does not affect mortality can be confirmed and may also determine the
source of variation of previous estimates.
Analysis without Pensions due to Unemployment or Part-Time Work
In this part of the sensitivity analysis all types of early and regular old-age pension
are added to the model except pensioners with pensions due to unemployment or
part-timework. At first, an estimation using OLS is presented. Afterwards, the iden-
tification strategy from section 1.4 is used and estimated via 2SLS. In the following,
retirement-relevant variables are added. Moreover, matching is used to overcome
the trade-off between bad control problem and random assignment of the instru-
ment (for details of the trade-off see section 1.4). In the end, the effect of age at
retirement on different mortality measures separated by female and male retirees is
presented.
The effect of age at retirement on survival at age 70, 75, and 80 is significantly
smaller than zero using OLS. The results imply that retirement at a younger age is
associated with lower mortality risk. This is in contrast to regression results using
OLS and all types of old-age pension (see Table 1.9) where estimates are significantly
positive or not significant at all. Therefore, subgroup heterogeneity is responsible for
the variation of estimates. Similar to previous results the effect of retirement age on
survival at age 85 is not significant.
Applying the identification strategy proposed in section 1.4 and estimating the
influence of age at retirement onmortality without retirees who receive pension due
to unemployment and part-time work the effect of retirement age on survival at 70,
75 and 80 is still significantly smaller than zero. In addition, the size of the effect of re-
tirement age on survival at age 85 becomes negative, but is not significant. The actual
size of the effect is relatively small, i.e. results imply that the probability of surviving
the age of 80 is on average 0.188 percentage points lower when entry into retirement
is delayed by one year. But, one has to keep in mind that pension eligibility age has
to be randomly distributed over affected individuals for actual identification of the
influence of age at retirement on mortality.
Results including proxies for prerequisites, 2SLS add’l controls, show that point
estimates are still negative but are only statistically different from zero in one of four
cases. There are only survival differences for survival at 75. Even more, the effect is
62. Although the model contains the variable ajaz, creditable periods due to unemployment, results
imply that identification strategy accounts only for a part of all mortality differences due to unem-
ployment of the respective pensioners.
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Table 1.12: Overall Regression Results without Pensions due to Unemployment or
Part-Time Work – 2SLS
Dependent variables: survived the age of 70, 75, 80 and 85
survived 70 survived 75 survived 80 survived 85
OLS
retirement age -0.023 -0.067 -0.173 0.268
(0.003) (0.007) (0.036) (0.605)𝛾 = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.658𝑅2 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.022
Observations 1,503,945 951,182 303,305 16,620
2SLS
retirement age -0.015 -0.074 -0.188 -0.448
(0.003) (0.007) (0.038) (0.692)𝛾 = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.517
F-value 1.4𝑥107 6.0𝑥106 207,770 630
Robust regression-based test 0.000 0.000 0.322 0.064
Observations 1,225,041 935,102 303,289 16620
2SLS add’l controls
retirement age -0.003 -0.044 -0.064 -0.913
(0.005) (0.011) (0.060) (2.320)𝛾 = 0 0.515 0.000 0.282 0.694
F-value 6.0𝑥106 2.1𝑥106 87,787 91
Robust regression-based test 0.000 0.015 0.798 0.719
Observations 1,156,788 849,839 231,000 5034
2SLS matching
retirement age -0.042 0.003 -0.066 -4.672
(0.003) (0.007) (0.058) (3.115)𝛾 = 0 0.000 0.644 0.256 0.134
Observations 951,992 709,348 92,530 400
2SLS Men
retirement age 0.057 -0.115 0.002
(0.023) (0.036) (0.123)𝛾 = 0 0.012 0.001 0.989
F-value 859,314 1.1𝑥106 193,135
Robust regression-based test 0.785 0.702 0.632
Observations 323,447 286,631 97,255
2SLS Women
retirement age -0.018 -0.016 -0.040 3.585
(0.006) (0.013) (0.072) (3.316)𝛾 = 0 0.001 0.212 0.573 0.280
F-value 2.5𝑥106 954,863 47,952 30
Robust regression-based test 0.000 0.028 0.517 0.565
Observations 833,341 563,208 133,745 126
Notes: All point estimates and standard errors aremultiplied by 100. Therefore, reported results show themagnitude of the
effect in percentage points. The model is estimated using robust standard errors. Standard errors are displayed in paren-
theses. Relevant birth cohorts, see Table 1.8. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF04-13; own calculations. Analysis includes
individuals who survived at least the age of 65 and whose type of retirement is not pension for invalids. Retirement age
is limited to ages 65 and under. In addition, first type of retirement equals current retirement status. Matching algorithm:
Nearest neighbour matching without replacement. All regressions include socio-demographic variables. Regressions for
2SLS add’l controls, 2SLS Men, 2SLS Women and 2SLS matching include retirement-relevant information.
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negligible. In comparison to general estimation results including retirement-relevant
variables, see Table 1.10, the extraction of pensioners due to unemployment and part-
time work leads to less variation of the coefficient of age at retirement. Although the
inclusion of proxies of prerequisites may satisfy the randomness of the instrument,
it can lead to a bad control problem as proxies of prerequisites are in themselves
outcomes of the variable of interest, i.e. retirement age.
To account for the bad control problem, the respective sample is restricted to
pensioners who exhibit similar or identical properties of socio-demographic and
retirement-relevant variables but differ in their age at retirement. That means, pen-
sioners were separated into groups depending on whether they are early (treatment
group) or regular old-age pensioners (control group). Afterwards, the treatment in-
dicator is regressed on all available socio-demographic and retirement-relevant vari-
ables using Probit estimation method. After regression, the respective propensity
score for each individual is projected. To chose the best possible control item for each
treatment nearest neighbourmatchingwithout replacement is used. Afterwards, the
restricted sample is estimated via 2SLS, while age at retirement is instrumented by
pension eligibility age.
By doing so, one reduces the chance that control variables can be in itself en-
dogenous. On the other side, one loses observations due to the underlyingmatching
process. In addition, the propensity score is actually estimated and 2SLS is applied
on a restricted sample which is based on a previous estimation procedure. But, the
2SLS estimator does not account for that fact. Moreover, matching is a control strat-
egy and depends on the actual available subset of control variables. Although, this
procedure can identify identical companions based on matched variables, they can
differ in important ways not accessible to the researcher. This potential bias is not
quantifiable by construction. An overview of propensity score matching, overlap
and common support and matching quality can be found in the appendix, tables
1.15, 1.16 and 1.17.63
Estimates based on matching confirms the non-significance of the influence of
retirement age on survival. A statistically significant effect exists only for survival
at age 70 implying that later retirement lowers survival probability. The actual size
is however negligible, i.e. a delay of entry into retirement leads to lower survival
probability of 0.042 percentage points.
Comparing estimates separated by female and male pensioners reveals that es-
timates for male pensioners show a higher volatility, but they are also fluctuating
around zero. For women, the results are more homogeneous.
In summary, estimates confirm the independent relationship between age at re-
63. Definitions of standardised bias and further details of relevant matching terms, see for example
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005).
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tirement and mortality. Although some estimates are significantly different from
zero there is no clear tendency of the direction of the estimated effect. Moreover, the
actual sizes of the effects are relatively small and economically insignificant.
1.6 Conclusion
Results are based on an identification strategy by instrumenting retirement age via
age at pension eligibility while also controlling for the prerequisites of eligibility
status. In addition, birth cohort heterogeneity is accounted for in contrast to previous
studies for Germany. As pension eligibility age is an important factor for entry into
retirement compliance is high.
Results show that age at retirement does not influencemortality in a specific way.
Divergences with respect to the size of the estimates can mostly be attributed to
subgroup heterogeneity which is not accounted for by the underlying identification
strategy. As survival at different ages depends on different birth cohorts conclusions
with regard to the temporal development of the effect are not possible. As one can-
not change data properties results are based on the given individuals in the relevant
birth cohorts and cannot be extrapolated to all individuals within the analysed birth
cohorts.
It is also important to note, that age at retirement cannot be a causal determinant
of mortality in itself. Rather, age at retirement is a proxy of potential determinants
affecting mortality which are influenced by a shift of age at retirement. However,
results imply that potential determinants are not affected or level themselves out.
As the results show that a shift of age at retirement does not influence survival,
there are no additional budgeting effects of an increase of legal retirement age as sug-
gested by previous authors. The results imply that an increase of age at retirement
leads to proportional decrease of time in retirement.
Although work after retirement for analysed birth cohorts are of minor impor-
tance for the majority of pensioners, it is important to note that retirement using the
definition from the pension scheme is not equivalent to end of work. Even more, the
entry into retirement can happen out of a situation of unemployment. For these
individuals, entry into retirement just means the beginning of pension payment.
Nonetheless, for a large fraction of individuals retirement is associated with end of
work even though there is no possibility to extract this part out of the existing data
set.
With regard to the gradual increase of age limits within the German statutory
pension scheme, it remains an open question whether potential unemployment of
older workers due to higher age limits outweighs the positive budgeting effects of
decreasing time in retirement.
43
1.7 Appendix
Table 1.13: Overview Variables – Original Data Set and Constructed Variables
Name Description Type of Variable Observations
From Original Data Set
ja year under review metric 6,742,180
fmsd family status nominal 6,180,901
gbjavs year of birth metric 6,742,180
gbmovs month of birth metric 6,742,107
gevs sex nominal 6,742,180
zlki12 number of children ordinal 6,742,180
rtbe1 year of first pension metric 6,742,180
rtbe2 month of first pension metric 6,742,180
ztptr1 year of current pension metric 6,742,180
ztptr2 month of current pension metric 6,742,180
rtwf1 year of cessation of pension payment metric 145,197
rtwf2 month of cessation of pension payment metric 145,197
frgld foreign pensions nominal 6,719,607
frgmo years of foreign pensions metric 6,742,180
byvl contribution period full-valued ordinal 5,871,205
auaz creditable periods due to illness ordinal 5,871,205
ajaz creditable periods due to unemployment ordinal 5,871,205
psegpt sum of personal earnings points ordinal 6,742,180
rtat type of pension nominal 6,742,180
leat type of old-age pension nominal 6,736,980
ausland citizenship nominal 6,725,579
Constructed Variables
geburtsdatum year and month of birth nominal 217,308
survived70 Individual survived the age of 70 nominal 4,302,228
survived75 Individual survived the age of 75 nominal 2,184,335
survived80 Individual survived the age of 80 nominal 836,310
survived85 Individual survived the age of 85 nominal 302,771
erstrente first corresponds current retirement nominal 6,742,180
rentenalter age at retirement metric 6,742,107
age age of individual metric 6,742,107
atg pension eligibility age without deductions metric 4,763,548
mogab possibility of retirement with deductions nominal 5,673,247
Notes: frgmo, byvl, auaz, ajaz and psegpt are censored from above. Observations with implausible values are removed
from the data set.
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Table 1.14: Regression Results by Type of Old-Age Pension – OLS
Dependent variables: survived the age of 70, 75, 80 and 85
OLS
survived 70 survived 75 survived 80 survived 85
Longtime Insured
retirement age -0.079 -0.204 -0.199 -0.619
(0.014) (0.022) (0.071) (1.410)
Socio-Demographic Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Retirement-Relevant Information ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗𝛾 = 0 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.661𝑅2 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.022
Observations 798,817 690,331 284,742 16,431
Women
retirement age -0.013 -0.038 -0.099 0.613
(0.003) (0.007) (0.040) (0.661)
Socio-Demographic Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Retirement-Relevant Information ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗𝛾 = 0 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.354𝑅2 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.011
Observations 870,391 598,558 171,611 10,239
Unemployed or Part-Time Work
retirement age 0.001 0.109 0.466 0.415
(0.005) (0.012) (0.072) (1.727)
Socio-Demographic Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Retirement-Relevant Information ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗𝛾 = 0 0.851 0.000 0.000 0.810𝑅2 0.003 0.009 0.011 0.023
Observations 865,500 698,632 253,372 15,957
Notes: All point estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Therefore, reported results show the magnitude of
the effect in percentage points. The model is estimated using robust standard errors. Standard errors are displayed in
parentheses. Relevant birth cohorts, see Table 1.8. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF04-13; own calculations. Rounded off
to the third decimal place. Analysis includes individuals who survived at least the age of 65 andwhose type of retirement is
not pension for invalids. Retirement age is limited to ages 65 and under. In addition, first type of retirement equals current
retirement status.
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Table 1.15: Propensity Score Matching – Probit
Dependent variables: Dummies indicating treatment of early old-age pension, zero otherwise
Probit
survived 70 survived 75 survived 80 survived 85
Socio-Demographic Variables
birth year -0.306 0.119 0.415 0.080
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.032)
family status
re-,married 0.124 0.097 0.044 0.039
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.096)
sex
female 2.309 1.287 0.557 0.201
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.125)
number of children
1 0.264 0.217 0.108 0.355
(0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.147)
2 0.422 0.364 0.255 0.281
(0.006) (0.007) (0.017) (0.155)
3 0.472 0.440 0.342 0.355
(0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.187)
4 0.507 0.507 0.430 0.319
(0.009) (0.010) (0.023) (0.265)
5 or more 0.513 0.606 0.612 0.020
(0.010) (0.011) (0.023) (0.330)
citizenship
foreign 0.666 0.948 0.998 0.613
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.119)
foreign pension time
GDR 2.490 0.107 -0.308 -0.396
(0.241) (0.013) (0.023) (0.312)
other 0.311 0.356 0.539 0.294
(0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.140)
Retirement-Relevant
byvl 0.100 0.088 0.066 0.042
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
psegpt 0.018 0.020 0.017 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
auaz 0.003 0.015 0.003 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
ajaz 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
constant 586.457 -234.621 -805.175 -157.902
(2.038) (1.675) (5.887) (61.394)
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.580 0.502 0.418 0.105
Observations 1,156,788 849,839 231,000 5034
Notes: The model is estimated using robust standard errors. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Relevant birth
cohorts, see Table 1.8. Data: FDZ-RV – SUFRTBNRTWF04-13; own calculations. Rounded off to the third decimal place.
Table 1.16: Propensity Score Matching – Overlap and Common Support
Overlap and Common Support
Minimum Maximum
Before After Treatement Before After Treatment
Survived 70
propensity score 3.41𝑥10−12 2.50𝑥10−7 2.50𝑥10−7 0.9999924 0.9999924 1
Survived 75
propensity score 2.42𝑋10−6 4.74𝑥10−6 4.89𝑥10−6 0.9999098 0.9999098 0.9999003
Survived 80
propensity score 5.57𝑥10−9 0.0000241 0.0000241 0.9951046 0.9951046 0.9983278
Survived 85
propensity score 0.0003381 0.004852 0.0048577 0.3905379 0.3465074 0.3404922
Notes: Nearest neighbour matching without replacement. Before and after refers to the use before and after matching
algorithm. Estimation without individuals with pension due to unemployment or part-time work. Treatment group are
individuals with pension for longtime insured or women. Adjusted group (control group) are individuals with regular
old-age pension.
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Table 1.17: Propensity Score Matching – Matching Quality
Matching Quality
Achieved Percentage Reduction in Standardised Bias
survived 70 survived 75 survived 80 survived 85
Socio-Demographic
birth year 35.7 25.9 36.4 90.8
family status
re-, married 5.3 -2.3 89.1 59.0
sex
female 52.2 -965.0 97.9 80.8
number of children
1 25.6 27.4 88.8 18.2
2 61.7 -227.2 88.4 70.8
3 -88.6 -33.0 95.3 -104.4
4 -622.0 32.9 99.2 51.0
5 or more -519.3 -67.2 89.2 67.6
citizenship
foreign 18.8 -6.1 -238.2 -83.9
foreign pension time
GDR 0.0 7.1 89.2 -52.7
other 12.3 14.9 51.3 39.3
Retirement-Relevant
byvl 15.9 15.6 79.9 89.9
psegpt 14.1 12.5 77.9 84.4
auaz 12.4 18.0 83.4 54.9
ajaz 15.8 23.0 90.4 73.3
Notes: Nearest neighbour matching without replacement. Estimation without individuals with pension due to unemploy-
ment or part-time work. Treatment group are individuals with pension for longtime insured or women. Adjusted group
(control group) are individuals with regular old-age pension. The percentage reduction of the standardised bias is rounded
off to the first decimal place.
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Chapter 2
Additional Earnings Ceiling During
Retirement – Analysis of the Effects on
Labour Force Participation in Germany
56
Abstract
Pensioners inGermanywho enter early old-age retirement scheme face an additional
earnings ceiling until they reach the regular pension eligibility age. In comparison,
regular old-age pensioners do not have any earning limits at all. Using adminis-
trative data of the German Pension Insurance in combination with panel data of the
German subsample of the SHARE data source, a model is constructed which consid-
ers the heterogeneity of labour force participation over different types of old-age re-
tirement. It also accounts for age differences of early and regular old-age pensioners
when entering retirement. Assuming a common growth of early and regular old-age
pensioners, results usingDifference-in-Differences (DiD) indicate that the additional
earnings ceiling does not have any effect on the growth of labour force participation
for pensioners in Germany between 1986 and 2013. In addition, there are signs that
the additional earnings ceiling in Germany negatively affects the amount of work
during retirement.
JEL codes: J32, J26
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2.1 Introduction
Early old-age retirement options within the German Pension Fund were largely in-
troduced in the 1970s (Deppe and Foerster 2014) to stimulate the employment of
younger workers. To restrict the entry into early old-age pension, potential retirees
face an additional earnings ceiling (Hinzuverdienstgrenze) when entering retirement.
The additional earnings ceiling prevents the possibility of two incomes, i.e. out of
labour and pension payment, to certain extent (§ 34 SGB VI, 2019). Earning restric-
tions are lifted once the regular legal retirement age is reached (§ 34 II SGB VI, 2019).
Due to demographic ageing of the German workforce (Borsch-Supan and Schn-
abel 1998), the continued employment of older people becomes more relevant and
is additionally supported by recent political reforms (Bundesgesetzblatt 2016). The
idea of these reforms is to ease the transition from working into retirement and to
increase the fraction of older people in the workforce. However, the general frame-
work preventing excess earnings when entering early retirement has not changed
over past reforms.1
From a theoretical standpoint, an earnings ceiling limits the amount of supplied
labour if the chosen limit is binding. If restrictions on supplementary income are
too high, it can lead to the total termination of supplied work. This paper answers
the question of how the additional earnings ceiling during early retirement affected
labour force participation of early old-age pensioners in Germany between 1986 and
2013.2
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the regulatory framework
of the additional earnings ceiling when entering retirement in Germany. Section
2.3 provides information on the underlying data sets and the construction of rele-
vant variables. Section 2.4 shows empirical findings of labour force participation of
older people by comparing pensioners who are affected by additional earnings ceil-
ing (early old-age pensioners) with pensioners who are not affected (regular old-age
pensioners). Section 2.5 describes the strategy of identification of the effect of ad-
ditional earnings ceiling on labour force participation while section 2.6 presents the
results. Section 2.7 concludes.
1. Although working during retirement has become more flexible due to past reforms
(Flexirentengesetz) an upper limit of additional earnings during retirement, the so-called Hinzuver-
dienstdeckel, is still in effect.
2. The additional earnings ceiling is relevant for all own pensions which start before the regular
pension eligibility age. Although invalidity pensions face an additional earning ceiling too, this type
of pension is not analysed in the following.
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2.2 Additional Earnings Ceiling in Germany
Regulatory Framework
When entering early retirement pensioners face an additional earnings ceiling up to
the effective regular pension eligibility age (§§ 34, 96a SGB VI). Therefore, the ad-
ditional earnings ceiling is valid for any type of pension3 that offers the possibility
of an entry into retirement before regular pension eligibility age.4 In contrast, reg-
ular old-age pensioners who enter retirement after they reach the regular pension
eligibility age have no earnings limit at all. Pension entitlements before the regular
pension eligibility age are only valid if the effective limit of additional earnings is not
exceeded. If the individual amount of additional earnings are too high, it can lead
to the complete loss of pension entitlement by the German Pension Fund.
In the analysed period, early old-age pensioners are allowed to increase the indi-
vidual amount of earnings by resigning one-third, half or two-thirds of the pension
income. By doing so, the additional earnings ceiling is increased on an individual
amount.5 But, due to difficult administrative guidelines and potential losses of earn-
ings6 general acceptance was low. In the analysed sample of pensions in payment
only three out of 1948 individuals, which is about 0.15 percent, used this kind of
pension.7
The introduction of new guidelines with respect to the additional earnings ceil-
ing in 2017 (Flexirentengesetz) simplified additional earnings above the exemption
amount of 6300€ annually.8 But, additional earnings limits are still in effect.
The additional earnings ceiling for individuals entering retirement before the
regular pension eligibility age was introduced in 1972 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1972). Ac-
cording to the first guidelines, pensioners faced an additional earnings ceiling of one
eighth of the individual contribution assessment ceiling (Beitragsbemessunsgrenze) in
a year. These individual limits were replaced in 2008 by a fixed amount. Table 2.1
3. Pensions which are not paid out of an own assurance entitlement, e.g. survivors’ pensions do
not exhibit an additional earnings ceiling at all.
4. The regular pension eligibility age is 65. For birth cohorts after 1946 the pension eligibility age
is increased gradually up age of 67. For exemptions to these guidelines, see § 235 II SGB VI.
5. The amount of additional earnings with part-pensions is computed individually and depends
on the last three calendar years. Even more, the place of work, i.e. former East (excluding Berlin) or
former West German states, has an influence on the amount of the additional earning ceiling.
6. An excess of the individual additional earnings ceiling is combinedwith a step backwards to the
next lower part-pension. That means that just one Euro of earnings above the individual additional
earnings ceiling leads to a disproportional loss as pensioners fall to the lower limit of the part-pension,
e.g. from one third part-pension to zero.
7. Evaluating the Scientific Use File of pensions in payment by the German Pension Fund in 2015
(Versicherungsrentenbestand) the share of pensioners using part-pensions is even lower, approximately
0.08 percent.
8. Although the level of 6300€ is identical to previous earning limits, the level of the additional
earnings ceiling shifted from a monthly to annual determination. This step makes it easier for pen-
sioners with seasonal work or self-employed persons to work during retirement.
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Table 2.1: Earnings Ceiling per Month in Euro – 1992-2013
Earnings
General (§ 34 SGB VI) Care (§ 37 SGB XI)
Level of Care
Relevant since I II III
1st January 1992 17 of monthly reference value1st April 1995 205 410 665
1st January 2008 400
1st July 2008 215 420 675
1st January 2010 225 430 685
1st January 2012 235 440 700
1st January 2013 450
Notes: Earnings out of care are not relevant for the additional earnings ceiling according to § 34 SGB VI. Exceeding general
earnings twice in a year by its actual amount is allowed. In 2002 earnings were revalued from Deutsche Mark into Euro;
no change with respect to the amount. Source: Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt), General Earnings: BGBl. I p.2261
(1989), BGBl. I p.1824 (1995), BGBl. I p.2167 (2002), BGBl. I p.554 (2007), BGBl. I p.681 (2008), BGBl. I p.2474 (2012), Care:
BGBl. I p.1014 (1994), BGBl. I p.830 (1996), BGBl. I p.2702 (2001), BGBl. p.874 (2008).
lists the additional earnings limits from 1992 to 2013. In contrast to the first guide-
lines introduced in 1972, the analysed additional earnings limits were calculated on
a monthly basis. Exceeding general earnings twice in a year by its actual amount is
allowed. The monthly determination of the additional earnings ceiling is replaced
by a yearly determination in 2017.9
These earnings are relevant for the additional earnings ceiling which originate
from being self-employed or employee during retirement. In addition, in 2003 com-
parable earnings, e.g. earnings from a representative function or early retirement
benefits are relevant for the additional earnings ceiling, too (Bundesgesetzblatt 2002).
However, income from rent and leasing or other capital income is irrelevant for the
additional earnings ceiling. Moreover, allowances for nursing care in terms of § 37
SGB XI do not count towards the additional earnings ceiling. These guidelines refer
to pensioners who nurse needy people. The level of care depends on the needs of
the person in care.10 Table 2.1 gives an overview of exempted earnings depending
on the level of care and year. The exempted earnings increase with severity of the
needy individual. Handicapped persons who work in special institutions according
to § 1 SGB VI are also exempted from the additional earnings ceiling.
The length of the period of the additional earnings ceiling depends on the entry
into retirement and the effective regular pension eligibility age. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the period of the additional earnings ceiling assuming an entry into retirement at the
age of 60. The regular pension eligibility age in the figure is 65, which is the valid
one for the majority of individuals in the analysed data set, i.e. for over 95 percent.
Within the figure, the illustrated period of the additional earnings ceiling covers five
9. From the first of July 2017 the monthly earnings ceiling of 450€ is removed. The tax-free amount
of 6300€ per year stays the same. Earnings above this amount are taxed with a tax-rate of 40%.
10. With the begin of 2017 the level of care changed to a system of five grades of care, see Zweites




On the one hand, restricting the labour force participation of pensioners in a mainly
pay-as-you-go financed pension scheme11 may be reasonable from a sociopolitical
standpoint as current workers pay the pensions for current pensioners. If pension-
ers would not suffer from an additional wage ceiling, they could otherwise compete
with those individuals who finance an important part of their monthly earnings.
Moreover, an additional earnings ceiling leads to a backward shift of entry into re-
tirement for potential pensioners as it is less attractive to enter retirement at earlier
ages. Therefore, the additional earnings ceiling indirectly stabilises the budgeting of
the German Pension Fund.
On the other hand, the German Pension Fund is based on the principle of merit.
In this context, it means that entry into retirement itself is based on individual re-
quirements, for example years of contribution to the pension scheme.12 According
to that, it is debatable to restrict retirement earnings for those who contributed more
while pensioners with less contribution periods face no additional earnings ceiling
when entering the regular old-age pension type.13 From an economical point of
view, any restriction of the potential labour force is inefficient, especially if one is
interested in an increase of the fraction of a particular group, as is the case for Ger-
many. This is even more true for old-age pensioners who offer above average work
experience.
Due to asymmetric information the individual amount of participation in the
labour market is a priori not clearly visible to the social planner. Therefore, early re-
tirement options can be an incentive to reduce labour force of older people.14 There-
fore, assuming that individuals’ knowledge is the best source for their respective
willingness to participate in the labour market, individuals should determine the
entry into retirement themselves. To some extent, this flexibility is achieved by de-
ductions and additions when shifting entry into retirement. But, these cuts and ben-
efits are too small in size (Börsch-Supan 2004) so that amajority of pensioners tend to
retire as soon as they reach pension eligibility age (Just 2019). Therefore, if the official
11. Pay-as-you-go refers to a system where you have to pay before you actually use the particular
service. Here, the current workforce pays the majority of present costs of the pension payments. By
doing so, workers qualify for future pension payments.
12. Although contribution periods are amain factor for pension eligibility of early old-age pensions,
higher contribution periods do not automatically lead to earlier entry into retirement. Whereas pen-
sion eligibility age was at the earliest 60 for pensioners with a pension for women these pensioners do
not need to have as many contribution periods as longtime insured persons who can enter retirement
at the earliest of 63 in the analysed time interval. Therefore, other requirements are also relevant for
entry into retirement.
13. On average, regular old-age pensioners exhibit fewer fully valued contribution periods than
early old-age pensioners. This is true for every type of early old-age pension in the data set.
14. If early retirement options are too generous, individuals tend to retire earlier than they would
without those options in effect. If early retirement options are too restrictive, people work longer or
terminate their participation in the labour market before they enter retirement.
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age of entry into retirement is too generous, the labour force shrinks as the additional
earnings ceiling prevents the full participation of the respective work force.
All early retirement options, i.e. invalidity and early old-age pensions, face an
additional earnings ceiling. Therefore, anticipatory behaviour of shifting the type of
pension to circumvent the additional earnings ceiling is only possible if the individ-
ual enters retirement after the legal pension eligibility age.
The size of the additional earnings ceiling was standardised in 2008 by 400€ and
increased over time to 450€ per month in the analysed period, see Table 2.1. The
presented limits of the additional earnings ceiling over time are comparable to earn-
ings of employees with a minor employment (Minijob). It is worth noting that due to
given limits of the additional earnings ceiling, pensioners compete with those em-
ployeeswho already have a lower probability of finding an adequate employment. In
addition, the change from yearly limits to monthly limits of the additional earnings
ceiling complicates irregular employment as is the case for seasonal employees and
self-employed pensioners. This problem was fixed by recent reforms which came
into effect in 2017.
Exceptions for additional earnings ceiling are possible with regard to type of
earnings and group of people. Whereas earnings out of labour are affected by ad-
ditional earnings ceiling, earnings out of capital are not affected by the additional
earnings ceiling at all. As the main source of pension payments is out of labour, this
is a reasonable measure. However, as the fraction of expenses of tax-funded pension
payment is increasing, the separation of earnings sources with regard to the addi-
tional earnings ceiling does not have to be fixed over time. The group of retirees
with an additional earnings ceiling does not cover disabled persons in certain facil-
ities. Moreover, pensioners’ earnings out of care of high-maintenance individuals
at home are exempted from the additional earnings ceiling, too. The amount of the
exemption depends on the individual level of care. For details, see the right part of
Figure 2.1. Although given limits orientate on the needs of the high-maintenance
individual who is often in a close relationship with the caring pensioner, any ex-
emptions of the additional earnings ceiling in one sector penalise those pensioners
who exhibit earnings in other sectors. Moreover, those exemptions of the additional
earnings ceiling lead to higher competition on the market of nursing and increases
the pressure of labour costs for regular employees.
2.3 Data
The data set consists of two independent data sources. On the one hand, administra-
tive data of pensions in payment (Rentenbestand) from the Research Data Centre of
the German Pension Fund (FDZ-RV 2015) between 2009 and 2013 is used. This data
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source gives access to detailed information regarding entry into retirement on an in-
dividual level. On the other hand, survey data from wave 1, 2, 4, and 5 (2004-2013)
of the German subsample of the SHARE panel data (Börsch-Supan et al. 2013) is the
basis for the identification of labour force participation and other relevant variables.
Both data sources can bematched by social security number if respective participants
of the SHARE agreed to this action (Korbmacher and Czaplicki 2015).15
Labour force participation in a given year is constructed out of five different in-
dicators which are available in each wave. Participants of the SHARE were asked if
they did any paid work in the last four weeks before the interview and if they had
any earnings from (self-) employment in the previous year. In addition, retrospec-
tive questions of the beginning of the current employment and end of last job were
used for the generation of labour force participation in a given year. Due to that, de-
tailed information on labour force participation of each individual before and after
entry into retirement can be obtained. Data of labour force participation before entry
into retirement is important for two reasons. First, it is an indication if differences of
labour force participation during retirement can be explained by previous employ-
ment before retirement. Second, employment history before entering retirement is
necessary when it comes to the identification of the effect of the additional earnings
ceiling on labour force participation during retirement.16
As this analysis focuses on old-age pensioners only17, those pensioners who ex-
hibit any time of invalidity pension are excluded. This is achieved by choosing only
those old-age pensioners whose current pension is equal to first pension. By doing
so, one can identify old-age pensioners only, but pensioners whose pension is reval-
ued or changed by a switch to part-time pension are automatically excluded from
the analysis.18
Age at entry into retirement can be determined exactly on a monthly basis19. The
determination of the age of the individual for any year of given information on labour
force participation is achieved by the difference of the reporting year and the date
of birth.20 The regular pension eligibility age is based on data of the German Pen-
15. The linkage rate in wave 3 and 4 was about 50%.
16. For details see subsection 2.5.
17. As the entry into an invalidity pension requires a poor health status, which is directly related
to labour force participation during retirement, pensioners with this type of pension are not part of
the analysis – although they face additional earnings ceiling, too. In contrast, entry into early old-age
pensions does not require a poor health status.
18. As already the fraction of part-pensions is low, due to this step the chance of having pensioners
with an individual size of an additional earnings ceiling in the data set is close to zero.
19. Those observations whose age at entry into retirement is below 60 – which is the lowest age of
entry into retirement for old-age pensioners – are deleted in the given sample.
20. For retrospective information on labour force participation no monthly accuracy is available in
the data. Therefore, the calculated difference of reporting year and date of birth is lowered by one
year for individuals with month of birth later than June, in contrast to individuals with month of
birth between January and June. Potential effects of this step on the achieved results is tested in the
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sion Fund, namely type of old-age pension, year of birth and possible time working
in mining industry (knbt) and is determined by Federal Law Gazettes (Bundesgesetz-
blätter). Within the analysed sample, the regular pension eligibility age for the ma-
jority of pensioners is 65 years. Based on the raw data, 95.4% exhibit this regular
pension eligibility age.21 Early old-age pensioners are those individuals which enter
retirement before the actual legal regular pension eligibility age.22 Regular old-age
pensioners are therefore individuals whose age of entry into retirement is equal or
higher than the corresponding regular pension eligibility age. The assignment of
having an additional earnings ceiling for early old-age pensioners is based on the
respective age in the reporting year, i.e. if the age is lower than the regular pension
eligibility age.
For the analysis a set of control variables is used which are time invariant23 in the
analysed period. This applies to sex of the individual, a variable, region, which iden-
tifies inhabitants of former GDR and BRD, the school leaving certificate, a variable
indicating the graduation of the pensioner, and the amount of children.
Tomeasure the influence of the additional earnings ceiling on the size of supplied
labour during retirement24, potential actions of avoidance of employment restriction
due to the additional earnings ceiling can be analysed. Therefore, different activities
which can be executed otherwise indicate potential effects on the quantity of sup-
plied labour. For this reason, dummy variables indicating whether the respective
individual does weekly voluntary or charity work, attended educational or training
course, club meetings, or is taking part in religious organisations are added to the
data set. Moreover, “given help to someone outside the household” and “individual
looks after grandchildren” are activity dummies which give information about the
last twelve months.
This data set offers the possibility of studying labour force participation and pos-
sible side effects which arise out of the additional earnings ceiling for early old-age
pensioners. For descriptive analysis, given weights of the SHARE data set are used
to calculate representative estimates of the underlying population of older people in
Germany (Börsch-Supan et al. 2013). An overview of given and constructed variables
sensitivity part of the paper, 2.6.
21. The regular pension eligibility age is increased step-wise to 67 years. In the given sample the
highest regular pension eligibility age is 65.5 for individuals born at birth year 1952.
22. A small fraction, 0.98 percent, of regular old age pensioners are attributed to early old-age pen-
sioners. As it is a priori unknown whether there is a specification error in the assignment of type of
old-age pension or in the construction of age of entry into retirement, observations were not excluded
from the sample. Excluding them does not change results, either. Estimates are available upon re-
quest. Moreover, a model using type of old-age pension instead of early and regular old-age pension
can be found in the sensitivity section, 2.6.
23. As the identification strategy requires data on retrospective labour force participation time vary-
ing variables cannot be used for the analysis
24. Although the SHARE survey asks for the amount of work, the actual response rate is rather low.
Therefore actual data of the amount of employment in hours cannot be used.
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used for the analysis can be found in the appendix, Table 2.8.
2.4 Labour Force Participation and Retirement in Ger-
many
In this section an overview of empirical findings of employment during retirement
based on the created data set is presented. The analyses focus on a comparison of
early and regular old-age pensioners’ labour force participation. By doing so, dif-
ferent motives and incentives of entering retirement and employment before and
after retirement of both groups will be discussed. Socio-demographic differences of
pensioners employment behaviour are analysed, too.
Table 2.2: Share of Pensioners Working by Type of Old-Age Pension – 2013
Paid Work Last 4 Weeks Worked Last Year (2012)
in %
Early Old-Age Retirement Yes 10.93 15.29No 89.07 84.71
Regular Old-Age Retirement Yes 10.32 15.86No 89.68 84.14
Individuals n 1278 1363
Equality of Means t-test -0.32 -0.32
Notes: Data: SHARE-RV, SHARE:Wave 5 (Release 5-0-0), RV: pensions in payment (Release 3-0-0). Own calculations. Only
old-age retired individuals with current retirement status identical to earliest retirement entry are used. Weighted using
calibrated cross-sectional weights for Wave 5 on individual level. Calibration reflects the size of targeted population (50+)
across 8 gender-age groups and across NUTS1 regional areas (states). For “Worked Last Year” only individuals were used
who did not enter retirement the year before interview. The values of t-test display the corresponding t-value of equality
of means of both groups, i.e. early and regular old-age pensioners. The t-value neglects stratification and the multi-staging
process of the underlying sample.
The share of old-age pensioners working during retirement depends on the cho-
sen proxy of Table 2.2 and varies between approximately 10 and 16%. Table 2.2
shows the results separated by type of old-age pension. The two indicators of labour
force participation, paid work in the last four weeks since the interview andwhether
the pensioner worked the last year at any time, show no significant differences be-
tween both groups of old-age pensioners. The difference of both indicators can be
attributed to the lower time span of a potential employment in the first case. In ad-
dition, more than 50% of the amount of interviews were performed in February and
March, were seasonal conditions of the weather led to lower demand of labour. This
may be especially relevant as for the majority of pensioners the type of employment
is a minor employment (Hochfellner and Burkert 2013). Due to different scope of the
variables general time trends are not identifiable.25
25. For changes in employment behaviour during retirement, see for example results of the logistic
model in Figure 2.2.
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The chance of take up employment for old-age pensioners is not equal over the
population. Therefore, a model is constructed which explains the probability of
employment during retirement by socio-demographic variables. This model is es-
timated via a logistic function. The model includes all old-age pensioners without
any invalidity pension. As individuals can potentially appear several times in the
data, standard errors allow for intragroup correlation of the particular individual.
The model includes 8569 observations from 1107 individuals.








1 2 3 4
95% Conﬁdence Interval
Odds Ratio
Notes: Data: SHARE-RV. 8569 observations; 1107 individuals; own calculations. Only old-age retired individuals with
current retirement status identical to earliest retirement entry are used. Results are based on logit estimation including
a constant. Standard errors allow for correlation within groups (individual). Odds ratio is plotted on logarithmic scale.
92.34% correctly classified. McFadden’s 𝑅2 is approximately 0.073.
Figure 2.2 shows the odds ratio26 and corresponding confidence intervals of rele-
vant control variables on a log scale of the estimated model.27 The presented model
includes the age of the pensioner, the school leaving certificate, the reported year, if
the pensioner lived before the Fall of the BerlinWall inWest Germany or the German
26. Odds ratio is the probability of success, i.e. being employed, over the probability of failure, i.e.
not employed.
27. For detailed coefficients and standard errors, as same as measures of goodness of fit, see Table
2.9.
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Democratic Republic (GDR)28, sex and type of old-age pension.29
The interpretation of the direction and significance of estimates presented on Fig-
ure 2.2 is straightforward. Odds ratios which are located on the right from the value
1 displayed on the abscissa imply that an increase by one unit is associated with
a higher probability of an employment during retirement.30 Analogously for odds
ratios on the left. Using given confidence intervals allows conclusion of statistical
significance on a five percent significance level. Confidence intervals which overlap
the vertical line of the value one imply the non-significance of the underlying odds
ratio.
The age of the pensioner does have a significant influence on the probability of
employment. Estimates of the model imply that an increase in age is associated with
a lower probability of labour force participation. This is in line with descriptive anal-
ysis of employment trends with increasing age, see Figure 2.8 in the appendix. The
level of education, i.e. finished specialised secondary school (Fachhochschulreife) or
qualification for university entry, is significantly positively correlated with employ-
ment probability. General year effects are identifiable in this model. All other vari-
ables being constant, employment probability is increasing with reporting years. In
contrast, lived in West Germany or former GDR before Fall of Berlin Wall does not
have any influence on the probability of employment during retirement. Figure 2.2
implies that women exhibit a lower probability of employment during retirement.31
Former results of Table 2.2 imply that there are no differences between the share of
employment of early and regular old-age pensioners. Controlling for the given age
one can conclude that early old-age pensioners, all other variables fixed, exhibit a
lower probability of employment. The reason for differences in Table 2.2 and Figure
2.2 between early and regular old-age pensioners’ amount of labour force participa-
tion is the control for the variable age. Whereas Table 2.2 does not control for the
effect that early old-age pensioners retire at a lower age, the presented model ac-
counts for age differences. Bringing both results together – no differences between
the share of work of both groups of pensioners and lower labour force participation
of early old-age pensioners when controlling for age differences – it is implied that
the length of being retired, rather than actual age, determines the level of aggregated
labour force participation during retirement. This is tested in the next subsections.
28. Individuals living outside German territory in 1989 are excluded from the model.
29. Different models with regard to the inclusion of a control variable of having children or not and
different specifications of the level of graduation can be found in the appendix on Table 2.9.
30. If the variable of the figure is a dummy odds ratios on the right side of value one imply higher
chance of employment if the dummy is one. Analogously for values on the left side of value 1.
31. Regression results which can be found in the appendix show that the negative and significant
effect of being female on labour force participation during retirement vanishes if one controls for
children. But, due to definition of the variable children the variable can be seen as a proxy for sex
itself. The underlying variable zlki12 records children if they are necessary for the computation of the
amount of the pension payment. This is mostly the case for women.
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Employment During Retirement – Begin and Duration
To test the relevance of the length of being retired on labour force participation, both
groups of old-age pensioners are compared along the time interval of being retired.
By doing so, one disregards the fact that early old-age pensioners exhibit by defini-
tion a lower age when entering retirement. If results show no significant differences
between both groups of old-age pensioners, this would imply that the length of be-
ing retired determines the amount of aggregated labour force participation. If that
is the case, the actual age of the pensioner is of minor relevance for the labour force
participation.












Data: SHARE-RV. 9295 observations; 1330 individuals, 316 not censored; own calculations. Only old-age retired individuals
with current retirement status identical to earliest retirement entry are used.
For that purpose Kaplan-Meier survival estimates are used to analyse potential
differences of early and regular old-age pensioners with respect to beginning and
duration of work when entering retirement. To evaluate the significance of potential
differences, models32 are estimated via Cox proportional-hazards.
32. Can be found in the appendix, see tables 2.10 and 2.11.
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Figure 2.3 analyses how much time it takes to begin the first employment sepa-
rated by type of old-age pension. At first around 70 percent of all pensioners in the
given data set do not start an employment during retirement. Second, the slope of
survival graphs is decreasing with increasing time of being retired. That means, ap-
proximately two-thirds of pensioners who work during retirement begin their em-
ployment within the first two and a half years of retirement. Third, there are no
differences33 for early and regular old-age pensioners although early old-age pen-
sioners exhibit a lower age of entry into retirement. This supports the hypothesis
that the length of being retired determines the aggregate level of labour force partic-
ipation rather than actual age of the pensioner.










Duration Work in Years
Data: SHARE-RV. 1027 observations; 322 individuals, 137 not censored; own calculations. Only old-age retired individuals
with current retirement status identical to earliest retirement entry are used.
Figure 2.4 presents the duration of employment of those who actually start their
employment during retirement.34 Approximately 25 percent of pensioners in em-
ployment do not end their employment even after 15 years and beyond. Around
33. Table 2.10 shows no significant differences of hazard ratios between early and regular old-age
pensioners.
34. Therefore, individuals starting retirement without quitting the previous employment are not
analysed.
70
50 percent of all pensioners working quit their employment within the first three or
four years. There are some differences in survival rates between early and regular
old-age pensioners implying that the duration of employment is longer for regular
old-age pensioners. But, results of Table 2.11 show no statistical differences in haz-
ard ratios. Because of that, results imply that the duration of employment does not
differ by type of old-age pension.
Reasons for Entering Retirement
Although having an age advantage, early old-age pensioners do not exhibit a higher
duration of employment. Therefore, they must differ in certain characteristics which
are relevant for labour force participation during retirement. For that purpose pie
charts in Figure 2.5 compare the reasons for entering retirement of early and regular
old-age pensioners in 2013.
Figure 2.5: Reasons for Entry into Retirement by Type of Old-Age Pension – 2013
Early Old-Age Pension Regular Old-Age Pension
Legal Retirement Age
Own Poor Health Status
Eligibile for Other Pensions
Early Retirement Scheme
Other Reasons
Data: SHARE-RV, SHARE: Wave 5 (Release 5-0-0), RV: pensions in payment (Release 3-0-0). 802 individuals; own cal-
culations. Only old-age retired individuals with current retirement status identical to earliest retirement entry are used.
Weighted using calibrated cross-sectional weights for Wave 5 on individual level. Calibration reflects the size of targeted
population (50+) across 8 gender-age groups and across NUTS1 regional areas (states).
Figure 2.5 shows the shares of relevant reasons for entry into retirement. The la-
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bel “Other Reasons” includes the following reasons: being terminated from job, poor
health status of a family member, synchronise entry into retirement with spouse,
having more time for the family, and enjoy the life. The fractions of respective rea-
sons differ by type of old-age pension. Two-thirds of all regular old-age pensioners
declare that the legal age at retirement is the primary reason for entering retirement.
As intrinsic circumstances are of minor relevance for those pensioners, results imply
that pensioners tend to retire when they are actually allowed to do so. Around 50
percent of early old-age pensioners specify the legal age at retirement as the relevant
reason for entering retirement. Therefore, administrative guidelines are the major
determinant for the point of retirement of old-age pensioners.
The share of pensioners who retire due to poor personal health status varies be-
tween types of old-age pension. This share is nearly twice as high for regular old-
age pensioners. Although overall health is not a mandatory requirement for early
old-age pensioners, particular requirements indirectly affect the composition of the
group of early old-age pensioners. In most cases, early old-age pensioners need a
certain amount of contribution periods. For those pensioners who achieve these pe-
riods after physically hard labour, this requirement can correlate with a poor health
status. For pensions due to unemployment or part-time work, the decision to not or
to partially work can be the result of an overall bad health status. As this measure is
subjective and does not depend on measurable indicators, it can also be the result of
a subjective feeling of bad health. As pensions due to part-timework require an early
retirement scheme, differences regarding the size of the share of the early retirement
scheme between early and regular old-age pensioners are in line with administrative
guidelines.
Analysing only pensioners whowork in the last year, the distribution of shares of
the given reasons does not change fundamentally for either group. Figure 2.6 shows
the respective pie charts. As the distribution of reasons remain nearly unaffected by
choosing only pensioners who work in the last year, one can assume that the deci-
sion to work does not influence the distribution of reasons for entry into retirement
for either group of old-age pensioners. This implies that given reasons for entry into
retirement do not influence the decision of labour force participation during retire-
ment, at least on an aggregated level.
Employment Before and After Retirement
Results of a comparison of Figure 2.5 and 2.6 imply that reasons for entry into re-
tirement cannot explain labour force participation during retirement. A comparison
of labour force participation before and after the entry into retirement for early and
old-age pensioners is presented in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.6: Reason for Entry into Retirement by Type of Old-Age Pension – Worked
Last Year
Early Old-Age Pension Regular Old-Age Pension
Legal Retirement Age
Own Poor Health Status
Eligibile for Other Pensions
Early Retirement Scheme
Other Reasons
Data: SHARE-RV, SHARE:Wave 5 (Release 5-0-0), RV: pensions in payment (Release 3-0-0). 79 individuals whoworked last
year (2012); own calculations. Only old-age retired individualswith current retirement status identical to earliest retirement
entry are used. Weighted using calibrated cross-sectional weights for Wave 5 on individual level. Calibration reflects the
size of targeted population (50+) across 8 gender-age groups and across NUTS1 regional areas (states).
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Figure 2.7: Labour Force Participation Before and After Entry into Retirement by



























Data: SHARE-RV 3-0-0. 21,542 observations; 1435 individuals; own calculations. Only old-age retired individuals with
current retirement status identical to earliest retirement entry are used. Separated by type of old-age pension. Early old-age
pensions includes the following pension types: pension due to unemployment or part-time work for employees, pension
for women, pension for invalids, pension for longtime insured persons and pension for really longtime insured persons.
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The share of individuals working before entry into retirement differs in several
aspects between early and regular old-age pensioners. First, the overall share of in-
dividuals working is higher for early old-age pensioners. Second, the slope of labour
force participation is decreasing towards entry into retirement whereas the trend is
predominantly linear for regular old-age pensioners. In contrast to regular old-age
pensioners, the negative slope is increasing towards entry into retirement for early
old-age pensioners and approaches the level of regular old-age pensioners. This can
be explained by requirements being valid for some types of early old-age retirement.
For example, pensioners due to unemployment or part-timework need to have some
time of unemployment or time of being away from employment. Third, less than 50
percent of old-age pensioners are employed when entering retirement.
The retirement effect on labour force participation, i.e. the drop in labour force
participation upon entering retirement, is steeper for early old-age pensioners. This
indicates that the fraction of individuals continuing their employment after retire-
ment is higher for regular old-age pensioners. After retirement the labour force par-
ticipation is at a lower level and is decreasing with increasing years of retirement.
This is true for both groups of old-age pensioners. Comparing the actual size, reg-
ular old-age pensioners exhibit a higher share of labour force participation at nearly
every year in retirement. Using years in retirement as time indicator, the difference
of share of labour force participation is relatively small between both groups. The re-
sult is remarkable as regular old-age pensioner exhibit a higher agewhen comparing
both groups of old-age pensioners.
Summarising the descriptive results reveals that the share of pensioners in em-
ployment does not vary between early and regular old-age pensioners. Although
early old-age pensioners have an age advantage as they retire at earlier ages, this
advantage does not lead to a higher employment share or increased length of em-
ployment. Moreover, it shows that the entry into retirement rather than actual age
is the relevant determinant for labour force participation during retirement. Due to
heterogeneous motives for participation in the labour market, reasons for entry into
retirement do not predict labour force participation during retirement. For regu-
lar old-age pensioners employment before and after retirement is almost linear and
only interrupted by the retirement effect. In addition, graphical analysis implies that
the regular old-age pensioners’ share of individuals with continuous employment
over retirement is larger than for early old-age pensioners. In contrast, early old-
age pensioners’ labour force participation shows an anticipatory behaviour towards
retirement entry which can mainly be attributed to administrative requirements of
underlying types of early old-age pensions.
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2.5 Strategy and Model
Thedescriptive analysis from the previous section gives an overviewof the behaviour
with regard to labour force participation during retirement. Although early and
regular old-age pensioners differ in age at entry into retirement and employment
behaviour before retirement, they actually face similar patterns of employment dur-
ing retirement when comparing them via time in retirement. As both groups differ
by entry into retirement and since age of the pensioner is negatively correlated with
labour force participation during retirement, see for example Figure 2.8, one can-
not deduce an effect of the additional earnings ceiling on labour force participation
when using descriptive analysis. Therefore, one has to use a strategy of identifica-
tion to extract the effect of the additional earnings ceiling from all other confounding
influences when analysing its effect on labour force participation during retirement.
From theoretical considerations an additional earnings ceiling during retirement
could have a negative effect on labour force participation if the given restrictions lead
to an unwillingness of supply of labour of affected pensioners. If restrictions of addi-
tional earnings ceiling are not binding, estimates of the coefficient of the additional
earnings ceiling should not be different from zero. A positive estimate of the effect of
the additional earnings ceiling seems unlikely as given restriction should not induce
an additional stimulus on participation in the labour market.
To quantify the effect of the additional earnings ceiling in Germany, one needs to
compare individuals which are affected by the additional earnings ceilingwith those
individuals who exhibit no earning limits. This can be achieved by different means.
As additional earnings ceilings are temporal and last only until respective pensioners
exhibit regular old-age pension eligibility age, one could use early old-age pension-
ers only. By doing so, one compares early old-age pensioners when entering retire-
ment and their labour force participation after they reach regular pension eligibility
age. But, as duration of being retired and effective age of the pensioners correlate
with individuals’ labour force participation, the obtained estimate of the effect of
the additional earnings ceiling would be confounded by age differences by analysed
groups. Analogously, that would also apply when comparing early old-age pension-
ers with regular old-age pensioners when entering retirement. Although regular
old-age pensioners exhibit no additional earnings ceiling at all, they have by defini-
tion an older age when entering retirement. Therefore, by comparing both groups of
old-age pensioners at their point of retirement, one faces a bias, too. As labour force
participation during retirement decreases with corresponding age of the pensioners,
see Figure 2.8 for a graphical illustration, the obtained estimate of the effect of the
additional earnings ceiling would be biased.
To circumvent age differences of analysed groups one can compare groups at
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similar ages. But, while early old-age pensioners enter retirement, future old-age
pensioners exhibit higher shares of labour force participation as they retire at older
ages and are still working. Therefore, one is confronted by a retirement effect which
leads to an abrupt decrease in labour force participation of the underlying group, see
Figure 2.7 for an aggregated empirical illustration of the retirement effect on labour
force participation. As a result, when comparing early and regular old-age pension-
ers’ labour force participation using levels of employment one is confronted with a
classical trade-off, to either compare groups at different ages to circumvent the re-
tirement effect or to compare individuals at similar ages while one group has not
yet retired. Both strategies make it impossible to identify the actual influence of the
additional earnings ceiling on labour force participation during retirement.
A possible solution to this problem is the use of changes from one age to another
rather than a comparison of levels of labour force participation at each age. Using
changes in labour force participation erases differences with regard to the partic-
ipation of labour before and after retirement and eliminates the negative effect of
retirement entry. The application of this approach offers the possibility to compare
early and regular old-age pensioners at similar ages without a confounding retire-
ment effect. But when analysing changes instead of levels, the model cannot explain
differences regarding the level of labour force participation between both groups.
Rather, it detects differences regarding the growth of labour force participation.
When using changes the trade-off which prevents an identification of additional
earnings ceiling is no longer relevant. But, this strategy is based on certain assump-
tions. First, the effect of the additional earnings ceiling has to be separated from
general age-specific employment changes. The assumption can be seen as fulfilled
since additional earnings ceiling are an additive restrictionwhich does not interact in
a multiplicative way with age changes. By using potential outcomes notation in the
equations (2.1) and (2.2), one assumes an additive structure in the growth of labour
force participation. This structure includes a time variant component (𝛽𝑡), which
captures the diminishing probability of being employed at higher ages, a time in-
variant component (𝛼𝑠)35, which is allowed to differ over type of old-age pension and
the additional earnings ceiling (𝛾).36 Moreover, this strategy requires that changes
in employment trends, i.e. growth of labour force participation during retirement,
would be the same for early and regular old-age pensioners without the treatment of
an additional earnings ceiling. That means that the effect of age changes during the
35. While subscript 𝑠 describes the type of old-age pension and subscript 𝑖 identifies the correspond-
ing individual, subscript 𝑡 highlights age differences.
36. Assuming an additive structure for the change of work proposed in (2.1) and (2.2) leads to an
unspecified representation of the underlying variable work. Moreover one assumes that differences
of the variable work eliminates differences of labour force participation before and after retirement.
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period of observation (𝛽∆Age[63,65) − 𝛽∆Age[66,68))37 has to be the same for both groupsof pensioners. This assumption can be described as the parallel growth assump-
tion, as both groups need to have identical employment changes in the absence of an
additional earnings ceiling. As this situation cannot be observed with observational
data, a test of falsification of this assumption is not possible. Rather than testing, one
has to argue by visual inspection of relevant employment behaviour of both groups.
Therefore, Figure 2.7 is used to check the parallel growth assumption. As the period
of identification should begin in a close range of a change in the treatment (Bertrand
et al. 2004) of the additional earnings ceiling and regular old-age pensioners have
not been retired in the given age range, one needs data of employment behaviour
before regular old-age pensioners start entering retirement.
Analysing the employment behaviour of regular old-age pensioners shows that
intended regular old-age pensioners have a nearly linear decrease towards entry into
retirement. In comparison to early old-age pensioners, they show no anticipatory
behaviour which would otherwise lead to a disproportional drop of labour force
participation several years before affected groups enter retirement. This difference
can be explained by requirements of entering certain types of early old-age pensions,
e.g. pension due to part-time work for employees over 55 and pensions due to un-
employment.38 When analysing the effect of the additional earnings ceiling during
retirement, the composition of affected and not affected groups should not be bi-
ased by anticipatory behaviour of individuals who circumvent the additional earn-
ings ceiling. As all pensioners who enter retirement before the regular legal age of
retirement face an additional earnings ceiling, it is not possible to bypass this earn-
ings restriction. On the other hand, it could be the case that especially motivated
individuals shift their entry into retirement backwards to circumvent the additional
earnings ceiling. If that would be the case, the effect of the additional earnings ceil-
ing would be biased. The impact of this potential anticipatory behaviour is checked,
see section 2.6 for results and further details. As given age ranges of identification are
to some extent arbitrarily, a shift of age ranges will also be checked in the sensitivity
subsection of 2.6.
37. The lower bound of each age range is included in the age range. In contrast, the upper bound
of each age is not included. By doing so, one circumvents potential duplication. By definition 𝑡 = 1
describes the age effect on labour force participation from the age range 63 until 64 to the age range
64 until 65. Analogously, 𝑡 = 2, describes the age effect on labour force participation from age range
66 until 67 to the age range 67 until 68.
38. The pension due to unemployment requires having a certain time of unemployment prior to
entry into retirement. For pensioners due to part-time work for employees over 55 the chosen time
horizon and quantity of being part-time employed can lead to periods of non-employment prior to
entry into retirement.
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𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘0𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠, 𝑡] = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑡 (2.1)𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘1𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠, 𝑡] = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾 (2.2)
To extract the component 𝛾 and identify the effect of the additional earnings ceil-
ing, one can use a strategy which is known as Difference-in-Differences (DiD). The
idea of DiD is to use the fact that the treatment, in this example the additional earn-
ings ceiling, is only temporal within the treatment group, i.e. early old-age pension-
ers. By finding an adequate control group which is not affected by the treatment,
one can identify the actual treatment effect by using differences within and between
both groups of treatment and control. While the difference within each group is
used to erase time invariant aspects in which treatment and control group differ, the
difference between both groups clears the treatment effect from confounding vari-
ables which are time-depending and by assumption identical over both groups. By
applying both, i.e. the difference in differences , the average effect of the treatment
indicator, in this application 𝛾, on the variable of interest, Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘, can be achieved.
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) show the results of differences (within) for regular and
early old-age pensioners in a potential outcome setup. As regular old-age pension-
ers do not face any additional earnings ceiling, the average effect depends on a time
invariant component, 𝛼, which is allowed to differ between regular and early old-
age pensioners39 and a time changing component, 𝛽. The time invariant component,𝛼𝑅𝑅, disappears and the average effect of a change in labour force participation for
regular old-age pensioners can be solely attributed to changing age of underlying
individuals. As age during retirement is negatively correlated with labour force par-
ticipation, obtained estimates of equation (2.3) should be positive.
𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅, 𝑡 = ΔAge[63,65)] − 𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅, 𝑡 = ΔAge[66,68)] == (𝛼𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽∆Age[63,65)) − (𝛼𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽∆Age[66,68))= (𝛽∆Age[63,65) − 𝛽∆Age[66,68))
(2.3)
Early old-age pensioners face an additional ceiling when entering retirement un-
til they reach the regular pension eligibility age. Therefore, the component 𝛾, the
effect of additional earnings ceiling, is only displayed in the first bracket of equation
(2.4).
39. The subscript 𝑅𝑅 refers to regular old-age pensioners whereas the subscript 𝐸𝑅 refers to early
old-age pensioners.
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𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝐸𝑅, 𝑡 = ΔAge[63,65)] − 𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝐸𝑅, 𝑡 = ΔAge[66,68)] == (𝛼𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽∆Age[63,65) + 𝛾) − (𝛼𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽∆Age[66,68))= (𝛽∆Age[63,65) + 𝛾 − 𝛽∆Age[66,68))
(2.4)
The difference of the differences of treatment and control groups leads to 𝛾, as
shown in equation (2.5). These results are based on the assumption that there are no
adaption effects of the additional earnings ceiling, i.e. that the burden of any earn-
ings restrictions have ended with the end of the additional earnings ceiling. Apply-
ing DiD by sample means is illustrated in equation (2.6). The estimate of 𝛾, ?̂?, is
achieved by differentiating between the respective sample means during and after
the additional earnings ceiling. A disadvantage of using sample means rather than
an econometricmodel is that standard errors and therefore statements regarding sig-
nificance are not directly accessible. Therefore, an equivalent econometric model is
constructed, see equation (2.7).
𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝐸𝑅, 𝑡 = ΔAge[63,65)] − 𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝐸𝑅, 𝑡 = ΔAge[66,68)]−𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅, 𝑡 = ΔAge[63,65)] − 𝐸[Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅, 𝑡 = ΔAge[66,68)]= (𝛽∆Age[63,65) + 𝛾 − 𝛽∆Age[66,68)) − (𝛽∆Age[63,65) − 𝛽∆Age[66,68))= 𝛾
(2.5)
?̂? = (Δ𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘ER, 𝑡 = ∆Age[63,65) − Δ𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘ER, 𝑡 = ∆Age[66,68))− (Δ𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘RR, 𝑡 = ∆Age[63,65) − Δ𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘RR, 𝑡 = ∆Age[66,68)) (2.6)
The econometric model is based on the DiD approach. The point estimate of
the effect of additional earnings ceiling on change in labour force participation is
identical if using sample means or baseline econometric approach without further
control variables 𝑋. But the model which is proposed in (2.7) offers more flexibility
regarding the specification. This flexibility is used to test some of the underlying
assumptions and the sensitivity of baseline results.
Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼EarlyRetired𝑠 + 𝛽Time𝑡 + 𝛾EarningsCeiling𝑠𝑡 +𝑋′𝑖𝑠𝑡𝛿 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡 (2.7)
The variable on the left-hand side of (2.7), Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘, is the difference of labour force
participation, which is allowed to vary on individual 𝑖 with type of old age pension
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𝑠 over relevant years of living 𝑡. As labour force participation is a dummy variable,
the difference of this dummy variable can be defined as the growth in labour force
participation.40
On the right-hand side of (2.7) the baseline model controls for type of old age
pension, 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑, the respective time in terms of age of the pensioner, 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, and
the additional earnings ceiling with coefficient 𝛾. In addition, the baseline model
includes an error term. The model is estimated with heteroscedasticity robust stan-
dard errors.
Due to the panel data structure, the model detects changes in labour force par-
ticipation which can be the result of a change of the additional earnings ceiling for
each pensioner. As individual’s outcome is analysed over more than one period, the
error term in (2.7) might be affected by serial correlation. As the variable of inter-
est, 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝐶𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔, varies around 𝑡 and 𝑠 cluster robust standard errors (over type
of old-age pension) cannot be used due to low number of groups. To account for
serial correlation, the time series dimension is focusing only at the end of the addi-
tional earnings ceiling. By using only two periods, at the close end of the additional
earnings ceiling and directly after the treatment, the model accounts indirectly – to
some extent – for serial correlation. In addition, the variable of interest differs only
at the group level 𝑠, the type of old-age pension, while the outcome variable, Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘,
can change on the individual level. This situation can lead to lower standard errors.
Therefore, a parametric Moulton correction41 is used if conventional standard errors
imply any ambiguity regarding the significance.
The analysis builds on individuals with regular pension eligibility age of 65 only.
Although groups of type of old-age pension are formed at the beginning of entry into
retirement, previous information on labour force participation is used to identify the
effect of the additional earnings ceiling. The formalisation of treatment and control
groups might be affected by the situation of labour at older ages, i.e. shift of entry
into retirement to circumvent the additional earnings ceiling. Therefore, potential
anticipatory behaviour will be tested.
The model captures the average effect of the additional earnings ceiling on the
change of labour force participation for old-age pensioners in Germany. By doing
so, the analysis shows whether given restrictions of the additional earnings ceiling
affected the growth of labour force participation between 1986 and 2013. As the vari-
able on the left-hand side can be interpreted as the change in probability of having
40. As pensioners who work are assigned a value of one, respectively non-working pensioners ex-
hibit a value of zero, the difference, ∆𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘, is allowed to vary between three values, i.e. minus one
(decline of labour force participation), zero (no change, either continuing working or continuing non-
working pensioner) and one (increase of labour force participation).
41. The Moulton factor corrects for the intraclass correlation as ∆𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 varies over 𝑖 and the addi-
tional earnings ceiling varies over 𝑠, i.e. type of old-age pension. The formula can be found in (Angrist
and Pischke 2008) on page 311.
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employment, a multiplication of coefficients by hundred leads to an interpretation
in percentage points.
Besides anticipatory behaviour, the model is also extended by using additional
control variables, allowance for different trends of treatment and control group across
time and gender specific analysis of additional earnings ceiling and other sensitiv-
ity checks. In addition, when using indicators which imply a lower activity on the
labour market, e.g. voluntary or charity work, educational or training course etc.,
conclusions regarding the size of labour during retirement can be made by using the
same identification strategy proposed in this section. This is done in subsection 2.6.
2.6 Results
Table 2.3 lists the sample averages for relevant age groups and their differences sep-
arated by type of old-age pension. While the upper part of the table presents the
means of each age group, the lower part of the table uses the difference of each indi-
vidual during and after the potential treatment. The identification of the effect of the
additional earnings ceiling is based on individual differences in labour force partici-
pation of relevant years. Analyses of size of supplied labour use the sample averages
for the computation of respective differences. This is due to data availability.
Comparing the results of the upper part between types of old-age pension and
over time, one can see that the labour force participation before retirement for reg-
ular old-age pensioners is significantly higher, specifically by a factor of four, than
for similar age groups of already retired early old-age pensioners. After entry into
retirement the labour force participation changes to a lower level; for a graphical
illustration of the effect of retirement on labour force participation see Figure 2.7.
Comparing both types of retirees, labour force participation in retirement is higher
for regular old-age pensioners. However, for either group a decrease of labour force
participation over time can be observed.42 The differences of the lower part are neg-
ative or not significantly different from zero when evaluating the provided standard
errors of the mean. That means that labour force participation is on average decreas-
ing (negative) or stable (not different from zero) over time. Using the lower part of
Table 2.3 to determine the point estimate of the additional earnings ceiling, ?̂?, one has
to subtract for each type of old-age pension row I from row II. Afterwards the differ-
ence of both differences is calculated, i.e. the difference of early old-age pensioners
and regular old-age pensioners (−0.019 − 0.006 + 0.023 − 0.028) which is around
42. Although technically possible, the age range of pensioners after the treatment of the additional
earnings ceiling is not beginning at the age of 65. The first reason is that the computation of the actual
age is based on a month year level. The second reason is the low number of observations for this
starting point.
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Table 2.3: Difference in 1st Differences by Sample Averages
Early Old-Age Pension Regular Old-Age Pension
ER RR𝑛∑𝑖=1 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖[63,64)𝑛 0.099 0.451(0.014) (0.026)𝑛∑𝑖=1 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖[64,65)𝑛 0.096 0.431(0.012) (0.026)𝑛∑𝑖=1 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖[66,67)𝑛 0.067 0.173(0.010) (0.020)𝑛∑𝑖=1 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖[67,68)𝑛 0.065 0.146(0.010) (0.019)
I 𝑛∑𝑖=1 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖[64,65)−𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖[63,64)𝑛 -0.019 -0.023(0.009) (0.009)II 𝑛∑𝑖=1 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖[67,68)−𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖[66,67)𝑛 0.006 -0.028(0.006) (0.011)
Notes: Multiplied by 100 gives the probability of labour force participation of respective age groups. Rounded off to the
third decimal place. Standard errors of means in parentheses.
−0.03.43 The effect of -0.03 would imply that individuals with additional earnings
ceiling exhibit a lower labour force participation which is around three percentage
points lower than for pensioners without an earnings ceiling. But, as standard er-
rors are not directly accessible, conclusions of the significance of the effect are not
possible.
Therefore, the model in (2.7) is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with
robust standard errors. General results of this model are displayed in Table 2.4. Ta-
ble 2.4 lists five different specifications of the model in (2.7). The baseline model
without further control variables is estimated in (1). Adding further control vari-
ables which differ over index 𝑖 increase precision of the estimates. This model can
be found in (2). Allowing for different trends of treatment (early old-age pensioners)
and control group (regular old-age pensioners) offers the possibility of accounting
for different developments of labour force participation over time which is not at-
tributed to the additional earnings ceiling. This procedure requires more data to
determine the trend. Therefore labour force participation up to the age of 80 is used.
This is done in (3) while also controlling for further variables. To circumvent the ad-
ditional earnings ceiling, an individual can shift its entry into retirement after reg-
ular pension eligibility age. Although descriptive analysis (Figure 2.6) implies that
the extent of this behaviour is relatively low, it can affect the estimates. Therefore in
(4) only individuals who enter retirement due to the achievement of individual legal
age of retirement are used to estimate the effect of the additional earnings ceiling
on labour force participation. From another perspective it may be possible to enter
early old-age pension by allowing deductions of the pensions income. Because of
this, the model in (5) uses only those individuals who enter retirement without any
deductions.
43. When using estimates which are not rounded off to third decimal place one would calculate an
effect of 0.0297; (−0.0188679 − 0.0057692) − (−0.0234604 + 0.028481) = 0.0297.
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Table 2.4: Regression Results – Difference in 1st Differences
Dependent variable: ∆𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘
Difference-in-1stDifferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
constant -0.023 -3.804 -1.993 -1.763 -3.342
(0.009) (1.583) (0.974) (1.905) (1.815)
early retired 0.034 0.018 0.020 0.000 0.019
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012)
time -0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.012 -0.004
(0.015) (0.013) (0.001) (0.014) (0.014)
earnings ceiling -0.030 -0.020 -0.015 -0.011 -0.022
(0.018) (0.017) (0.010) (0.023) (0.019)
Control Variables
Sex
women 0.002 0.004 0.013 0.012
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006)
year 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
region lived before Fall of Berlin Wall
West Germany -0.016 -0.006 -0.013 -0.019
(0.010) (0.006) (0.017) (0.011)
somewhere else -0.002 0.001 0.020 0.017
(0.019) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
school leaving certificate
finished primary school 0.003 0.002 0.025 0.007
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010)
secondary school – low 0.001 -0.001 0.017 0.012
(0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
secondary school – middle 0.007 0.007 0.030 0.014
(0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.015)
specialised secondary school 0.017 0.003 0.003 0.013
(0.024) (0.014) (0.037) (0.022)
qualification for university entrance -0.019 -0.011 0.007 -0.005
(0.018) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017)
other education 0.191 0.070 0.033 0.022
(0.153) (0.058) (0.017) (0.014)
Number of children
1 -0.009 -0.005 -0.032 -0.018
(0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.018)
2 0.009 0.003 -0.004 0.008
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
3 -0.023 -0.017 -0.042 -0.024
(0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016)
4 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.010
(0.019) (0.013) (0.005) (0.020)
5 or more 0.020 0.010 0.005 0.012
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Trend
early retired ∗ time -0.001
(0.001)
control variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
trend ✓
potential anticipatory behaviour ✓ ✓𝑅2 0.007 0.020 0.013 0.015 0.014
N 1601 1527 3445 822 1277
n 947 887 899 470 727
Notes: Estimated via OLS. Heterosecedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Only individuals included with
pension eligibility age of 65. Rounded off to the third decimal place. Models including additional variables control for year,
sex, region, highest education and number of children. Model (4) and (5) test for anticipatory behaviour. While (4) restrict
the sample by using only individuals who enter retirement due to the achievement of individual legal age of retirement,
model (5) uses only those individuals who enter retirement without deductions due to early entry into retirement.
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The point estimate of the additional earnings ceiling on the change in labour force
participation in the baseline model (1) is equal to using sample averages as in Table
2.3. The standard error of the estimated coefficient, ?̂?, is around 0.018. That means
that on a conventional significance level of five percent, one cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the actual influence of the effect of additional earnings ceiling during
retirement on the change of labour force participation is zero. Therefore, the result
of the baseline model implies that the additional earnings ceiling does not have any
influence on the growth of labour force participation in Germany.44
Model (2) includes additional control variables. The set includes the sex of the
pensioner, the reporting year, a proxy of assigning the pensioners to Former GDR,
West Germany or somewhere else, a variable of measuring the level of education,
and the number of children. Whereas the first three variables are socioeconomic
variables which account for differences of specific subgroups, the latter two can be
interpreted as labour market proxies. First, the level of education may influence
the level of labour demand and therefore increase the probability of finding an em-
ployment during retirement. But it may also be the case that the level of education
reduces the labour force participation during retirement as it is positively correlated
with different wealth measures. Second, the amount of children can be seen as a
proxy of higher opportunity costs as the probability of having grandchildren to care
for is increasing with more children. When controlling for these additional control
variables the effect of the additional earnings ceiling approaches zero and is still not
significantly different from zero. Potential labour market differences by using con-
trol variables cannot be stated for specific subgroups.
When adding a trend to the model it does not change the result of a non-signifi-
cance of the additional earnings ceiling on the change of labour force participation
either. This is also true for different anticipatory behaviour in model (4) and (5). All
estimates of ?̂? are close to zero and show no significance at all.
Sensitivity
The next section uses several sensitivity checks to validate the result of a non-signi-
ficance of the effect of the additional earnings ceiling on the change of labour force
participation in Germany. Model (6) uses a restricted sample of individuals who ex-
hibits information at every point in time of the analysis. The balanced panel in (6)
does not contain any outliers that are only recorded once. But, on the other hand the
probability of attrition is higher. Instead of using an aggregated measure of early
and regular retired persons to assign group of treatment and control, one can also
44. As pointed out in section 2.5 conventional standard errors are lower and should be inflated by
the Moulton factor. As given standard errors show no ambiguity of the results, respective Moulton
factors are available upon request.
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use the specific type of old-age retirement pension which is done in model (7). That
means that the group of early old-age pensioners can be separated into retirees hav-
ing a pension due to unemployment or part-time work, a pension for women, for
disabled persons, or a pension for longtime insured persons. The reference group is
the pension for regular old-age retirees. The separation of the early old-age retire-
ment group allows flexibility regarding the group specific importance of each type
of pension which can effect the influence of the additional earnings ceiling.
As the definition of the range of age after the additional earnings ceiling is ar-
bitrary, model (8) uses the age range from 67 to 69 instead of 66 to 68 to evaluate
the influence of a shift of age range on the effect of the additional earnings ceiling.
The trade-off of shifting the age range at times which are far away from one another
is that the non-testable assumption of having a parallel growth assumption is ex-
tended to longer periods. Even more, the longer the periods of analysis, the higher
the probability of measuring something else than the pure effect of the additional
earnings ceiling. The sensitivity of the generation of age with regard to the effect of
the additional earnings ceiling is tested in model (9) and (10). The generation of age
depends on the month of birth. Therefore, the respective age of an individual is only
specific on a monthly basis. That means that variations of generated age and actual
age can be possible if executed rounding is misleading, see section 2.3 for details
of the generation of age. Thus, model (9) uses information from individuals born
from July until December, whereas model (10) uses only individuals born between
January and June. The sensitivity of the construction of Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 is checked in model
(11), which excludes the short term indicator of having “any paid work in the last
four weeks”.
In model (12), the additional earnings ceiling is interacted with a year dummy
indicating whether observations are from 2008 or higher (dummy is one) or from
previous years (dummy is zero). By doing so, the effect of the additional earnings
ceiling is allowed to vary between periods in time. This is especially meaningful as
the amount of the additional earnings ceiling is not stable within the period of anal-
ysis. Moreover, the definition of restricted income changes between the years, too.
Consequentially, an interaction with year is meaningful. For the sake of a clear vi-
sual presentation a year dummy is used instead of interacting the additional earning
ceiling with all years.45
The effect of the additional earnings vary around zero for each model and show
no significance at all. This is also true for the interaction with year which means
that there are no differences regarding the effect of the additional earnings ceiling
over the period of analysis. Thus, the sensitivity analysis validates previous results
45. The detailed regression results using an interaction with all years are available upon request.
The implication of using a year dummy or the whole set of years is the same in both models.
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Table 2.5: Sensitivity Results – Difference in 1st Differences
Dependent variable: ∆𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘
Difference-in-1stDifferences
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
constant -0.030 -0.024 -0.023 -0.020 -0.026 -0.024 -0.025
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
early retired 0.014 -0.009 0.033 0.035 0.027 0.034
(0.012) (0.011) (0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
pension due to unemployment or part-time work 0.025
(0.014)
pension for women 0.031
(0.014)
pension for disabled persons 0.047
(0.018)
pension for longtime insured persons 0.049
(0.018)
time 0.010 -0.005 0.020 -0.009 -0.002 0.004 -0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015)
year >= 2008 0.013
(0.011)
year >= 2008 ∗ earnings ceiling 0.008
(0.015)
earnings ceiling -0.013 -0.026 0.013 -0.040 -0.022 -0.025 -0.030
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.027) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018)𝑇 = 2 ✓
individual type of retirement ✓
shift of age range ✓
potential measurement error in generation of age ✓ ✓
variation with respect to labour force participation ✓
Interaction with year dummy ✓𝑅2 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008
N 1308 1601 1550 699 902 1575 1601
n 654 947 950 418 530 927 947
Notes: Estimated via OLS. Heterosecedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Only individuals included with
pension eligibility age of 65. (6) Only those individuals were selected with no missing during analysed time span. (7)
Instead of differentiating between early and regular old-age pension the particular type of old-age pension is being used.
(8) Shift of age range from 66-68 to 67-69. (9) Sensitivity of variable age, i.e. only individuals born from July until December.
(10) Sensitivity of variable age, i.e only individuals born from January until June. (11) Without labour force indicator: “any
paid work in the last four weeks”. (12) Interaction of earnings ceiling with year dummy before and after 2008.
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of non-significance of the effect of the additional earnings ceiling on the growth of
labour force participation in Germany.
Gender Differences
Although some of the previous models control for the sex of the pensioner, i.e. mod-
els (2) to (5), the inclusion of sex as a control variable does not affect the size of the
effect or the level of significance of the additional earnings ceiling. In this section
the sample is divided into women andmen. This offers the possibility to analyse the
effect of the additional earnings ceiling by each sex individually. Another possibility
is to use the whole sample and to interact the additional earnings ceiling with sex.
This step has the advantage to test if potential differences between both sexes with
regard to the additional earnings ceiling are statistically significant. But, as this is of
minor importance here, the separation of both sexes is presented in the following.




(13) (14) (15) (16)
constant -0.014 -8.719 -0.031 1.416
(0.014) (2.610) (0.012) (1.926)
early retired 0.051 0.036 0.017 0.004
(0.024) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014)
time -0.024 -0.029 0.009 0.016
(0.027) (0.024) (0.016) (0.015)
earnings ceiling -0.067 -0.058 0.005 0.014
(0.031) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021)
Control Variables ✓ ✓
Moulton Factor 1.663 1.753 1.830 1.427𝑅2 0.013 0.059 0.005 0.014
N 785 750 816 777
n 480 450 467 437
Notes: Estimated via OLS. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Only individuals included with pen-
sion eligibility age of 65. The set of control variables includes year, region, school leaving certificate, and the number of
children.
Interestingly, there are large differences in the additional earnings ceiling be-
tween women and men. Whereas for women the size of the effect of the additional
earnings ceiling on the growth of labour force participation is not different from
zero, for men conventional standard errors show a significantly negative effect of
the additional earnings ceiling on the growth of labour force participation. This is
true for the baseline model as well as for a model which includes additional control
variables.
The results imply that the additional earnings ceiling has a negative effect on
labour force participation only for male pensioners. But, conventional standard er-
rors do not account for the difference in variation of the variable on the left side,
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Δ𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘, which varies by each individual 𝑖 and the variable of interest, the additional
earnings ceiling, which varies by 𝑠 the type of old-age pension as described in section
2.5. To account for that theMoulton factor is displayed. Multiplying the conventional
standard errors with theMoulton factor gives amore reliablemeasure of variation of
the estimated effect of the additional earnings ceiling.46 Thus, for the male baseline
model the standard error of the additional earnings ceiling is around 0.031 which
is multiplied with a Moulton factor of 1.663. This gives a standard error of around0.052. Based on the 95% confidence interval, the point estimate of −0.067 various
around [−0.168, 0.034]. The confidence interval using additional control variables
with adjusted standard errors are [−1.556, 0.040]. So, in both cases the estimated
coefficient of the additional earnings ceiling is not different from zero. Therefore, it
can be concluded that the additional earnings ceiling does not have any effect on the
change of labour force participation even when sexes are analysed separately.
Effects of Additional Earnings Ceiling on Other Activities
Although general results and sensitivity checks imply that the additional earnings
ceiling does not affect the growth of labour force participation of pensioners, it can
suppress the size of supplied labour. That means while the composition of targeted
groups of working pensioners is not changed by the additional earnings ceiling, it
can be the case that these pensioners decrease their amount of work due to earnings
restrictions when entering retirement.
A straightforward way to test this assumption would be the use of a variable
indicating the hours of supplied labour. Although available in the SHARE data,
the response rate of supplied hours during retirement is rather low and thus not
suitable for the proposed identification strategy. Therefore, an indirect approach
of analysing activities during retirement is used to draw conclusions regarding the
influence of the additional earnings ceiling on the size of supplied labour. The idea
is that an increase in the analysed activity is combined with a reduction of supplied
labour. This is achieved by using the strategy of Difference-in-Differences which
compares individuals’ activity behaviour during and after the additional earnings
ceiling and compares the outcome with the one of regular old-age pensioners. If the
common growth assumption holds, reported differences can be directly attributed
to the additional earnings ceiling.47
To evaluate the influence of the additional earnings ceiling on the growth of anal-
46. As the effect of the additional earnings ceiling is not different from zero with conventional stan-
dard errors the Moulton factor is not displayed in these tables. The reason is that standard errors can
only inflate conventional standard errors if the model is specified like (2.7.)
47. As already noted the assumption of a common growth is not testable. Therefore it can be the
case, that a change of preferences is responsible for the change in activities and not the additional
earnings ceiling.
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Table 2.7: Influence on Other Activities
∆ Treatment ∆ Treatment ∆ Control ∆ Control ∆ 1st Differences𝑡 = 0 𝑡 = 1 𝑡 = 0 𝑡 = 1∆ Voluntary or Charity Work 0.034 -0.011 -0.119 0.050 0.214∆ Educational or Training Course -0.024 0.023 0.000 -0.100 -0.148∆ Club Meeting (sport, social, etc.) 0.001 0.029 -0.057 -0.025 0.003∆ Taking Part in Religious Organisation -0.001 0.007 -0.091 0.023 0.105∆ Given Help -0.091 0.013 0.012 0.063 -0.054∆ Looked After Grandchildren 0.286 -0.244 0.233 0.110 0.406
Notes: The last column lists the estimated effect of each indicator. Positive values show an increase in the respective activity
due to the additional earnings ceiling, while a negative values show a decrease. Treatment in 𝑡 = 1 (Without Earnings
Ceiling) and 𝑡 = 0 (with Earnings Ceiling). Age range [63, 64),𝑁 = 304; age range [64, 65),𝑁 = 351; age range [66, 67),𝑁 = 572 and age range [67, 68),𝑁 = 700.
ysed activities, sample means of each age range are calculated. This is in contrast to
the executed strategy in section 2.5 where the individual difference during and after
the additional earnings ceiling is used to calculate the respective sample means. The
reason is that overall data quality of activities is not as good as for the information
of labour force participation. The calculation of sample means of each age range is
not a problem if the distribution of included and excluded individuals is as good as
random.
For the proposed strategy the SHARE data source offers six activities. All of them
are dummy variables indicating whether the respective individual takes part in the
given activity. Four of them ask if the the individual attends on a weekly basis; vol-
untary or charity work, educational or training course, club meeting, or takes part
in a religious organisation. The other two, given help and looked after grandchil-
dren, ask for the last twelve months. As the probability of exercising the respective
activity is increasing with a broader time horizon, the latter two indicators are less
informative with regard to the effect of the additional earnings ceiling on the size of
supplied labour.
Positive values of the last column in Table 2.7 can be attributed to a higher growth
of the probability of exercising the respective activity. If the assumption holds that
both groups of treatment and control do not differ except for the additional earnings
ceiling, positive values are a sign for the reduction of supplied labour. Standard
errors are not available so far, so that conclusion regarding the statistical significance
cannot be stated.
The effect of the additional earnings ceiling on the growth of voluntary and char-
ity work is relatively strong and positive. This is also true for the effect of looking
after grandchildren. Both effects can be interpreted as a sign for a decrease of the
size of supplied labour of pensioners who face an additional earnings ceiling. Both
effects are combined with a decrease of the growth of each activity after the end of
the treatment of the additional earning ceiling. For the control groups the growth of
voluntary work is increasing with age while the growth of probability is decreasing
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for looking after grandchildren. The effect on the growth of taking part in a religious
organisation is positive and mostly driven by an increase in the growth of probabil-
ity of the control group. The effects of given help and club meeting are close to zero.
Interestingly, the effect of educational or training course is negative. That would im-
ply that the additional earnings ceiling would have a negative effect on this activity.
This effect is largely driven by a drop in the control group in 𝑡 = 1, whereas the
treatment group exhibit an increase in growth at the same period. Therefore, results
imply that potential labour market effects counteract the influence of the additional
earnings ceiling on the change of participationwith regard to educational or training
courses. Summing up all effects there is some support that the additional earnings
ceiling have a negative effect on the size of supplied labour.
2.7 Conclusion
By using a Difference-in-Differences approach this paper shows that the additional
earnings ceiling in Germany does not affect the growth of labour force participation
during retirement. The result is robust over various sensitivity checks including an-
ticipatory behaviour. Moreover, the analysis of potential activities of substitution of
labour gives some support to a decrease of the size of supplied labour due to the ad-
ditional earnings ceiling. However, this indirect approach has to be validated if data
sources allow an analysis of the actual quantity of supplied labour. It is important
to note that as identification strategy makes it necessary to use the change of labour
force participation, reported differences which can be attributed to the additional
earnings ceiling can only be assigned to the growth of labour force participation.
That means that potential differences in the level of labour force participation be-
tween both types of old-age pension cannot be explained by the proposed approach
with regard to the additional earnings ceiling.
Descriptive analysis shows little differences in labour force participation between
early and regular old-age pensioners when comparing both groups via time in re-
tirement. But, this approach neglects the different age structures as regular old-age
pensioners exhibit an higher age when entering retirement. As age is negatively cor-
related with labour force participation during retirement, differences with regard to
employment increase when comparing both groups of old-age pensioners via age.
The strategy compares early and regular old-age pensioners during and after the
additional earnings ceiling. Another possibility is to use data before the additional
earnings ceiling. Moreover, a combination of using data before, during and after the
additional earnings ceiling could be implemented in a model. But, this step needs
careful handling of the anticipatory behaviour of labour force participation towards
entry into retirement for early old-age pensioners.
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In this context it seems also reasonable to analyse the influence of the duration
of the additional earnings ceiling on labour force participation. This step, similar
to the previous extension, requires a larger time interval of analysis. Therefore the
proposed extensions need to address serial correlation in a potential setup. In ad-
dition, future analysis should incorporate the increasing regular pension eligibility
age as well as consequences of recent reforms of the so-called Flexirente, which try to
increase the flexibility of additional earnings during retirement.
Froman economical perspective the prevailing additional earnings ceiling inGer-
many increase the costs of supplying labour during retirement while other sources,
i.e. earnings out of capital, remain unaffected. Therefore, it seems interesting to
analyse whether the additional earnings ceiling does have a positive influence on
the participation rate in the capital market of affected pensioners. Moreover, it seems
also promising to analyse the influence of the additional earnings ceiling on the par-




Table 2.8: Overview Variables – Original Data Sets and Constructed Variables
Name Description Type of Variable Origin Observations
From Original Data Sets
mergeid personal identifier nominal SHARE-RV 64,530
rtbe year and month of first pension metric FDZ-RV 60,135
ztptr year and month of current pension metric FDZ-RV 64,530
gevs sex of individual nominal FDZ-RV 64,530
fmsd family status nominal FDZ-RV 64,530
gbjavs year of birth metric FDZ-RV 64,478
leat type of old-age pension nominal FDZ-RV 64,530
psegpt sum of personal earnings points ordinal FDZ-RV 64,530
byvl contribution period full-valued ordinal FDZ-RV 55,884
zlki12 number of children ordinal FDZ-RV 64,530
knbt share of miners’ pension on the amount of pension metric FDZ-RV 64,507
moab number of months of deductions metric FDZ-RV 64,530
Constructed Variables
work dummy indicating working during retirement nominal SHARE 64,530
year reporting year metric SHARE 64,530
intyearmonth year and month of interview metric SHARE-RV 3,288
age age of pensioner metric SHARE-RV 64,470
origin work origin of value of variable work nominal SHARE 64,530
region location pensioner lived before Fall of Berlin Wall nominal SHARE 61,072
wave corresponding wave in SHARE data nominal SHARE 3,288
school leaving cert. type of graduation nominal SHARE 61,072
reason retirement reason of entering retirement nominal SHARE 52,244
early retired type of old-age retirement nominal FDZ-RV 58,540
earnings ceiling additional earnings ceiling during retirement nominal FDZ-RV 58540
tinr time in retirement metric SHARE-RV 60,075
retired individual retired or not nominal SHARE-RV 60,075
regelaltersgrenze legal age of retirement metric FDZ-RV 62,943
erstrente first corresponds current retirement nominal FDZ-RV 60,135
rentenalter age at retirement metric SHARE-RV 60,075
geburtsdatum year and month of birth metric SHARE-RV 64,418
activity1w voluntary or charity work; weekly nominal SHARE 3,280
activity2w attended educational or training course; weekly nominal SHARE 3,280
activity3w club meeting (sport, social, etc); weekly nominal SHARE 3,280
activity4w taking part in religious organisation; weekly nominal SHARE 1,707
sp008 given help last 12 months (outside household) nominal SHARE 2,547
sp014 looked after grandchildren nominal SHARE 1,868
Notes: SHARE-RV: can be found in both data sets. SHARE: only in SHAREdata source. FDZ-RV: variable can only be found
in the administrative data source of the German Pension Fund. Rounded variables as same as weights are not displayed.
Furthermore, the time indicator for treatment and control group in model 2.7, variable time, is not displayed.
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Table 2.9: Probability of Working During Retirement – Logit
Dependent variable: Dummy indicating working during retirement, zero otherwise
Odds Ratio via Logit
I II III IV
age 0.847 0.847 0.849 0.848
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
year 1.051 1.053 1.051 1.053
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Sex
female 0.545 0.180 0.497 0.182
(0.103) (0.144) (0.094) (0.139)
Lived Before Fall of Berlin Wall
West Germany 0.991 0.981 0.944 0.932
(0.223) (0.220) (0.212) (0.209)
Education
high educated 2.139 2.209
(0.516) (0.532)
high educated (incl. secondary education) 1.427 1.444
(0.278) (0.279)
Type of Old-Age Pension
early retired 0.366 0.378 0.351 0.360




constant ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
McFadden’s 𝑅2 0.073 0.079 0.065 0.070
McFadden’s Adjusted 𝑅2 0.069 0.074 0.061 0.065
n 1107 1107 1107 1107
N 8569 8569 8569 8569
Notes: Only old-age retired individualswith current retirement status identical to earliest retirement entry are used. Results
is based on Logit estimation. The variable high educated aggregates pensioners with Abitur or similar education. The base
category includes pensioners with lower education level. Only pensioners included who lived in West or East Germany
before the Fall of Berlin Wall. Standard errors allow for intragroup correlation within clusters (individual). Odds ratios are
displayed. Data: SHARE-RV; own calculations. Rounded off to the third decimal place.
Table 2.10: Time Until First Employment After Retirement – Cox Proportional-
Hazards
Dependent variable: Time in retirement
Hazard Ratio
I II
Type of Old-Age Pension
















Not censored 316 211
Notes: Only old-age retired individualswith current retirement status identical to earliest retirement entry are used. Results
are based onCoxProportional-Hazards estimation. The variable high educated aggregates pensionerswithAbitur or similar
education. The base category includes pensioners with lower education level. Only pensioners included who lived inWest
or East Germany before the Fall of BerlinWall. Standard errors allow for intragroup correlationwithin clusters (individual).
Hazard ratios are displayed. Data: SHARE-RV; own calculations. Rounded off to the third decimal place.
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65 68 71 74 77 80
Age
Mean
Data: SHARE-RV. 8421 observations; 1128 individuals; own calculations. Only old-age retired individuals with pension
eligibilty age 65 are used. 95% confidence interval for proportion 𝑝: ?̂?±𝑧1− 𝛼2 √ ?̂?(1−?̂?)𝑛 with 𝑧 the inverse cumulative standardnormal distribution, 𝛼 level of significance and 𝑛 observations.
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Table 2.11: Duration of Employment in Retirement – Cox Proportional-Hazards
Dependent variable: Duration of work
Hazard Ratio
I II
Type of Old-Age Pension
















Not censored 137 106
Notes: Only old-age retired individuals with current retirement status identical to earliest retirement entry are used. Re-
sults are based on Cox Proportional-Hazards estimation. The variable high educated aggregates pensioners with Abitur or
similar education. The base category includes pensioners with lower education level. Only pensioners included who lived
in West or East Germany before the Fall of Berlin Wall. Standard errors allow for intragroup correlation within clusters (in-
dividual). Hazard ratios are displayed. Anaylsis includes only the first employment during retirement. Data: SHARE-RV;
own calculations. Rounded off to the third decimal place.
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Chapter 3
Pension Income, Age at Retirement,





Based upon univariate and multivariate analyses, this paper examines the relation-
ship between pension income, age at retirement, and employment during retirement
using data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) between 1995 and 2015. Results
show that the distribution of total pension income becomes more unequal. Refer-
ring to the increase of inequality, this paper examines the association of age of entry
into retirement with pension income while focusing on distributional differences in
the relationship of both variables. In a second step, the influence of pension income
on employment probability during retirement is analysed. Regression outcomes im-
ply that the association of own pension income and age at retirement have changed
fundamentally. In previous years, age at retirement is not associated with pension
income. In contrast, a statistical positive relationship can be seen in 2015. Moreover,
the magnitude of this positive effect is higher for lower parts of the distribution of
pension income and flattens out for upper parts. While this development can be in-
terpreted as an additional incentive of shifting entry into retirement to higher ages,
this result cannot be confirmed by using total pension income, which also includes
pension income from non-own source, i.e. widow’s or widower’s pension as well
as orphan’s pension. Therefore, the legislative authority faces a classical trade-off as
the inclusion of pension income from non-own source leads to a more equal distri-
bution of pension income. Regarding the influence of pension income on probability
of employment, findings show that working after retirement is rather a preference
than a necessity, at least on an aggregated level of analysis.
JEL codes: J26, D63
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3.1 Introduction
The association of pension income, age at retirement, and employment during re-
tirement is multidimensional. It is obvious that an early entry into retirement of
otherwise identical individuals is associated with lower pension income. But this
simple relationship becomes vague whenever accounting for the different history
of earnings over the working life and different health outcomes. Moreover, as en-
try into retirement is not any longer connected to end of work (Brenke 2011), it is
unclear if employment during retirement is based on economical needs or can be at-
tributed to a preference. Whereas the former can be the result of an early entry into
retirement which is connected to lower pension income, the latter could imply that
pension income is not a relevant factor for predicting employment probability dur-
ing retirement. This becomes even more complicated as the German Pension Fund
privileges different subgroups with an earlier entry into retirement.1
Due todemographic ageing, the distribution of the population inGermany changes
(Birg and Flöthmann 2002), e.g. the share of workers to pensioners is decreasing
(Borsch-Supan and Schnabel 1998). This puts pressure on the German Pension Fund
which is mainly financed by a pay-as-you-go system (Borsch-Supan and Schnabel
1998). As a result, pension eligibility ages were increased (Bundesgesetzblatt 2007)
or certain types of old-age pension were terminated for later birth cohorts (§ 237, §
237a SGB VI). In addition, other reforms (Bundesgesetzblatt 2016) try to increase the
labour force participation of older people. Based upon a general increase of average
age at retirement within the period of analysis (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund
2018), this paper investigates if the relationship of age of entry into retirement and
pension income gives further incentives to retire at later ages or not. Moreover, esti-
mation methods are used to determine if the effect is equal over the distribution of
pension income.
As the share of individualswho exhibit employment during retirement is increas-
ing (Brenke 2011), this paper gives evidence for the reasons of an employment dur-
ing retirement. This is done by analysing the influence of pension income at the
beginning of entry into retirement on employment probability in 2015. The paper is
structured as follows: section 3.2 presents data and gives an overview of univariate
analyses of age at entry into retirement (3.2), pension income (3.2), and employment dur-
ing retirement (3.2). Section 3.3 analyses the association of age of entry into retirement
and pension income, whereas section 3.4 identifies potential differences of probabil-
ity of employment during retirement which can be attributed to the size of pension
income at the beginning of entry into retirement. Section 3.5 concludes.
1. Individuals with a bad health status can enter retirement before regular pension eligibility age
via invalidity pension. Old-age pensioners with a long and continuous history of earnings can apply
for an early old-age retirement.
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3.2 Data
The analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a
household panel study which contains representative information of the life course
of the underlying German population (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007). Within this
paper, individual level data is used from 2000 up to 2015. The focus of the analysis
lies on three specific individual questionnaires (1995, 2005, and 2015) which cover a
period of more than 20 years.2
The advantage of the SOEP when analysing the relationship of pension income,
age at retirement, and employment during retirement is the panel survey design and
the wide range of different proxies of employment during retirement and pension
income. That means, the data source on the one hand includes information about
the size and source of pension income while on the other hand, it also covers in-
formation about employment during retirement and age at entry into retirement.
In combination with socio-demographic information provided by each respondent,
the association of these variables can be analysed and compared for different sub-
populations. On the downside, available information, especially concerning income
and other sensitive information, is based on individual willingness to report. There-
fore, given information lacks precision in comparison to administrative data. But, as
administrative data does not cover a wide range of sources of pension income, the
SOEP constitutes a basis of analysing the interaction of total pension income, age at
retirement, and employment during retirement.
The targeted population are pensioners with usable information for the respec-
tive purpose of univariate and multivariate analysis. While univariate analysis of
pensioner’s income uses all information of any pension income, analyses of employ-
ment during retirement and the distribution of age at entry into retirement restrict
the sample of pensioners whose age at entry into retirement is known by certainty
and equal or higher than age of 55. For multivariate analyses the focus refers to indi-
viduals with known entry into retirement, whose age at retirement is not earlier than
age of 55. To account for sample design of the SOEP (Spiess and Kroh 2007) cross
sectional weights are used to give a representative view on the targeted population
(Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2013).
Information regarding age at entry into retirement is extracted from spell data
source ARTKALEN (activity status over the life course combined with information
from biography questionnaire) from the SOEP (Goebel 2017). This data source of-
fers the possibility of extracting the year and month of the entry into retirement.
Moreover, the data set contains a variable which identifies a possible censoring of
2. While the time horizon of the questionnaires cover 20 years, included retrospective information
in the given personal questionnaires enlarge the period of analysis.
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the information of entry into retirement. In combination with year and month of
birth provided by PPFAD (SOEP Group 2017), a basic data set of the SOEP, age at
retirement can be determined on a monthly basis.
Pension income is surveyed two times in each analysed questionnaire; first for
the given year of the questionnaire and second for the previous year. All values are
pre-tax income. As income from different sources is taxed differently, e.g. differ-
ent tax exemption limits, net incomes may diverge disproportionally. In addition,
retrospective pension income in questionnaires can be split into different sources.
The values of monthly pension income from own insurance are asked separately
from pension income of non-own insurance, i.e. widow’s or widower’s pension, and
orphan’s pension. Total pension income includes pension income from own and
non-own income sources. Capital income is not included. If necessary, income is
revalued from Deutsche Mark (DM) into Euro using the official exchange rate of1€ = 1.95583DM. If income is compared over several years, values are expressed in
same prices using Consumer Price Index of the Federal Office of Statistics (Destatis).
Employment during retirement in 2015 is analysed using two different measures,
i.e. “paid work last seven days” and “current employment status”. The current em-
ployment status can be separated into full-, part-time, and minor employment. The
variable “paid last seven days” is a dummy which is one if the respective individual
exhibits any employment and zero if otherwise. For later purposes current employ-
ment status is aggregated to a dummy of having an employment or not.
In the following analyses additional control variables are used. The set of control
variables includes: sex; current age of the pensioner; a regional variable indicating
if the pensioner lives in East or West Germany; the year of entry into retirement; and
a potential invalidity status.
Age at Entry into Retirement
The general step-wise increase of the pension eligibility age within the German Pen-
sion Fund leads to a higher average age at entry into retirement (Deutsche Renten-
versicherung Bund, 2018). This increase is displayed in Figure 3.1 which compares
the distribution of age at entry into retirement over the period of 1995 until 2015 us-
ing SOEP data.3 The average age of entry into retirement in the year 1995 was 61.24
years while in the year 2015 the average age at entry into retirement rose to 62 years.
The variation, specified as standard deviation (SD), is nearly unchanged over time.
The sample includes all pensioners who enter retirement between age 55 and age 70,
irrespective of type or source of the pension. Moreover, the average retirement age
3. The graphical illustration of age at retirement over the period of analysis restrict entry into re-
tirement to age of 70 for visual purposes.
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Notes: Only individualswhose entry into retirement is uncensored or right censored are used. Illustrationdisplays pension-
ers whose entry into retirement is equal or higher 55 years and lower or equal age of 70. Respective cross sectional weights
are used. Individuals equals observations in the samples. 2015: 𝑛 = 2891, 2005: 𝑛 = 4084, and 1995: 𝑛 = 2551.Data:
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1995, 2005, and 2015.
does not account for a potential invalidity status of the pensioner. When differentiat-
ing by potential invalidity, pensioners without invalidity status exhibit a higher age
of entry into retirement compared to pensioners with an invalidity status.4 The dif-
ference between pensioners with invalidity status is about one and a half years and
statistically significant.5 Average age at retirement in West Germany is significantly
higher than in East Germany (average age of retirement inWest Germany 62.26 years
in the sample in comparison to 60.95 in East Germany), while differences of age at
retirement via sex are small (for women: 62.06, for men: 61.98) and not statistically
different from each other.6
Figure 3.1 shows that there are three relevant ages (60, 63, and 65) of entry into
4. An invalidity status does not mean that the respective pensioner have an invalidity pension.
5. According to the definition, the average age at retirement of pensioners with invalidity status
is about 60.98, the average retirement age is 62.41 in 2015. A Wald test (Wooldridge 2001) rejects the
null hypothesis of the equality of the means. The F-value is 62.95. The test accounts for stratification
and primary sample units and uses cross sectional weights of 2015.
6. The exact test statistic and p-values are available upon request.
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retirement over the period of analysis. When evaluating the change of age at entry
into retirement over time, it is evident that the share of individuals retiring at age 60
is decreasing over time while the share of pensioners retiring at age 65 is increasing.
In 1995, the share of pensioners retiring at 60 was the highest while in 2015 the share
of pensioners retiring at age 65 marks the peak. The share of people retiring at age
63 is increasing too, but, on a smaller scale. These affects can be mainly attributed
to the termination of specific types of pensions for later birth cohorts – pension for
women and pension due to unemployment and part-time work for employees over
55 – and increasing pension eligibility ages for other pension types.
Pension Income
The source and distribution of pre-tax pension income over time is evaluated in this
subsection. Pension income covers all sources from previous own insurance of any
private or official source. Pension income from non-own insurance, i.e. widow’s
or widower’s, and orphan’s pension are only to a minor extent part of this section.
Capital income or transfer payment are not part of the analysis.
The SOEP asks for several sources of pension income. The choice of categories
changed over the analysed questionnaires. Pension income from the German Pen-
sion Fund was separated in 1995, i.e. the questionnaire includes separate categories
for miner’s, farmer’s, salaried employees’ and wage earners’ pension. These values
were added to the source ofGermanPension Fund to ensure comparability of income
source over time. Personal pensions were not included in the questionnaire of 1995.
This is also true for Riester pensions which only appear in the 2015 questionnaire.7
The Riester pension is a privately financed, but publicly subsidised insurance which
was introduced to account for the decrease of the net replacement ratewhen entering
retirement (Börsch-Supan, Coppola, and Reil-Held 2012). As the name suggests, the
civil service pension (Beamtenversorgung) covers individuals who work in a official
field of administration and exhibit a civil servant status. Occupational pensions are
based on an employer-employee relationship. Supplementary insurance (Zusatzver-
sorgung des öffenlichen Dienstes) is relevant for public sector employees. The pension
for war victims8 (Kriegsopferversorgung) compensates and assists war victims. It can
include civilian as well as soldiers which were directly affected by the SecondWorld
War and have bad health. In addition, the questionnaires include pensions from
an accident insurance and personal pension scheme, e.g. pensions for members of
professions and other private insurances.
Figure 3.2 plots the share of each source of the own total pension income of all
7. Each analysed questionnaire includes the category “other pension income” in which pensioners
can enter pension income from not mentioned income sources.
8. See Bundesversorgungsgesetz for details.
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Figure 3.2: Share of Own Total Pension Income (Pre-Tax) by Source – 1994, 2004, 2014












Notes: Monthly own pension income. In 1995, income from the German Pension Fund was asked separately for miners’,
famers’ pension insurance as well as salaried employees’ and wage earners’ pension insurance. Personal Pension is not
included in individual questionnaire of 1995. Riester Pension is only included in the 2015 questionnaire. Ordered by
size. Respective cross sectional weights are used. Individuals equals observations in the samples. 2014: 𝑛 = 5780, 2004:𝑛 = 4882, and 1994: 𝑛 = 2118. Data: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1995, 2005, and 2015.
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pensioners. Therefore, Figure 3.2 lists the economic magnitude of each source for
every year within the analysis. For each year the shares sum up to one. Pension
income from the German Pension fund exhibits by far the highest share; up to nearly
80% in 1994. But, this share is decreasing over time. In 2014, the share is about 68%.
Civil service pension’s share is the second most important pension income source
in the economy and its influence is increasing over time. The actual share in 2014
is about 19%. Occupational pensions cover about 6-7% of total pension income in
2014. Other sources of pension income have in total about 6.5% of the total pension
income in 2014.9 Although several income sources profit from the loss of relevance
of the German Pension Fund over time, the largest increase can be attributed to the
civil service pension.10
The distribution of the size of each source of pension income and therefore its
relevance across the population of pensioners in Germany is displayed in Figure 3.3.
The figure plots the share of pensioners having the respective source of pension in-
come. As pensioners can have pension income from several sources, the sum of
shares is larger than one. The spread of pension income from the German Pension
Fund across the population is large. Results indicate that about nine of ten pension-
ers have any earnings from the German Pension Fund in 2014. However, the fraction
is decreasing over time, but not as much as its magnitude with regard to overall pen-
sion income. In contrast, the fraction of pensioners with earnings from civil service
pension is increasing over time, implying that a part of the increase of the economic
relevance in Figure 3.2 can be attributed to an increasing fraction of reception. In
comparison, its overall share of distributionwithin the population is relatively small,
about 8.5% in 2014. Moreover, the shares of occupational pension and pension from
supplementary insurance for public sector employees, and personal pension are in-
creasing over time, too. The share of the Riester pension is relatively small. Since
most of the individuals having a Riester pension have not yet retired and benefits of
having a Riester pension are rather low for analysed birth cohorts, this result is not
out of ordinary.
Combining both Figures, 3.2 and 3.3, conclusions with regard to the average
magnitude of each pension type can be drawn. Results imply that the decrease of
the share of total pension income from the German Pension Fund is disproportion-
ally high and cannot solely be attributed to the decrease of pensions in payment
(Rentenbestand). Moreover, the average value of civil service pensions is in compar-
ison to other pension income sources relatively high and increasing over time. A
9. Supplementary insurance for public sector employees exhibit the highest share with 2.6%.
10. As the survival of directly affected individuals of the SecondWorldWar is decreasing over time,
the actual share of pension for war victims is decreasing for recent years, too. The share of other
pension income is increasing from 2004 to 2014, while the highest share is in 1994. This effect may be
the result of the non-existence of personal pensions in the 1995 questionnaire.
107
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Pension Income (Pre-Tax) by Source within Population –
1994, 2004, 2014













Notes: Share of all pensioners having respective type of pension income. In 1995, income from the German Pension Fund
was asked separately for miners’, famers’ pension insurance as well as salaried employees’ and wage earners’ pension
insurance. Personal Pension is not included in individual questionnaire of 1995. Riester Pension is only included in 2015
questionnaire. Respective cross sectional weights is used. Ordered by size. Individuals equals observations in the samples.
2014: 𝑛 = 5780, 2004: 𝑛 = 4882, and 1994: 𝑛 = 2118. Data: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1995, 2005, and 2015.
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detailed overview of average pension income by source over the analysed period
can be found on Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 lists the mean and the standard deviation (SD) of each income source
for the years 1994, 2004, and 2014. The respective values are expressed in 2014 Euro
using Consumer Price Index of the Federal Office of Statistics (Destatis) and the offi-
cial exchange rate of 1€ = 1.95583DM for values in the questionnaire of 1995. Cross
sectional weights have been used to guarantee that the sample is representative with
regard to the German population of pensioners. The average total value of pre-tax
pension income is increasing over the analysed period. The largest increase happend
in the first decade while in the second decade, from 2004 to 2014, the difference be-
tween the average total pension income is relatively small. Analysing total pension
in 2014 by subgroups; men face higher average own pension income than women
(for men: 1720.44€, for women: 910.35€). The pension income is higher in West Ger-
many (West: 1335.59€, East: 1058.27€), while an invalidity status is associated with
a slight decrease of average pension income in the weighted sample (with invalidity
status: 1232.95€, without 1307.87€).
Evaluating the development for each pension income source separately, large dif-
ferences can be quantified. The average pension income from the German pension
income has not been changed fundamentally between the ends of the analysed pe-
riod while in 2004 there is a substantial increase to previous and prospective values.
This pattern can also be observed for the supplementary pension income insurance
of public sector employees. In contrast, average values of civil service pensions, oc-
cupational pensions, and personal pensions are increasing continuously over time.
Pension income from accident insurance is stable at the ends of the period under
surveillance, but with a minimum value in 2004. The size of pensions for compen-
sation and assistance of war victims is decreasing over time.11
Although analysing pre-tax income, conclusions with regard to net pension in-
come for each source can bedrawnwhenusing growth rates of the respective sources.
However, one has to assume that there are no major differences over time with re-
gard to taxation of pensions. Moreover, the distribution within each pension source
has to be relatively stable over time. If so, individuals having a civil service pension,
occupational pension, or personal pension face an increase in net pension income.
In contrast, the size of pension income from the German Pension Fund is relatively
stable over time. Even when incorporating the Riester pension, which was intro-
duced to compensate for subsequent income losses from the German Pension Fund,
the value of the sum of earnings from the German Pension Fund and Riester pension
leads to only a minor increase to 960.03€ in 2014 in comparison to 959.86€ without
11. A general pattern of the category “Other Pension Income” cannot be stated as the categories are
not stable over the questionnaires.
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Table 3.1: Mean and StandardDeviation of OwnPension Income (Pre-Tax) by Source
– 1994, 2004, 2014
1994 2004 2014
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
in 2014 €
German Pension Fund 956.33 571.45 1033.55 734.71 959.86 518.06
Civil Service Pension 2535.63 908.37 2702.88 1157.79 2851.66 1230.80
Occupational Pension 398.76 546.31 523.43 979.62 600.38 1256.90
Supplementary Insurance 377.07 307.83 459.28 743.72 360.47 309.20
Other Pension Income 702.27 740.84 633.08 946.44 677.12 1195.77
Personal Pension - - 531.20 629.71 598.78 688.22
Accident Insurance 479.66 377.76 415.02 273.87 489.68 355.97
Pension War Victims 434.12 369.25 352.87 305.85 343.58 167.97
Riester Pension - - - - 71.50 157.78
Total 1122.08 802.37 1245.64 1082.77 1280.29 1030.97
Notes: Values in 1994 are revalued in Euro using the official exchange rate of 1€ = 1.95583DM. Own Pension income is
expressed in 2014 Euro using Consumer Price Index of the Federal Office of Statistics (Destatis). Respective cross sectional
weights for 1995, 2005, and 2015 (year of questionnaire) are used. Individuals equals observations in the samples. 2014:𝑛 = 5780, 2004: 𝑛 = 4882, and 1994: 𝑛 = 2118. Data: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1995, 2005, and 2015.
Table 3.2: Distribution of Monthly Retirement Income (Pre-Tax) – Inequality Mea-
sures
Total Own Insurance Non-Own Insurance
1995 2005 2015 1995 2005 2015 1995 2005 2015
Relative Mean Deviation 0.216 0.225 0.242 0.265 0.257 0.265 0.219 0.223 0.229
Coefficient of Variation 0.592 0.660 0.695 0.700 0.744 0.763 0.589 0.627 0.630
Gini Coefficient 0.311 0.323 0.345 0.369 0.363 0.373 0.309 0.320 0.329
Theil’s Index 0.164 0.183 0.204 0.226 0.226 0.237 0.162 0.175 0.183
Observations 2302 5165 5374 2030 4853 5123 661 1099 1006
Notes: Total monthly retirement income includes own and non-own pension payments. Respective cross sectional weights
for 1995, 2005, and 2015 are used. The Relative Mean Deviation computes the average absolute difference from the mean
divided by the mean (Cowell, 2011). The Coefficient of Variation is the square root of the sample variance of monthly retire-
ment income, standardised by the respective mean (Cowell, 2011). The Gini Coefficient is based on the ratio filled by the
Lorenz curve and the area of total equality. Theil’s Index is 1𝑁 ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑦?̄?𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝑦?̄?𝑦 ), where 𝑦 is the monthly pension income andindex 𝑖 refers to the individual 𝑖 of 𝑁 individuals in total. Further definitions, details ,and additional information of the
inequality measures can be found in Cowell (2011). Individuals equals observations. Data: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
1995, 2005, and 2015.
including the Riester pension. This is remarkable from a distributional standpoint,
as shares within the population of each increasing source are also increasing over
time. When comparing the ratio of means of pre-tax income from civil service pen-
sions and the German Pension Fund, the ratio is increasing from 2,65 in 1994 to a
factor of almost three in 2014.
The overall variation of pension income is evaluated by using different measures
of inequality. Table 3.2 lists four different inequality measures: the relative mean
deviation, the coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient, and Theil’s index. A def-
inition of each measure can be found in the notes under Table 3.2. The table also
lists the variation of own pension income, pension income from non-own insurance
including widow’s or widower’s, and orphan’s pension, and the sum of own and
non-own pension income (described as “Total”). The analysis uses cross sectional
weights for each year of the analysis. The total pension income is increasing on all
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measures over time. That implies, that pension income is distributedmore unequally
over time. By evaluating own and non-own pension income separately, the increase
of inequality cannot be confirmed with certainty for own pension income. In con-
trast, inequality of non-own pension income is increasing over time. With regard
to own pension income, the relative mean deviation is stable while the coefficient
of variation is increasing substantially. The Gini coefficient as well as Theil’s index
is only increasing marginally. A comparison of the actual magnitude of the vari-
ation of pension income shows that pension income from own insurance is more
unequally distributed than pension income from non-own insurance. Therefore, the
sizes of measures of inequality using total pension income lie between both incomes
of own and non-own insurance. This implies that widow’s or widower’s, and or-
phan’s pension income have a positive effect with regard to an equal distribution of
total pension income in Germany.
Employment During Retirement
In this subsection the probability employment in 2015 are evaluated while focusing
on subgroup differences. The share of employment during retirement is increasing
over time (Just 2019). Based on the SOEP data source, the share of pensioners with
employmentwhose age of entry into retirement is equal or higher age of 55 is around
9-11% and depends on the measure used to proxy actual employment status.12
Table 3.3: Employment during Retirement in Percent – 2015
Paid Work Last 7 Days Current Employment Status
full-time part-time minor
Germany 10.81 1.17 2.02 5.96
West Germany 11.74 1.30 2.24 6.55
East Germany 6.65 0.59 1.09 3.35
Germany – Only Men 12.72 2.07 1.85 7.35
Germany – Only Women 9.13 0.39 2.18 4.75
Germany – Pensioners with Invalidity 9.78 0.73 0.61 7.49
T-tests for “Paid Work Last 7 Days”
F-value p-value
Difference West and East Germany 10.89 0.00
Difference Men and Women 5.41 0.02
Difference Invalidity – Yes and No 0.67 0.41
Notes: Employment during retirement for pensioners older than 55 whose age at entry into retirement is known. The
table reports shares of pensioners with employment. Cross sectional weights for 2015 are used. T-tests accounts for survey
design, i.e. accounts for stratification and primary sampling units. Singleton primary sample units do not contribute to
standard errors. Individuals equals observations in the samples. Paidwork last seven days: 𝑛 = 2913; current employment
status: 𝑛 = 2921. Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1995, 2005, and 2015.
The majority of pensioners who have an employment during retirement exhibit
a minor employment. By evaluating the current employment status, it becomes evi-
dent that the share of pensioners with full-time employment is low in comparison to
12. Using the proxy of employment “Paid Work Last 7 Days”, the share is about 11%. In contrast,
using the ordinal measure of current employment status the share is about 9%.
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other types of employment. Differences between East and West Germany are large,
implying that the share of East German pensioners being employed is about 56% of
the share in West Germany. The difference is statistically significant on conventional
levels of significance. However, the differences of the relative shares of the attributes
of the current employment do not differ between East and West Germany.
Gender differences affect the share of employment, too. Women have a signifi-
cantly lower share of employment than men. Even more, differences between gen-
der are also relevant when it comes to shares of type of employment. The share of
male pensioners with fulltime employment is about 18%whereas the share of female
fulltime employment is about 5%. With regard to invalidity status, which has to be
officially determined according to the respective question in the questionnaire, there
are no overall differences in the share of employment between pensioners with and
without an invalidity status.
Based upon the univariate results of this section, the next two sections analyse
the relationship of pension income, age at retirement, and employment during re-
tirement in amultivariate setup. As increasing pension eligibility ages lead to higher
average retirement age, the next section analyse the association of age at retirement
and pension income. Here, heterogeneous effects along the distribution of pension
incomewill be presented in detail. Afterwards, the relationship of pension income at
the beginning of retirement and employment probability is evaluated. By doing so,
this analysis gives support of actual reasons for supplying labour during retirement,
i.e. out of a personal preference versus necessity.
3.3 Age at Entry into Retirement and Pension Income
A continuous and rewarding employment during life time is associated with higher
pension income during retirement. Moreover, early old-age retirement options are
granted within the German Pension Fund for individuals who exhibit longer peri-
ods of employment. However, early entry into retirement is also motivated by a bad
health status and as a result attributed to lower income, e.g. invalidity pensions due
to reduced earning capacity. The association of age at retirement and pension in-
come inGermany is analysed in this section. Moreover, corresponding distributional
differences with regard to the relative income position at different ages of entry into
retirement will also be evaluated. The analysis covers a period of 20 years from 1995
until 2015 and focuses on pensioners with age at retirement of 55 years or later. For
each year under review (1995, 2005, and 2015) respective cross sectional weights are
used. The analysis uses monthly pension income from own insurance and the total
pension income which also incorporates pension income from non-own insurance,
i.e. widow’s or widower’s, and orphan’s pension.
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Table 3.4: Age at Entry into Retirement and Own Pension Income (Pre-Tax) – QRE
and OLS
Log(Own Pension Income) QRE OLS
Year Obs. Mean SD 0.25 0.50 0.75 Coefficient Root MSE
1995 598 6.500 0.809 -0.016 0.051 0.078 -0.031 0.631
(0.110) (0.065) (0.081) (0.081)
2005 2245 6.743 0.810 0.046 0.028 0.105 0.015 0.636
(0.109) (0.054) (0.059) (0.037)
2015 2321 6.968 0.822 0.171 0.121 0.051 0.134 0.692
(0.056) (0.034) (0.053) (0.050)
Notes: QRE – Quantile Regression Estimates. Models control for year of entry into retirement, current age, sex, region, and
family status. Respective cross sectional weights for 1995, 2005, and 2015 are used. In 1995, pension income is revalued from
DM in Euro using the official exchange rate of 1€ = 1.95583DM to ensure comparability of Mean and standard deviation
(SD) over the years. Standard errors in parentheses. Only pensioners whose age at entry into retirement is equal or higher
55 years are chosen. Cross sectional weights are used. Data: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1995, 2005, and 2015.
The model explains the association of age at retirement and the logarithmised
pension income while also controlling for year of entry into retirement, current age,
sex, region (East or West Germany), and family status. The former two variables
control for the heterogeneity of paid pension over different years and different ages.
The last three variables control for socio-demographic differences of pensioners. The
analysis is executed on the individual level.
To evaluate the average effect of age at entry into retirement on pension income,
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors is used.
To analyse distributional differences with regard to the relative pension income posi-
tion, Quantile Regression Estimates (QRE) are computed and displayed for the 0.25,
0.50, and 0.75 quantiles.
Table 3.4 reports the association of age at entry into retirement and own pension
income. For the first two years, 1995 and 2005, there is no clear tendency of age at re-
tirement and own pension income. This is true for the average effect using OLS and
for respective quantiles using QRE. Only in 2005, there is little support13 of a positive
relationship of retirement age and own pension income for the upper quartile (0.75).
However, in 2015 the relationship of age at entry into retirement and own pension in-
come changes fundamentally. Evaluating the average effect, there is a clear tendency
that a higher age at entry into retirement is associated with higher own pension in-
come. The effect is significant on conventional levels of significance. Evaluating the
point estimate, regression results imply that an increase of age at retirement of one
year is associatedwith an increase of own pension income of 13.4 percent on average.
The effect varies over the distribution of pension income. This is illustrated by the
QRE estimates. While the effect is positive on all displayed quartiles, the magnitude
is decreasing with higher quartiles and only significant for the lower quartile and
13. The effect is statistical significant on the ten percent significance level. In contrast, evaluating
significance at the five percent level, the null hypothesis implying that the relationship of retirement
age and own pension income is independent cannot be rejected.
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Table 3.5: Age at Entry into Retirement and Total Pension Income (Pre-Tax) – QRE
and OLS
Log(Total Pension Income) QRE OLS
Year Obs. Mean SD 0.25 0.50 0.75 Coefficient Root MSE
1995 636 6.584 0.762 -0.156 0.012 0.073 -0.058 0.640
(0.098) (0.080) (0.061) (0.078)
2005 2307 6.822 0.772 -0.011 0.049 0.051 0.058 0.618
(0.101) (0.070) (0.213) (0.044)
2015 2347 7.061 0.784 0.017 0.049 0.015 0.072 0.660
(0.048) (0.032) (0.039) (0.047)
Notes: QRE – Quantile Regression Estimates. Models control for year of entry into retirement, current age, sex, region, and
family status. Respective cross sectional weights for 1995, 2005, and 2015 are used. In 1995, pension income is revalued from
DM in Euro using the official exchange rate of 1€ = 1.95583DM to ensure comparability of Mean and standard deviation
(SD) over the years. Standard errors in parentheses. Only pensioners whose age at entry into retirement is equal or higher
55 years are chosen. Cross sectional weights are used. Data: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1995, 2005, and 2015.
the median. This implies that the positive association of age at entry into retirement
and pension income is relevant for individuals at the lower parts of the distribution
of own pension income.14
Table 3.5 reports the regression estimates of age at entry into retirement on total
pension income. In contrast to Table 3.4, there are no statistical significant changes
in the association of retirement age and total pension income over the period under
review. This is true for OLS and QRE estimates which implies that the inclusion of
non-own pension income prevents a positive relationship of age at entry into retire-
ment and total pension income.
3.4 Pension Income and Employment
Within life cycle theory, the entry into retirement describes the point in time during
which individuals achieve a stable path of consumption over the life course. This
result is based on a trade-off between consumption which has to be financed mainly
out of employment and leisure. The idea is that individuals seek for continuity of
consumption levels over different ages (Deaton 2005). For Germany Beznoska and
Steiner (2012) show that there is, on average, no consumption drop when entering
retirement. But in contrast to basic theory, entering retirement is not associated with
the end of work. Additionally, an increasing part of the population of pensioners
in Germany exhibit an employment after entering retirement (Brenke 2011). In this
section, the relationship of pension income and employment during retirement is
analysed. In detail, this section gives answers of how total pre-tax pension income
at the very beginning of entering retirement affects the probability of employment
14. When evaluating the sign and the magnitude of the average effect of retirement age on pension
income over the period of observation, one can see that there is change in the development of the
distribution of own pension income with regard to age at retirement. Although not significant in
1995 the association was negatively related and shifts to a statistical significant positive relationship
in 2015.
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during retirement. Employment during retirement is represented by two different
variables, i.e. having a paid work in the last seven days and a dummy variable of the
current employment status.
A potential negative association of pension income and employment can be in-
terpreted as a sign of necessity of supplying labour during retirement, as pension
income is to low to finance individual consumption levels. According to classical
life cycle theory which assumes a clear cut between work and retirement, it is also
implied that a potential shift of entry into retirement, i.e. a higher age at retirement,
is more reasonable. On the other hand, an independent relationship or even positive
association of pension income and employment during retirement gives support for
the theory that employment during retirement is a preference of will rather than a
necessity. As the analysis covers average effects, potential individual needs of em-
ployment during retirement are only relevant if those needs are important for a larger
part of the underlying population of pensioners.
The model explains the employment status in 2015 by total monthly pension in-
come at the beginning of entering retirement. The total pension income includes
pension income from own and non-own source from 2000 up to 2014. Therefore, the
model controls directly for a potential endogeneity bias from simultaneous causal-
ity, i.e. an employment can increase the amount of pension income. See for example
recent changeswithin the German Pension Fund (Bundesgesetzblatt 2016). The vari-
able of interest, the total pension income, is logarithmised. In addition, themodel adds
respective year dummies to account for the nominal property of the pension income
variable (Wooldridge 2015).15 Furthermore, further specifications of the model are
added to control for the age of the pensioner, the age at retirement, the region (East
or West Germany), the sex, and the family status of the pensioner. In a second step,
logarithmised pension income is interacted with sex, region, a dummy indicating
if the pensioner has an invalidity status, and pension income quartiles. These sen-
sitivity checks allow flexibility with regard to the determination of the influence of
pension income on employment probability. Results can be found in Table 3.7.
The model is estimated via logistic link function which insures that predictions
of employment probability are always between zero and one. By using the logistic
function, the cumulative density function is strictly increasing (Wooldridge 2015),
which means that the sign of reported coefficients are in line with the direction of
underlying partial effects (Wooldridge 2015).
Table 3.6 reports the regression results using the logistic function for two dif-
ferent proxies of employment during retirement. The first three columns, (1)-(3),
15. Assuming that inflation is constant over respective subpopulations in different regions in Ger-
many, the addition of an intercept for each year of entry into retirement (except for the base category)
absorbs the price level of the respective year when the variable of interest is logarithmised.
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Table 3.6: Total Pension Income (Pre-Tax) and Employment During Retirement –
Logit
Dependent Variable
Paid Work Last 7 Days Current Employment Yes/No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(pension income) -0.013 -0.057 -0.179 0.025 -0.018 -0.168
(0.131) (0.132) (0.147) (0.142) (0.143) (0.153)
Age at Entry into Retirement -0.237 -0.124 -0.272 -0.197
(0.336) (0.356) (0.343) (0.371)
Age 0.257 0.146 0.264 0.178




East Germany -0.005 -0.261
(0.328) (0.364)
Family Status








Year of Entry into Retirement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Constant ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Log-likelihood value -205 -202 -192 -189 -185 -174
McFadden’s 𝑅2 0.066 0.070 0.096 0.056 0.060 0.097
Percentage correctly classified 84 84 84 84 84 84
n 500 494 487 454 447 440
Notes: Total log(pension income) at the beginning of entry into retirement is used. Only pensioners are chosen who exhibit
an age at entry into retirement equal or higher than 55 years and whose begin of retirement is not later than year 2000.
Estimated via logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Dummy of current employment status is constructed
out of raw ordinal employment status. Number of individuals 𝑛 is equal to the number of observations. The value of
Log-liklehood is rounded to full integer. Data: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 2000-2015.
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Table 3.7: Sensitivity Checks of Total Pension Income (Pre-Tax) and Employment
During Retirement – Logit
Dependent Variable
Paid Work Last 7 Days Current Employment Yes/No
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Log(pension income) -0.214 -0.233 -0.155 0.221 -0.165 -0.231 -0.108 0.173
(0.193) (0.156) (0.261) (0.413) (0.197) (0.161) (0.252) (0.430)
Interaction Terms
Female*Log(pension income) 0.079 -0.006
(0.286) (0.294)
East Germany*Log(pension income) 0.447 0.669
(0.381) (0.448)
No Invalidity*Log(pension income) -0.036 -0.086
(0.298) (0.298)
Pension Income Quartile
2*Log(pension income) -2.464 -1.553
(1.599) (1.587)
3*Log(pension income) -1.803 -1.267
(1.805) (2.019)
4*Log(pension income) -0.858 -0.383
(0.990) (1.187)
Year of Entry into Retirement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Control Variables ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Log-likelihood value -192 -192 -192 -188 -174 -173 -173 -172
McFadden’s 𝑅2 0.096 0.099 0.095 0.116 0.097 0.103 0.098 0.110
Percentage correctly specified 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
n 487 487 483 487 440 440 437 440
Notes: Total log(pension income) at the beginning of entry into retirement is used. Only pensioners are chosen who exhibit
an age at entry into retirement equal or higher than 55 years and whose begin of retirement is not later than year 2000.
Estimated via logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Dummy of current employment status is constructed
out of raw ordinal employment status. Number of individuals 𝑛 is equal to the number of observations. The value of
Log-liklehood is rounded to full integer. Data: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 2000-2015.
report regression results using the proxy of paid work in the last seven days. The last
three columns, (4)-(6), display the results using a dummy of current employment sta-
tus. All models include a constant and intercepts for the respective year of entry into
retirement.
Evaluating all specifications, the coefficients of log(pension income) is not differ-
ent from zero using conventional levels of significance. As signs of coefficients are in
the majority negative, except for model (4), point estimates show a negative associa-
tion of pension income and employment probability which is also valid in terms of
partial effects. Nevertheless, effects are not statistical different from zero, implying
that the independent relationship of pension income and employment probability
during retirement cannot be rejected.
Table 3.7 uses interactions termswith log(pension income) to check the sensitivity
of achieved results. Similar to Table 3.6 results have been computed for both prox-
ies, paid work in the last seven days and current employment status. Models (7) and (11)
interact log(pension income) with sex to allow different coefficients for the variable
of interest, separated by sex. Models (8) and (12) combine log(pension income) with
a dummy indicating if the respective pensioner is located in East or West Germany.
Models (9) and (13) interact the logarithmised pension income with a dummy show-
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ing a potential invalidity status. In models (10) and (14) pension income quartiles
have been generated and interacted with log(pension income) to identify potential
differences of coefficients of log(pension income) over the distribution of pension
income.
All sensitivity checks show that log(pension income) in itself and the respective
interaction terms are not different from zero using conventional levels of signifi-
cance. Therefore, sensitivity checks confirm the independent relationship of pension
income and employment probability during retirement.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper the relationship of pension income, age at retirement, and employment
during retirement is analysed using univariate and multivariate procedures. Figure
3.4 visualises the interaction and shows the executed correlation-based analyses by
using arrows. The arrow marked with (1) refers to the analysis of pension income
by different ages of entry into retirement. Here, the focus lies on distributional dif-
ferences in the association of pension income and retirement age and changes over
time. The second arrow, (2), marks the model in section 3.4. The model tests the in-
fluence of pension income at the beginning of entry into retirement on employment
probability in 2015.
Figure 3.4: Pension Income, Employment, and Age at Retirement – Illustration
Employment
Pension Income Age at Retirement(1)
(2)
Notes: Trinity of age at retirement, pension income, and employment. In this paper, (1) gives descriptive evidence of the
association of age at retirement and pension income, (2) reports potential differences of employment behaviour during
retirement by pension income.
The univariate analyses show that average age of entry into retirement is increas-
ing which can be mainly attributed to increases of pension eligibility ages and the
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termination of respective types of pension within the German Pension Fund. After
quantifying the actual share of pensioners with an employment during retirement,
the univariate analysis shows that themajority of pensioners exhibit aminor employ-
ment. Moreover, men show significantly higher employment shares and pensioners
in West Germany exhibit higher shares of employment during retirement in com-
parison to pensioners from East Germany. Differences of employment probability
with regard to a potential invalidity status are not statistical significant. Descrip-
tive analysis of total pension income shows that overall inequality using different
measures is increasing within the period of analysis from 1995 to 2015. Separating
total pension income by own and non-own source, it is evident, that non-own pen-
sion income’s variation is increasing over time while inequality measures using own
pension income show no congruent results. This is interesting as the inclusion from
non-own pension income leads to a more equal distribution of the underlying pen-
sion income. The German Pension Fund is the major source regarding the share of
total pension income, but it’s influence is decreasing with time. However, the shares
of civil service pensions, occupational pensions and income from supplementary in-
surance for public sector employees increased within the period of analysis. As the
use of the German Pension Fund within the population is relatively stable over time,
it is obvious that the importance of the German Pension Fund is, in comparison to
other sources of pension income, decreasing. The analysis shows that the average
pension income from the German Pension Fund was increasing, but at the end of
the analysis decreases to its originally value. In contrast, civil service pensions and
occupational pensions are increasing within the same period.
The analysis of the association of age of entry into retirement and own pension
income shows that only recently a positive relationship of both variables can be de-
termined. That implies that higher age of entry into retirement is associated with
higher pension income. This conclusion can be not drawn for previous years for 1995
and 2005. Moreover, this new development is especially important for lower parts
of the distribution of pension income. In contrast, using total pension income which
includes pension income from own and non-own source, the positive association
of retirement age and pension income cannot be confirmed. As pension eligibility
ages are increasing (Bundesgesetzblatt 2007) and recent reforms (Bundesgesetzblatt
2016) try to increase the fraction of older people working, this new development can
be seen as an incentive for increasing labour force participation at higher ages. But
when incorporating pension income from non-own source, which is independent
of individual merit, this positive incentive cannot be achieved. As the inclusion of
non-own pension income leads to a more equal distribution of pension income and
is especially relevant for female pensioners with a non-continuous earnings history,
the pension system in Germany faces a trade-off which has to be analysed in subse-
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quent analyses.
Analysing the influence of pension income at the beginning of entry into retire-
ment on probability of employment during retirement using data of 2015, it shows
that pension income cannot predict the individual decision of labour force participa-
tion during retirement. Therefore, the decision of employment during retirement is
more related to an individual preference than a necessity, at least on an aggregated
level.
As taxation varies over sources, an analysis using after tax pension income is
desirable, but cannot be executed as after tax pension income is not available so far
within the SOEP data. In addition, it seems reasonable to include other forms of
income, i.e. transfer payments and capital income when analysing the influence of
income on employment probability during retirement. In this context, an analysis
on the aggregated household level could be done in further research.
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